Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

FirstMerit Bank sued CFE Group in federal court to enforce a promissory note and guaranties. The district court dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend. Rather than amend, FirstMerit filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). FirstMerit then filed a new complaint in an Illinois state court asserting the same claims. CFE moved to dismiss the new suit, arguing that the earlier federal dismissal meant that FirstMerit’s claims were barred by claim preclusion (res judicata). The state trial court denied the motion. CFE filed a new federal action, seeking to enjoin the state court under the relitigation exception to the federal Anti‐Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The district court refused, ruling that the dismissal of the first federal case was not a judgment on the merits and, therefore, did not preclude the state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CFE’s request for an injunction was also barred by the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, and finding the appeal frivolous, so that sanctions on CFE are appropriate. View "CFE Group, LLC v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Inmates, acting pro se, alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment by overcrowding and provision of inadequate mental-health services. The district court denied their “Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel” seeking to certify three classes: (1) “all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined in the [Wisconsin Department of Corrections],” (2) all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at [Waupun Correctional Institution],” and (3) all prisoners with a serious mental illness or disability “who are now or in the future will be confined at” Waupun. The courts then rejected their claim that they “should be appointed counsel to represent the certified classes … pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” The court stated that the pro se plaintiffs could not adequately represent a class and that Rule 23(g), “is only implicated when a class is first certified under Rule 23(a)(4).” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for leave to appeal. View "Howard v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

CEOC, the Chapter 11 debtor, owns and operates casinos. Caesars (CEC) is CEOC's principal owner. CEOC borrowed billions of dollars, issuing notes guaranteed by CEC. As CEOC’s financial position worsened, CEC tried to eliminate its guaranty obligations by selling assets of CEOC to other parties and terminating the guaranties. CEOC's creditors, who had received the guaranties, challenged CEC’s repudiation, seeking approximately $12 billion. CEOC, in its bankruptcy proceeding, asserted claims alleging that CEC caused CEOC to transfer valuable assets to CEC at less than fair value, leaving CEOC saddled with debt (fraudulent transfers) and that the guaranty suits will thwart CEOC’s multi‐billion‐dollar restructuring effort, which depends on a substantial contribution from CEC in settlement of CEOC’s claims, and will let the guaranty plaintiffs take precedence over other creditors. The bankruptcy judge, and a district judge refused CEOC's request to enjoin the guaranty suits until 60 days after a bankruptcy examiner completes his report. The bankruptcy judge’s exercise of jurisdiction over the other suits would have been constitutional, but he thought he lacked statutory authority to enter an injunction under 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the judges misinterpreted the statute and that issuance of a temporary injunction could facilitate a prompt wind‐up of the bankruptcy. View "Caesars Entm't Operating Co., Inc. v. BOKF, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell, physically a man, psychologically a woman, sought to compel her probation officers to alter conditions of her probation, by allowing her to reside with her family rather than in the men’s homeless shelter, allowing her to dress as a woman, and referring her to treatment programs for her gender dysphoria. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on grounds that she hadn’t complied with rules governing injunctive relief, that the requested injunctive relief was unrelated to the merits of her claims against prison doctors (the only claims that had survived screening of her complaint), and that she had failed to demonstrate either that she was likely to prevail on the underlying claims or would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. While the appeal was pending, Mitchell was returned to custody, after pleading guilty to theft, prostitution, and resisting an officer. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal of denial of an injunction as moot. Mitchell still has claims pending against the doctors, unaffected by the denial of the preliminary injunction, and should she be released from jail during the litigation and again placed on probation she can renew her objections to the terms of her probation. View "Mitchell v. Wall" on Justia Law

Lawyer Spicer represented plaintiff Egan in a case that alleged sex discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment. The complaint included allegations that Egan, at her deposition, emphatically denied. Spicer conceded that the allegations in the paragraph were false and claimed “proofreading error.” The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district judge imposed a $5,000 sanction on Spicer for “bad faith” misconduct/ The Seventh Circuit affirmed, calling Spicer’s excuses “pathetic” and noting that it took six months for Spicer to correct the complaint. View "Egan v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Alliance for Water Efficiency engaged Fryer to analyze how water agencies’ programs affect elasticity of water demand during droughts. Fryer prepared a draft report. Alliance was dissatisfied, and sued to prevent Fryer from publishing the report. The California Department of Water Resources, a project sponsor, wanted to present his findings under its auspices. After negotiations, Fryer promised to remove Alliance’s name from his report, issue it under California’s sponsorship, and provide his data to Alliance, which would issue a separate report. After a magistrate concluded that a binding settlement had been reached, acrimony resumed. Complete written agreement was never reached. Alliance protested when Fryer circulated a new draft report that identified, as providers of data and assistance, some organizations that had participated through a committee that Alliance had organized. Fryer claimed that the organizations wish to be identified and that a consultant is entitled to name sponsors and collaborators. The magistrate concluded that Fryer must remove any reference to entities that worked with him through or in connection with Alliance, unless those entities take the initiative to contact him and say that he can mention their names. Fryer challenged the order as a prior restraint, violating the First Amendment. Declining to address the constitutional issue, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction as going beyond what the parties agreed. View "Alliance for Water Efficiency v. Fryer" on Justia Law

Defendants are national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and operate as self‐regulatory organizations that regulate markets in conformance with securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a. Plaintiffs are securities firms and members of the defendant exchanges. They compete for customer order flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for particular stocks. Between at least January 2004 and June 2011, each defendant charged “payment for order flow” (PFOF) fees. Each defendant exchange imposes PFOF fees when a trade is made for a customer; however, these fees are not imposed for proprietary “house trades,” where a firm trades on its own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit, in which they sought to recover PFOF fees they claim were improperly charged. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC. View "Citadel Sec., LLC v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc." on Justia Law

Several multi-employer health and welfare funds filed this suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act seeking approximately $70,000 in alleged delinquent contributions. The assertedly delinquent employer, Con-Tech Carpentry, did not file an answer within the statutory period and was found in default. The district court subsequently entered a judgment in the funds’ favor and awarded damages. Con-Tech subsequently filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, which also invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The judge denied the Rule 60(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that because Con-Tech made a deliberate decision to disregard the pending suit, there was no reason for the district judge to excuse Con-Tech’s conduct in retrospect. View "Mid-Central Illinois Reg’l v. Con-Tech Carpentry, LLC" on Justia Law