Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Two individuals made false statements to a Village of Deerfield police officer, which resulted in Doe’s arrest. The Village prosecuted Doe for ordinance violations. Although the Village became aware of the falsity of the statements during the prosecution, it nevertheless proceeded and refused to dismiss the charges. The criminal case “resolved in [Doe’s] favor,” and he obtained an order expunging his related arrest and prosecution records. Doe asserts that his arrest and prosecution were conducted in retaliation for his previous lawsuit against a Deerfield police officer. Doe filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing Doe’s failure to comply with FRCP 10(a) requiring him to provide his true name in his complaint’s caption. The court denied Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously, finding Doe did not show exceptional circumstances. Doe argued that having to reveal his true identity would thwart the purpose of the expungement of his criminal records and would embarrass him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that an order denying leave to proceed anonymously falls within the collateral order doctrine and is immediately appealable, but Doe failed to show exceptional circumstances justifying anonymity. View "Doe v. Village of Deerfield" on Justia Law

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Chicago Officer Jung, patrolling with his partner, approached “Maxwell Street Hot Dog Stand” and saw a woman run into traffic waving her hands, her face covered in blood. She stated that her husband had struck her and pointed toward Hall, to identify her husband. Jung parked, and walked toward Hall. Hall did not comply with Jung’s commands to “stop, put his hands behind his back, calm down, [and] stop screaming.” Jones grabbed Hall. who attempted to twist away; his momentum caused him to fall. After he was in handcuffs, Hall continued to resist and again fell to the ground. Hall did not complain of pain or indicate that his arm was injured. Hours later at the police station, Hall complained of pain; he was taken to the hospital, where doctors discovered his arm was fractured. The entire arrest was captured on video. Hall pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, but filed suit, claiming excessive force, assault, and battery. During discovery, the magistrate set a deadline for Hall to disclose his expert witness (FRCP 26(a)(2)). Hall failed to provide the expert’s report and did not respond to Jung’s motion to strike. The magistrate barred Hall from presenting the expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in Jung’s favor, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings because Hall failed to provide transcripts memorializing proceedings regarding three rulings. Hall’s fourth challenge did not warrant reversal. View "Hall v. Jung" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Illinois enacted legislation requiring prior approval for reimbursement for more than four prescriptions for one Medicaid patient within a 30‐day period. 305 ILCS 5/5‐5.12(j). Ciarpaglini is an Illinois Medicaid recipient and suffers from chronic conditions, including bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Doctors have prescribed at least seven medications to manage these conditions. Ciarpaglini alleges that after the prior‐approval requirement took effect, he could not, at least at times, obtain medications he needed and that he has contemplated committing suicide, committing petty crimes so that he would be jailed, or checking himself into hospitals just to get medications. He challenged the requirement under federal Medicaid law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution. Illinois subsequently moved Ciarpaglini from the general fee‐for‐service Medicaid program to a new managed care program, under which the requirement does not apply. The district court dismissed the matter as moot. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding insufficient evidence to determine whether the claims were moot, given Ciarpaglini’s stated desire to move to another county and the lack of information about whether the change in his program was individual or part of a change in policy. View "Ciarpaglini v. Norwood" on Justia Law

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Magruder bought 940,000 shares of Bancorp through his Fidelity account, paying $9,298. Years later he asked Fidelity for a certificate showing his ownership. When Fidelity did not comply, Magruder initiated arbitration through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Magruder and Fidelity chose simplified arbitration, in which the arbitrator cannot award more than $50,000 in damages or order specific performance that would cost more than $50,000. Magruder had demanded $28,000 (actual plus punitive damages). The arbitrator directed Fidelity to deliver a stock certificate or explain why it could not do so. Fidelity explained that in 2005 the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, responsible for issuing Bancorp paper certificates, had placed a “global lock” on that activity as a result of Bancorp reporting that fraudulent shares bearing identification number 106 were flooding the market. In 2012 Bancorp offered to swap series 106 shares for new series 205 shares, but by then Bancorp had been delisted from stock exchanges and FINRA blocked the swaps. The arbitrator accepted this explanation. Magruder then filed suit. The district judge sided with Fidelity. The Seventh Circuit vacated for lack of jurisdiction. Even assuming that the parties are of diverse citizenship, the stakes cannot exceed $50,000, and the minimum under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) is $75,000. View "Magruder v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Illinois and the Board after the Board refused to put plaintiff's name on the ballot for a local government election in 2015. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that, in this case, all three requirements of claim preclusion are satisfied where the parties in the state and federal actions are the same, and the Circuit Court of Cook County's order dismissing plaintiff's petitions for judicial review are a final judgment on the merits. Nor is there any doubt that the state court was competent to resolve plaintiff's federal claims. Finally, both the state and federal actions are clearly predicated on the same set of operative facts and are therefore the same cause of action under Illinois law; the state court proceedings to which plaintiff voluntarily submitted were constitutionally adequate; and plaintiff had a fair opportunity to appeal the state court's decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, and the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause were met. View "Rose v. Board of Election Commissioner" on Justia Law

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Hassebrock hired the Bernhoft Law Firm in 2005 to help with legal problems, including a federal criminal tax investigation, a civil case for investment losses, and a claim against Hassebrock’s previous lawyers for fees withheld from a settlement. Hassebrock was ultimately found guilty, sentenced to 36 months in prison, and ordered to pay a fine and almost $1 million in restitution. In 2008, Hassebrock fired the Bernhoft firm. In a malpractice suit against the Bernhoft attorneys and accountants, Hassebrock waited until after discovery closed to file an expert-witness disclosure, then belatedly moved for an extension. The court denied the motion and disallowed the expert, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have applied the disclosure deadline specified in FRCP 26(a)(2)(D) rather than the discovery deadline set by court order. The disclosure deadline specified in Rule 26(a)(2)(D) is just a default deadline; the court’s scheduling order controls. It was well within the judge’s discretion to reject the excuses offered by Hassebrock to explain the tardy disclosure. Because expert testimony is necessary to prove professional malpractice, summary judgment was proper as to all defendants. View "Hassebrock v. Bernhoft" on Justia Law

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The EEOC investigated Aerotek staffing agency for compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and served a subpoena requesting information: about all persons that Aerotek referred from its Illinois facilities for employment by clients; regarding all job requisition requests by Aerotek clients nationwide; about persons hired into internal positions at Aerotek’s Illinois facilities; and documents related to Aerotek’s analysis of its workforce. Aerotek partially complied. EEOC’s initial review revealed hundreds of discriminatory job requests by clients at 62 of Aerotek’s 286 facilities. EEOC issued another request for information about individuals assigned to clients including names, dates of birth, contact information and the names of the clients to whom they were assigned. Aerotek again partially complied, excluding client names and the names and contact information for workers hired by those clients. Instead, Aerotek created a code system and supplied numerical identifiers for clients and workers. Aerotek refused to produce unredacted information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order to enforce the subpoenas. The inquiry is within the authority of the EEOC and the information sought is clearly relevant to its investigation of age-related discrimination. Aerotek did not claim that the request is too indefinite; production of this information would not impose an unreasonable or undue burden. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aerotek, Inc." on Justia Law

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Debtor, a construction business, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which was converted to chapter 7. A The Bank holds a valid, first-priority security interest in all of the Debtor’s assets, including accounts receivable. The Trustee discovered that checks payable to the Debtor had been negotiated and deposited into the personal account of Hartford, the father of Debtor’s principal, totalling $36,389.89. Before initiating adversary litigation, the Trustee engaged in settlement talks with Hartford, who agreed to pay $36,389.89 to the estate and release the estate from all claims involving the transfers. While the Trustee was pursuing settlement., the Bank obtained an order modifying the automatic stay to allow it to exercise its state law remedies with respect to collateral, then filed suit to recover from Hartford the value of the checks. A state court entered judgment in favor of the Bank. The next day, the Trustee successfully moved for approval of the Hartford settlement. The Bank objected. The bankruptcy court rejected the Bank’s argument that the order granting relief from the automatic stay allowed it to pursue the fraudulent transfer action in state court. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the bankruptcy court entered no final judgment or appealable order. View "Schaumburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Alsterda" on Justia Law

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A 2012 car accident rendered Hernandez a quadriplegic. He was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence involving an accident causing death. Hernandez was taken into custody while he was hospitalized for treatment of pressure wounds. Under Cook County Sheriff’s Office policy, officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized pre‐trial detainee to his hospital bed. Hernandez was shackled and sent to Cook County Jail, then immediately transferred to Stroger Hospital, where he remained from March 14 to April 18, 2013; the shackling continued. Hernandez claims that doctors had instructed him to move every two hours to help his sores heal, and that the shackling stunted his recovery. Hernandez complained orally. The grievance process, described in a handbook that Hernandez did not receive, states that an inmate must file a written grievance within 15 days of the alleged incident. Hernandez never filed a written grievance. After discharge from Stroger, he entered the jail general population. Unable to write, he had other inmates write and file grievances, including an August 3, 2013, grievance stating that nursing staff refused to help him move between his chair and his bed. Hernandez received a response on September 11 and appealed. On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court stated that Hernandez’s oral complaints constituted a proper grievance but held that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that Hernandez did exhaust his remedies. View "Hernandez v. Dart" on Justia Law

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Noboa, while living in Illinois, booked a trip to Mexico by using the Orbitz website. In the lobby of the Barcelo hotel, she booked an eco-tour, operated by Rancho. During the tour, the all-terrain vehicle in which Noboa was riding overturned. She died as a result of her injuries. The district court dismissed her estate's suit against Barcelo and Rancho, finding neither company subject to jurisdiction in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Noboa's death was connected to Illinois through a causal chain that began with her booking the trip while in Illinois. View "Noboa v. Barcelo Corp. Empresaria, SA" on Justia Law