Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Lockheed and others for injuries suffered by her father as a result of asbestos exposure sustained by him during his work as an Air Force mechanic in locations in Europe and around the United States, but not in Connecticut. Lockheed, a major aerospace company with a worldwide presence, is both incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Maryland. The district court dismissed the suit against Lockheed. The court agreed with the district court that the district court did not have general jurisdiction over Lockheed. By applying the due process principles of Daimler AG v. Bauman, and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the court concluded that Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut, while perhaps “continuous and systematic,” fall well below the high level needed to place the corporation “essentially at home” in the state. Further, upon the court's examination of Connecticut law, the court concluded that by registering to transact business and appointing an agent under the Connecticut statutes - which do not speak clearly on this point - Lockheed did not consent to the state courts’ exercise of general jurisdiction over it. The court noted that a more sweeping interpretation would raise constitutional concerns prudently avoided absent a clearer statement by the state legislature or the Connecticut Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, OAG, alleging discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. OAG moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter, arguing that plaintiff was employed at a policymaking level and thus was subject to the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16a, 2000e-16b, and 2000e-16c. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that GERA was inapplicable in this case. The court concluded that the district court's denial of OAG's motion to dismiss under GERA does not qualify as an immediately appealable order under that doctrine. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Fischer v. New York State Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that SK Fund, a sovereign wealth fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, misrepresented the value of certain notes issued by non‐party BTA, a Kazakhstani corporation majority‐owned by SK Fund, in connection with a 2010 restructuring of BTA Bank’s debt. At issue on appeal, and one of first impression, is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States. The court agreed with the district court that SK Fund is not immune from suit under the FSIA because plaintiffs’ claims are “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States” that “cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.” The court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider SK Fund’s argument that the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it consistent with due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from rival claims to the “Stolichnaya” trademarks. FTE and Cristall alleged that defendants unlawfully misappropriated and commercially exploited the Stolichnaya trademarks related to the sale of vodka and other spirits in the United States. Control over the marks in the United States is currently exercised by defendants as successors in interest to a Soviet state enterprise. In a prior suit, FTE brought claims against SPI under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and the court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the Russian Federation itself retained too great an interest in the marks for FTE to qualify as an "assign" with standing to sue. FTE's non-section 32(1) claims were either dismissed or dropped during the course of that litigation. At issue principally in this appeal is whether FTE, an agency of the Russian Federation, has been endowed by that government with rights and powers that give it standing to pursue claims under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining whether FTE’s asserted basis for standing was valid under Russian law. However, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed all of FTE's other claims as barred by both res judicata and laches. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l B.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order staying his action for, inter alia, injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that retail property owned by defendants does not comply with the ADA's accessibility requirements. The court held that the district court's stay order is neither “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, nor an appealable collateral order, nor a clear abuse of discretion warranting mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction. View "Range v. 480-486 Broadway, LLC" on Justia Law

Counsel for plaintiff signed a stipulation dismissing most of plaintiff's claims against defendant. Plaintiff then filed a pro se motion and attached a letter asking the district court to reopen his case because his attorney had filed the stipulation without his knowledge or consent. The district court denied the motion, relying principally on the proposition that each party is deemed bound by the acts of his or her lawyer‐agent under our system of representative litigation. The court concluded that, in this case, plaintiff's motion raised a factual dispute concerning his attorney’s authority to stipulate to a dismissal of his claims and it was necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to address this dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in district court seeking correction of his military records, a retroactive promotion, and back pay. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Secretary moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and plaintiff cross-appealed to correct his brief on appeal. The court concluded that, because plaintiff's counsel did not timely complete the electronic filing process that was established by the Eastern District’s Local Rules, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss, denied as moot the cross-motion, and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Franklin v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Department and others. While the litigation was pending, plaintiff was represented by non-party appellees, whose motion is before the court. Appellees withdrew their representation and were replaced. The case was ultimately settled. Before the parties announced their intention to settle, appellees sought an order directing plaintiff to pay their unpaid attorney’s fees out of the proceeds of the settlement. The district court later entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiff. On February 12, 2014, the district court issued a decision and order on motions for attorneys' fees. On May 21, 2014, the district court filed a decision and order determining that replacement counsel was entitled to attorney fees and ordered payment to her. On June 22, 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on February 12, 2014, and May 21, 2015. On July 14, 2015, appellees filed a motion requesting dismissal of plaintiff's appeal and seeking sanctions. The court denied the motion to dismiss as untimely an appeal from the district court's order and denied the motion for sanctions. View "Cole-Hoover v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of defendant, filed suit alleging three claims under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appealed. The court certified the following question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the exemption of post-garnishment residual wages from further execution: Do Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐361a and 52‐367b, read together, exempt post‐garnishment residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq.? View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law