Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Tarala, a Colorado corporation that is the principal supplier of clothing and military equipment to Nepal, and Wu Lixiang, the director of the company that helps Tarala coordinate the logistics of its international transactions, appealed the default judgment and dismissal of their complaint against Rastra Bank and the Department. The court agreed with the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because both Rastra Bank and the Department, as political subdivisions or agencies of Nepal, are immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. Therefore, the court need not address the issue of service. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Chettri v. Nepal Rastra Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged an administrative summons issued by the IRS after it issued an approximately $25 million penalty against petitioner and his company. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied petitioner's request for jurisdictional discovery. The court agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to allow suits to quash summonses that are “issued in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment,” and that the challenged summons was issued in aid of collection. Moreover, the IRS had authority to issue the summons, as there was not an outstanding criminal referral at the time the summons was issued. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery because petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the requested discovery is likely to produce the facts needed to establish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Haber v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter was murdered, plaintiff filed suit alleging claims related to her daughter's death. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, the district court issued judgment for defendants, and plaintiff did not seek to amend the notice of appeal. The court held that, in the absence of prejudice to an appellee, the court read a pro se appellant’s appeal from an order closing the case as constituting an appeal from all prior orders. In an accompanying summary order, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Elliot v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Ritchie filed suit against GECC for civil conspiracy to commit fraud, for aiding and abetting fraud, and for negligence in connection with Thomas Petters' Ponzi scheme. The district court granted GECC's motion to dismiss based on Ritchie's lack of standing. The district court reasoned that Ritchie lacked standing to bring the conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims because the causes of action were the exclusive property of the Petters Estate and, in the alternative, that Ritchie failed to state a claim because Ritchie failed to plead proximate cause for the aiding and abetting claim and failed to plead an “overt act” for the civil conspiracy claim. The court concluded that Ritchie lacks standing to assert its claims because Ritchie has not alleged a particularized injury. The court adopted the district court's opinion and order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt. v. GECC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants, alleging that they charged plaintiffs more than the statutory maximum fees allowed by N.Y. Pub. Health Law 18(2)(d) and (e) for providing copies of plaintiffs' medical records. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the complaint alleged that the requested records had been paid for by plaintiffs' attorneys, ruling that the complaint therefore did not plead injury-in-fact to plaintiffs themselves and that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that, in light of the ordinary principles of agency, the complaint's allegations that each named plaintiff "through [her or his] counsel" "paid" the charges demanded by defendants for providing the records and that "Plaintiffs" bore "the ultimate expense" for those records, plausibly alleged that plaintiffs themselves were injured by the claimed violations of New York law. Because the district court erred in dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(1), the court vacated and remanded. View "Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was incarcerated at Attica, defendant corrections officers Dennis Fleckenstein and Chester Kosmowski subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by depriving him of meals and defendant Fleckenstein physically assaulted him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. At trial, the jury found that both defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional right to nutritionally adequate food and awarded him nominal and punitive damages. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's admission of a prison monitoring report conducted by a private, nonprofit corporation. The court concluded that the report is hearsay that does not fall within the Business Records Exception nor the Public Records Exception. Furthermore, the report was inadmissible because it further contains hearsay in the form of statements from inmates complaining about abuse at Attica. Because admission of the report was not harmless error, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abascal v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vikas Goel founded and managed a computer‐equipment distribution company called eSys Informatics, Ltd. Plaintiff contracted to sell fifty‐one percent of eSys’s shares to Teledata, an Indian company purporting to be in the software business, at the price of $105 million. Plaintiff alleges that Teledata was a sham operation; that it carried on no legitimate business; and that it was only through the connivance of defendants, who participated with Teledata in a complex scheme that involved illegal loans used to generate profits from interest‐rate arbitrage, that Teledata was made to appear an attractive investment partner. On appeal, Goel and Rainforest Trading challenged the dismissal of their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. The district court also declined to exercised supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that their claims are timely under New York's so-called "savings statute," NY CPLR 205(a), and agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims are untimely. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by relying on materials outside the pleadings in deciding motions to dismiss brought by defendants. Presented with documents extrinsic to the complaint at the motion‐to‐dismiss stage, the district court should have either excluded the documents or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Goel v. Bunge, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, asserting various First and Fourth Amendment claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his action with prejudice. The district court ordered the dismissal based on plaintiff's failure to seek timely reinstatement following a conditional dismissal order the district court entered to effectuate a then‐pending settlement agreement, which one defendant refused to join. Plaintiff also appealed, separately and on the merits, the district court’s earlier order, dated January 9, 2013, which granted a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of three of the defendants. The court concluded that the passage of 69 days before requesting reinstatement, standing alone, does not justify the extreme sanction of involuntary dismissal. Moreover, defendants suffered no prejudice from plaintiff's delay. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action and therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The motion of defendants to strike portions of plaintiff's brief and appendices is moot, and their motion for damages is denied. View "Hoefer v. Bd. of Educ. of Middletown" on Justia Law

This case originated in a sex‐discrimination lawsuit by plaintiffs against their former employer, Lyons. Interested party-appellant Garrison appealed various factual determinations made by the district court in granting a motion to enforce a judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly construed plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 5225 as a plenary action pursuant to New York’s substantive law of fraudulent transfers. In this case, the district court found that the book of business at issue was in fact transferred to Garrison, that the book of business was worth at least $300,000, that it originally belonged to LPS (not Lyons), and that LPS itself received no consideration for the transfer. The court concluded that the district court did not err, much less clearly err, in making these factual findings. View "Mitchell v. Garrison Protective Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the award of costs against it in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, case, arguing that the district court improperly ordered it to pay defendants the costs of deposition transcripts under FRCP 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 190. Because "costs" and "expenses" have distinct meanings under Rule 54(d), section 1920, and the FCA, the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(4) does not preclude the award of the costs for deposition transcripts. Plaintiff forfeited its argument under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and, even if appropriately presented, the argument has no merit where the court has stated clearly that section 1920 permits the taxation of deposition expenses, when necessarily incurred for use of the deposition in the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Associates Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron" on Justia Law