Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, five entities incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, filed suit against the Republic of Ecuador and two of Ecuador's instrumentalities, CFN and Trust, claiming that an agency of the Republic of Ecuador unlawfully seized their property in Ecuador. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed and concluded that the presumption of legal separateness established by the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, and respect for international comity compel the court to treat these legally separate entities as just that, unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that CFN and the Trust exercise “significant and repeated control over the [entities’] day‐to‐day operations.” Because plaintiffs have failed to clear this substantial bar, they fail to satisfy the requirements of Section 1605(a)(3) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3). Therefore, defendants are protected by sovereign immunity and the court need not consider the alternative bases for dismissal relied on by the district court or presented by defendants. View "Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

WWE, relying on the court's decision in Hageman v. City Investing Co., moved to dismiss these appeals on the ground that other consolidated cases remained pending in the district court. Because the McCullough and Haynes cases, the subjects of the pending motion, were consolidated with other cases in the district court for all purposes, and because the Supreme Court in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. explicitly declined to express an opinion on the appealability of a dismissal of one of multiple cases in such a consolidation, Gelboim does not oblige the court to reconsider the continuing validity of Hageman. Applying Hageman, the court sees nothing in plaintiffs' papers that overcomes the “strong presumption that the judgment is not appealable.” Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeals in 16-1231 and 16-1237 is granted, without prejudice to renewal of these appeals upon entry of a final judgment in the district court disposing of all the cases with which the McCullough and Haynes cases have been consolidated. View "McCullough v. World Wrestling Entm't" on Justia Law

Eleven American families filed suit against the PLO and the PA under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), for various terror attacks in Israel that killed or wounded plaintiffs or their families. A jury awarded plaintiffs damages of $218.5 million, an amount that was trebled automatically pursuant to the ATA, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), bringing the total award to $655.5 million. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the minimum contacts and fairness analysis is the same under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment in civil cases. On the merits, the court concluded that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Daimler, the district court could not properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court also concluded that, because the terror attacks in Israel at issue here were not expressly aimed at the United States and because the deaths and injuries suffered by the American plaintiffs in these attacks were “random [and] fortuitous” and because lobbying activities regarding American policy toward Israel are insufficiently “suit-related conduct” to support specific jurisdiction, the court lacks specific jurisdiction over these defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The court did not consider defendants' other arguments on appeal or plaintiffs' cross-appeal, all of which are now moot. View "Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org." on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Stevenson is a former Member of the New York State Assembly representing a district in the Bronx. Stevenson was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest servies wire fraud, conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery and to violate the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 371, accepting bribes, and extortion under color of official right. On appeal, defendant challenged his 36 month sentence, the district court's order of forfeiture in the amount of $22,000, and the district court's designation of defendant's contributions to the New York State pension fund as a substitute asset for forfeiture. The court concluded that the application of sentencing enhancements under both USSG 2C1.1(a)(1) and 2C1.1(b)(3) did not constitute double counting; the court rejected Stevenson's claim of sentence disparity and concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error in its computation and application of the sentencing guidelines; the court declined to reverse the district court's forfeiture order where the calculation of the amount of forfeiture is not subject to any statutory thresholds that increase penalties and remains within the province of the sentencing court; and Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution is preempted to the extent that it would prevent forfeiture of Stevenson’s contributions to or benefits from a state pension or retirement system up to $22,000, the amount ordered forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law

Appellants claim that some aluminum futures traders, having acquired some operators of aluminum warehouses, manipulated a price component for aluminum in the Detroit metro area. The district court dismissed the complaints and denied two groups of plaintiffs leave to amend, while permitting a third group to amend their complaint. The district court then concluded that appellants lacked antitrust standing because they did not demonstrate that they suffered antitrust injury or that they were efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, and that they would be unable to show that they were efficient enforcers through repleading. The district court also determined that appellants failed to state a claim under various state consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws. The court held that appellants lack antitrust standing on the ground that they did not (and could not) suffer antitrust injury. The court also held that their state law claims were inadequately pleaded. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Defendants, the Donziger Firm and others, appealed the district court's grant of certain relief against them in favor of Chevron, in connection with an $8.646 billion judgment obtained against Chevron in Ecuador by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs represented by the Donziger Firm. The judgment award was for environmental damage in connection with the Texaco oil exploration activities in Ecuador from the 1960s-1990s. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's judgment, arguing principally that the action should have been dismissed on the ground that Chevron lacks Article III standing, and/or that the judgment should be reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that it violates principles of international comity and judicial estoppel, exceeds any legal authorization for equitable relief, and was entered without personal jurisdiction over defendants other than Donziger and his Firm. The court found no basis for dismissal or reversal in the absence of challenges to the district court's factual findings; considering the express disclaimers by the Ecuadorian appellate courts of their own jurisdiction to "hear and resolve" the above charges of corruption, "preserving the parties' rights" to pursue those charges in actions in the United States; and considering the district court's confinement of its injunction to a grant of in personam relief against the three defendants-appellants without disturbing the Ecuadorian judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

Laroe, a real estate development company, appealed the denial of its motion to intervene under FRCP 24 in pending litigation in which a now-deceased land developer filed suit against the Town of Chester, alleging a regulatory taking. The court vacated and remanded because the court does not require proposed intervenors in this circumstance to show that they independently have standing. Because neither a proposed intervenor’s lack of Article III standing nor its failure to state an independent claim necessarily renders a motion to intervene futile, the district court should have instead focused its analysis on the requirements of Rule 24. Because the factual record before the court is insufficiently developed at this stage to allow the court to resolve the issues, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Laroe satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. View "Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

OneWest commenced a foreclosure action against defendant. The district court denied defendant's cross-motion to dismiss and granted OneWest's motion for summary judgment. The district court held in part that a national bank such as OneWest is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located - not also of the state of its principal place of business - and that OneWest’s main office is indisputably in California. The court agreed with the district court and joined its sister circuits in holding that, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located. The court also concluded that OneWest had standing to foreclose based on LSA's assignment of all of its rights that FDIC previously had to defendant's loan as the conservator and receiver of IndyMac Federal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pro se filed suit alleging claims against defendants which arise out of events spanning more than a decade and principally concern the Village’s allegedly wrongful interference with his business interests and its maintenance of a police force that plaintiff believes to be unauthorized by law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court noted that plaintiff's principal brief fails to address adequately the merits of most - arguably all - of the claims dismissed by the district court where plaintiff's filing largely fails to set out identifiable arguments in his principal belief; to the extent that plaintiff has adequately argued the merits of any claims on appeal, those arguments must be rejected; for a variety of reasons, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and the court likewise was unconvinced by plaintiff's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue" on Justia Law