Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Bank of America, N.A. v. Martinson
The bank filed a residential mortgage foreclosure suit in Wisconsin state court. The owners, citizens of Minnesota, removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. The district court entered a judgment of foreclosure, ordered the property sold at a sheriff’s auction after the time for redemption expired, and held that the bank would not be entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment. The owners appealed. In the meantime, the Seventh Circuit held (Townsend decision) that a judgment of foreclosure applying Illinois law was not a final, appealable judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1291, then dismissed the Wisconsin foreclosure appeal. The court noted that both judgments: determined the amount owed as of the judgment date; allowed the bank to seek additional costs before the sale; ordered a sale, but only after passage of the redemption period under state law; ordered the sheriff to report the sale for court confirmation; and ordered that, upon confirmation, the auction purchaser would be entitled to possession of the property. Unlike in Townsend, the Wisconsin judgment precludes any deficiency judgment, so that the bank’s recovery is limited to the sale proceeds. Given a post‐judgment state law right of redemption and a sale that requires further court approval before taking effect, the fact that Wisconsin courts treat a foreclosure judgment ordering a sale as final and appealable does not override the federal standard of finality. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Martinson" on Justia Law
RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc.
ORIX made a $41 million loan for the purchase of a North Carolina commercial building. Inheritance (a subsidiary of Detroit’s civil service retirement plans) guaranteed the loan. The building’s sole tenant did not renew its lease. No new tenant was willing to pay as much. ORIX accelerated the loan and demanded that Inheritance assume the outstanding debt. Inheritance sought a declaratory judgment. ORIX, which has citizenship in Delaware and Texas, removed the case to federal court, based on diversity of citizenship. The district court ordered Inheritance to pay $30 million. The Seventh Circuit vacated for lack of jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra, that when a trustee sues (or is sued), the trustee’s citizenship matters for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. When the beneficiary is a party, or a trust litigates in its own name, it takes the citizenship of each of its members. It does not matter that Detroit’s pension funds call some people “members” and others (often the same people at different times) “beneficiaries.” People in their active work lives, retirees, and family members entitled to payments on their accounts, all have financial interests in the pension trusts, raising “grave doubt about the existence of complete diversity of citizenship.” If ORIX does not seek an adjudication of the domicile of 59 persons who, in 2013, lived in Texas or Delaware, the district court must remand to state court. View "RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc." on Justia Law
Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC
In 2013, Panther, a marketing and brand management company, signed a contract with IndyCar, to purchase access to coveted space in the “Fan Village” at IndyCar racing events, an area where sponsors set up displays to attract fans. The Army National Guard had been Panther’s team sponsor, 2008-2013. After it signed the 2013 contract, Panther learned that another team, RLL, intended to provide the Guard with Fan Village space. Believing that RLL had conspired with IndyCar and the Docupak agency to persuade the Guard to sponsor RLL instead of Panther, Panther brought suit in state court against RLL, Docupak, IndyCar, and active‐duty Guard member Metzler, who acted as the liaison between the Guard and Panther. The defendants removed the case to federal court, where the United States was substituted as a party for Metzler, 28 U.S.C. 2679(d); Panther filed an amended complaint that did not name either Metzler or the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint against RLL, IndyCar, and Docupak and found the United States’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction moot. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; the basis for federal jurisdiction disappeared when Panther amended its complaint. View "Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC" on Justia Law
Rocha v. Rudd
In 2005, FedEx delivery drivers, represented by Defendants (lawyers), filed suit, alleging that FedEx had misclassified them as independent contractors, citing the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1. In 2011, after the court granted partial summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs were IWPCA employees, Rocha joined the action. His agreement with Defendants limited the scope of representation because he was pursuing other claims against FedEx on behalf of his company with separate representation by Johnson (his spouse). The agreement affirmed Rocha’s right to accept or reject any settlement. In 2012, the parties notified the court of a tentative settlement. Defendants told Rocha and Johnson that FedEx required “a release of all claims against FedEx both individually and on behalf of any associated corporation,” but reasserted Rocha’s right to not join the settlement. After the court approved the settlement, it allowed Defendants to withdraw as Rocha's counsel, dismissed the case with prejudice for all named plaintiffs except Rocha, and dismissed Rocha's case without prejudice. Rocha was not required to pay attorney’s fees or expenses. The district court later dismissed Rocha’s separate suit. Before filing his state‐court complaint (still pending), Rocha sued Defendants, claiming breach of contract, malpractice, fraud, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding no plausible grounds for relief. View "Rocha v. Rudd" on Justia Law
Trade Well Int’l v. United Central Bank
After the Bank foreclosed on the hotel housing Trade Well’s leased furnishings and started searching for buyers, Trade Well demanded the return of its property. The Bank refused. Trade Well sued. While the replevin action was pending, Trade Well’s attorney, Salem, filed a “Notice of Lien” on the hotel with the Sauk County Register of Deeds. Salem refused to withdraw the notice. The court held Salem in contempt of court and revoked his pro hac vice admission as a sanction, referred him for disciplinary action, and allowed the Bank to file a counterclaim, alleging slander of title and seeking damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and a declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the contempt order and imposition of sanctions. Meanwhile, Trade Well had not secured alternative representation and, due to its corporate status, was unable to appear without counsel. The district court dismissed Trade Well’s claims with prejudice and entered a default judgment against Trade Well on the Bank’s counterclaim. With Salem back as its representative, Trade Well moved to vacate the default judgments.The district court expressed skepticism about Trade Well’s efforts to find alternate counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to vacate, noting Trade Well’s delay in bringing the motion and the district court’s credibility determinations. View "Trade Well Int'l v. United Central Bank" on Justia Law
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC
The Blatt firm filed a collection lawsuit against Oliva in the first municipal district of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Oliva resided in Cook County. Under the Seventh Circuit’s 1996 “Newsom” decision, interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, debt collectors were allowed to file suit in any of Cook County’s municipal districts if the debtor resided in Cook County or signed the underlying contract there. While the Oliva suit was pending, the Seventh Circuit overruled Newsom, with retroactive effect (Suesz, 2014). One week later, Blatt voluntarily dismissed the suit. Oliva sued Blatt for violating the FDCPA’s venue provision as newly interpreted by Suesz. The district court granted Blatt summary judgment, finding that it relied on Newsom in good faith and was immune from liability under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense, 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c), which precludes liability for unintentional violations resulting from a good‐faith mistake. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the defense should not apply because the firm’s violation resulted from its mistaken interpretation of the law. In relying on Newsom, the firm simply followed the circuit's controlling law; its failure to foresee the retroactive change of law was not a mistaken legal interpretation, but an unintentional bona fide error View "Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC" on Justia Law
In re: Sobczak-Slomczewski
Dells Hospitality borrowed $12,600,000 to purchase the Lake Delton Hilton Garden Inn. Dells’ owner and president, Sobsczak-Slomczewski, agreed to indemnify the lender against all losses.. Dells defaulted. The lender filed a foreclosure action. Sobsczak‐Slomczewski directed the hotel’s independent management company to transfer $677,000 to a corporate entity he owned. After a foreclosure sale, the lender amended the complaint to add claims for theft and conversion. The district court found that Sobsczak-Slomczewski had converted and embezzled the $677,000. Sobsczak‐Slomczewski then petitioned for bankruptcy. The lender filed an adversary proceeding seeking to have the $677,000 debt found non‐dischargeable. The bankruptcy court granted the lender summary judgment, citing 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) and (a)(6). The district court dismissed Sobsczak‐Slomczewski’s appeal, filed 15 days after the bankruptcy court order, holding that Rule 8002(a)’s 14‐day deadline was jurisdictional. Rejecting Sobsczak‐Slomczewski’s assertion that he did not receive notice until the day of the deadline, the court explained that there are no equitable exceptions to a mandatory jurisdictional rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after considering recent Supreme Court pronouncements The court joined other circuits in holding that the 14‐day deadline to file a notice of appeal is rooted in the jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 158, which expressly includes a timeliness condition. Sobsczak‐Slomczewski did not timely seek additional time from the bankruptcy court. View "In re: Sobczak-Slomczewski" on Justia Law
Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co.
The Seventh Circuit held, in Irish v. BNSF (2012), that the plaintiffs, injured by a 2007 flood in Bagley, Wisconsin, had forfeited an argument concerning the scope of Wis. Stat. 88.87. The statute concerns liability for negligent design and maintenance of a railroad grade that causes an obstruction to a waterway or drainage course. Plaintiffs’ counsel assembled a new group of plaintiffs and refiled the same litigation in Arkansas state court to pursue that argument. The new suit was removed and transferred to the Western District of Wisconsin, which dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The defendant asked the court to sanction plaintiffs’ counsel under FRCP 11 or 28 U.S.C. 1927 for pursuing frivolous claims and engaging in abusive litigation tactics. The court denied that request, reasoning that although the claims were all but foreclosed by the decision in Irish, they were not frivolous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but reversed the denial of sanctions. The record indicated that counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings by filing suit in Arkansas, which had no connection to the case. Pursuant to section 1927, the defendant is entitled to its fees and costs for removing the case and successfully seeking its transfer. View "Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law
Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Deposit Co.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulates contracts concerning commodities for future delivery when offered on margin or another form of leverage, 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D), with an exception for contracts that “results in actual delivery within 28 days or such other longer period as the Commission may determine by rule or regulation based upon the typical commercial practice in cash or spot markets for the commodity involved”. The CFTC began investigating whether Monex's precious-metals business was within this exception. Monex refused to comply with a subpoena, arguing that since 1987, when it adopted its current business model, the CFTC has deemed its business to be in compliance with all federal rules and that, because it satisfies the exception, the Commission lacked authority even to investigate. The district court enforced the subpoena. Monex turned over the documents. Monex appealed, seeking their return and an injunction to prevent the CFTC from using them in any enforcement proceeding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Monex was impermissibly using its opposition to the subpoena to get a judicial decision on the merits of its statutory argument, before the CFTC makes a substantive decision. The propriety of an agency’s action is reviewed after the final administrative decision. Contesting the agency’s jurisdiction does not change the rules for determining when a subpoena must be enforced. View "Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex Deposit Co." on Justia Law
Martinez v. City of Chicago
As part of a malicious prosecution lawsuit against Chicago, the plaintiffs sought by subpoena to discover documents from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. Lawyers representing the Office, including McClellan, stated that the files no longer existed. A year later, the Presiding Judge ordered the Office to allow the plaintiffs’ lawyers to inspect 181 boxes of documents stored in a warehouse. The documents at issue were quickly found. Plaintiffs moved to sanction McClellan and others for obstructing discovery. After the tort suit ended in the plaintiffs’ acceptance of an offer of judgment, the judge granted the motion and ordered McClellan and the State’s Attorney’s Office to pay fees and costs ($35,522.94) that their misconduct had imposed on the plaintiffs, based on a finding of attorney misconduct under 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the inherent authority of a federal court to punish attorney misconduct in a case before it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the criticisms of McClellan as “apt and accurate” and, because the sanction had been paid, holding that a district court order imposing a sanction on a lawyer for misconduct in a case before the court can be appealed even if the sanction lacks a monetary component. View "Martinez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law