Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the award of costs against it in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, case, arguing that the district court improperly ordered it to pay defendants the costs of deposition transcripts under FRCP 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 190. Because "costs" and "expenses" have distinct meanings under Rule 54(d), section 1920, and the FCA, the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(4) does not preclude the award of the costs for deposition transcripts. Plaintiff forfeited its argument under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and, even if appropriately presented, the argument has no merit where the court has stated clearly that section 1920 permits the taxation of deposition expenses, when necessarily incurred for use of the deposition in the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Associates Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging common-law fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that she never agreed to the mortgage loan at issue. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting an attorney's testimony under FRE 406 regarding the fact that he had met with plaintiff and had not asked her to sign blank sheets of paper; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan documents at issue under FRE 901(a) for authenticated records and the court rejected plaintiff's argument that admission of the photocopies violated the best evidence rule where the original documents had been lost; plaintiff's FRCP 50 argument fails where the evidence was more than adequate to warrant the jury in finding for defendants' on the case's central issue; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59 motion for a new trial where nothing in the record warranted upsetting the verdict. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Hapag‐Lloyd filed an Interpleader Complaint and moved ex parte for an anti‐suit injunction under 28 U.S.C. 2361. The district court granted the motion and enjoined named defendants. The court concluded that adjudication of Hapag‐Lloyd’s obligation to pay for the fuel bunkers at issue involves inextricably intertwined claims, and interpleader jurisdiction is proper under the broad and remedial nature of 28 U.S.C. 1335. The court also concluded that by initiating an interpleader concerning certain in rem claims and posting adequate security for those claims, Hapag‐Lloyd consented to the district court’s jurisdiction over its interests, which is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. However, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order that eliminates or retains the foreign scope of the injunction, with specific determinations applying the test in China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong. View "Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. Oil Trading LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former law firm and five of its partners, alleging that he had been forced to resign after blowing the whistle on what he considered to be the firm’s unethical litigation conduct. The parties eventually settled the suit and then sought an order directing the clerk of the court to close the file while leaving it permanently sealed. The district court denied the parties' request. The court held that pleadings, even in settled cases, are judicial records subject to a presumption of public access. The court concluded that the district court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the competing interests at stake and the district court's conclusions were amply supported. Finally, the court concluded that sealing of the complaint is not justified in order to protect “confidential client information.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP" on Justia Law

This case stems from a feud over local governance matters. The threshold issue is whether the court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order passing on the merits of defendants’ special motions to strike under Vermont’s anti‐SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. 1041. The court concluded that interlocutory appeals of such orders do not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and accordingly dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Ernst v. Carrigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lockheed and others for injuries suffered by her father as a result of asbestos exposure sustained by him during his work as an Air Force mechanic in locations in Europe and around the United States, but not in Connecticut. Lockheed, a major aerospace company with a worldwide presence, is both incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Maryland. The district court dismissed the suit against Lockheed. The court agreed with the district court that the district court did not have general jurisdiction over Lockheed. By applying the due process principles of Daimler AG v. Bauman, and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the court concluded that Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut, while perhaps “continuous and systematic,” fall well below the high level needed to place the corporation “essentially at home” in the state. Further, upon the court's examination of Connecticut law, the court concluded that by registering to transact business and appointing an agent under the Connecticut statutes - which do not speak clearly on this point - Lockheed did not consent to the state courts’ exercise of general jurisdiction over it. The court noted that a more sweeping interpretation would raise constitutional concerns prudently avoided absent a clearer statement by the state legislature or the Connecticut Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, OAG, alleging discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. OAG moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter, arguing that plaintiff was employed at a policymaking level and thus was subject to the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16a, 2000e-16b, and 2000e-16c. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that GERA was inapplicable in this case. The court concluded that the district court's denial of OAG's motion to dismiss under GERA does not qualify as an immediately appealable order under that doctrine. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Fischer v. New York State Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that SK Fund, a sovereign wealth fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, misrepresented the value of certain notes issued by non‐party BTA, a Kazakhstani corporation majority‐owned by SK Fund, in connection with a 2010 restructuring of BTA Bank’s debt. At issue on appeal, and one of first impression, is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States. The court agreed with the district court that SK Fund is not immune from suit under the FSIA because plaintiffs’ claims are “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States” that “cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.” The court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider SK Fund’s argument that the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it consistent with due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from rival claims to the “Stolichnaya” trademarks. FTE and Cristall alleged that defendants unlawfully misappropriated and commercially exploited the Stolichnaya trademarks related to the sale of vodka and other spirits in the United States. Control over the marks in the United States is currently exercised by defendants as successors in interest to a Soviet state enterprise. In a prior suit, FTE brought claims against SPI under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and the court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the Russian Federation itself retained too great an interest in the marks for FTE to qualify as an "assign" with standing to sue. FTE's non-section 32(1) claims were either dismissed or dropped during the course of that litigation. At issue principally in this appeal is whether FTE, an agency of the Russian Federation, has been endowed by that government with rights and powers that give it standing to pursue claims under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining whether FTE’s asserted basis for standing was valid under Russian law. However, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed all of FTE's other claims as barred by both res judicata and laches. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l B.V." on Justia Law