Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order staying his action for, inter alia, injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that retail property owned by defendants does not comply with the ADA's accessibility requirements. The court held that the district court's stay order is neither “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, nor an appealable collateral order, nor a clear abuse of discretion warranting mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction. View "Range v. 480-486 Broadway, LLC" on Justia Law

Counsel for plaintiff signed a stipulation dismissing most of plaintiff's claims against defendant. Plaintiff then filed a pro se motion and attached a letter asking the district court to reopen his case because his attorney had filed the stipulation without his knowledge or consent. The district court denied the motion, relying principally on the proposition that each party is deemed bound by the acts of his or her lawyer‐agent under our system of representative litigation. The court concluded that, in this case, plaintiff's motion raised a factual dispute concerning his attorney’s authority to stipulate to a dismissal of his claims and it was necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to address this dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in district court seeking correction of his military records, a retroactive promotion, and back pay. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Secretary moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and plaintiff cross-appealed to correct his brief on appeal. The court concluded that, because plaintiff's counsel did not timely complete the electronic filing process that was established by the Eastern District’s Local Rules, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss, denied as moot the cross-motion, and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Franklin v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Department and others. While the litigation was pending, plaintiff was represented by non-party appellees, whose motion is before the court. Appellees withdrew their representation and were replaced. The case was ultimately settled. Before the parties announced their intention to settle, appellees sought an order directing plaintiff to pay their unpaid attorney’s fees out of the proceeds of the settlement. The district court later entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiff. On February 12, 2014, the district court issued a decision and order on motions for attorneys' fees. On May 21, 2014, the district court filed a decision and order determining that replacement counsel was entitled to attorney fees and ordered payment to her. On June 22, 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on February 12, 2014, and May 21, 2015. On July 14, 2015, appellees filed a motion requesting dismissal of plaintiff's appeal and seeking sanctions. The court denied the motion to dismiss as untimely an appeal from the district court's order and denied the motion for sanctions. View "Cole-Hoover v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of defendant, filed suit alleging three claims under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appealed. The court certified the following question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the exemption of post-garnishment residual wages from further execution: Do Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐361a and 52‐367b, read together, exempt post‐garnishment residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq.? View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law