Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law

Appellants claim that some aluminum futures traders, having acquired some operators of aluminum warehouses, manipulated a price component for aluminum in the Detroit metro area. The district court dismissed the complaints and denied two groups of plaintiffs leave to amend, while permitting a third group to amend their complaint. The district court then concluded that appellants lacked antitrust standing because they did not demonstrate that they suffered antitrust injury or that they were efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, and that they would be unable to show that they were efficient enforcers through repleading. The district court also determined that appellants failed to state a claim under various state consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws. The court held that appellants lack antitrust standing on the ground that they did not (and could not) suffer antitrust injury. The court also held that their state law claims were inadequately pleaded. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Defendants, the Donziger Firm and others, appealed the district court's grant of certain relief against them in favor of Chevron, in connection with an $8.646 billion judgment obtained against Chevron in Ecuador by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs represented by the Donziger Firm. The judgment award was for environmental damage in connection with the Texaco oil exploration activities in Ecuador from the 1960s-1990s. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's judgment, arguing principally that the action should have been dismissed on the ground that Chevron lacks Article III standing, and/or that the judgment should be reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that it violates principles of international comity and judicial estoppel, exceeds any legal authorization for equitable relief, and was entered without personal jurisdiction over defendants other than Donziger and his Firm. The court found no basis for dismissal or reversal in the absence of challenges to the district court's factual findings; considering the express disclaimers by the Ecuadorian appellate courts of their own jurisdiction to "hear and resolve" the above charges of corruption, "preserving the parties' rights" to pursue those charges in actions in the United States; and considering the district court's confinement of its injunction to a grant of in personam relief against the three defendants-appellants without disturbing the Ecuadorian judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

Laroe, a real estate development company, appealed the denial of its motion to intervene under FRCP 24 in pending litigation in which a now-deceased land developer filed suit against the Town of Chester, alleging a regulatory taking. The court vacated and remanded because the court does not require proposed intervenors in this circumstance to show that they independently have standing. Because neither a proposed intervenor’s lack of Article III standing nor its failure to state an independent claim necessarily renders a motion to intervene futile, the district court should have instead focused its analysis on the requirements of Rule 24. Because the factual record before the court is insufficiently developed at this stage to allow the court to resolve the issues, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Laroe satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. View "Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

OneWest commenced a foreclosure action against defendant. The district court denied defendant's cross-motion to dismiss and granted OneWest's motion for summary judgment. The district court held in part that a national bank such as OneWest is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located - not also of the state of its principal place of business - and that OneWest’s main office is indisputably in California. The court agreed with the district court and joined its sister circuits in holding that, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located. The court also concluded that OneWest had standing to foreclose based on LSA's assignment of all of its rights that FDIC previously had to defendant's loan as the conservator and receiver of IndyMac Federal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pro se filed suit alleging claims against defendants which arise out of events spanning more than a decade and principally concern the Village’s allegedly wrongful interference with his business interests and its maintenance of a police force that plaintiff believes to be unauthorized by law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court noted that plaintiff's principal brief fails to address adequately the merits of most - arguably all - of the claims dismissed by the district court where plaintiff's filing largely fails to set out identifiable arguments in his principal belief; to the extent that plaintiff has adequately argued the merits of any claims on appeal, those arguments must be rejected; for a variety of reasons, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and the court likewise was unconvinced by plaintiff's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue" on Justia Law

Tarala, a Colorado corporation that is the principal supplier of clothing and military equipment to Nepal, and Wu Lixiang, the director of the company that helps Tarala coordinate the logistics of its international transactions, appealed the default judgment and dismissal of their complaint against Rastra Bank and the Department. The court agreed with the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because both Rastra Bank and the Department, as political subdivisions or agencies of Nepal, are immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. Therefore, the court need not address the issue of service. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Chettri v. Nepal Rastra Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged an administrative summons issued by the IRS after it issued an approximately $25 million penalty against petitioner and his company. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied petitioner's request for jurisdictional discovery. The court agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to allow suits to quash summonses that are “issued in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment,” and that the challenged summons was issued in aid of collection. Moreover, the IRS had authority to issue the summons, as there was not an outstanding criminal referral at the time the summons was issued. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery because petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the requested discovery is likely to produce the facts needed to establish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Haber v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter was murdered, plaintiff filed suit alleging claims related to her daughter's death. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, the district court issued judgment for defendants, and plaintiff did not seek to amend the notice of appeal. The court held that, in the absence of prejudice to an appellee, the court read a pro se appellant’s appeal from an order closing the case as constituting an appeal from all prior orders. In an accompanying summary order, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Elliot v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Ritchie filed suit against GECC for civil conspiracy to commit fraud, for aiding and abetting fraud, and for negligence in connection with Thomas Petters' Ponzi scheme. The district court granted GECC's motion to dismiss based on Ritchie's lack of standing. The district court reasoned that Ritchie lacked standing to bring the conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims because the causes of action were the exclusive property of the Petters Estate and, in the alternative, that Ritchie failed to state a claim because Ritchie failed to plead proximate cause for the aiding and abetting claim and failed to plead an “overt act” for the civil conspiracy claim. The court concluded that Ritchie lacks standing to assert its claims because Ritchie has not alleged a particularized injury. The court adopted the district court's opinion and order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt. v. GECC" on Justia Law