Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Roberto Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui
After the County approved a county ordinance prohibiting the growth, testing, and cultivation of genetically engineered crops, plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin and invalidate the Ordinance. Two public-interest citizens’ groups, Shaka and MOM Hui, filed motions to intervene. The magistrate judge granted Shaka’s motion to intervene but denied MOM Hui’s, finding that Shaka would adequately represent MOM Hui’s interests. The district court held that the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to rule on MOM Hui’s motion to intervene; any appeal from the magistrate judge’s order needed to be taken to the Ninth Circuit because the magistrate judge, having obtained the consent of the parties, had authority to enter a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1); and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear MOM Hui’s appeal. The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that a prospective intervenor is not a "party" as the term is used in section 636(c)(1). The court concluded that, because the magistrate judge had the consent of the parties and did not need the consent of MOM Hui, the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to rule on MOM Hui’s motion to intervene. Effectively presiding as a district judge over the suit, the court explained that the magistrate judge’s intervention order became immediately appealable to this court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Roberto Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui" on Justia Law
Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital
Plaintiff filed suit against the State Defendants, alleging state and federal claims arising out his discharge from the Hospital and subsequent transportation to Sacramento. The district court dismissed the federal statutory claims with prejudice as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. The court held that plaintiff waived the argument that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his federal claims under Rule 41(b). The court explained that, in the absence of a showing that the district court abused its discretion, because the prior interlocutory order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable, there would be no basis to appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to make in his opening brief the abuse of discretion argument as to Rule 41(b), he has waived it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law
NRDC V. County of Los Angeles
Plaintiffs filed suit against the County Defendants in 2008, alleging that the County Defendants were discharging polluted stormwater in violation of the terms of their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, issued pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C.1251 et seq. The court held in 2013 that as a matter of law, the County Defendants had violated their permit. In 2012, during the pendency of appellate proceedings, the County Defendants sought and received a new NPDES permit from the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (the Regional Board), which now governs the County Defendants’ stormwater discharges. In January 2015, the County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit on mootness grounds, arguing that the 2012 Permit supplanted the 2001 Permit and therefore relief was not available to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court's dismissal of their claims for injunctive relief. The court held that it has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court also held that plaintiffs' injunctive claims are not moot because the County Defendants are still subject to receiving water limitations, which are substantially the same as the limitations in the 2001 Permit. The County Defendants have not met their burden of making it “absolutely clear” that no violation will recur in the future. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "NRDC V. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
NewGen v. Safe Cig
Safe Cig challenges an almost $1.5 million default judgment awarded in NewGen's favor as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court acted within its statutory authority to give NewGen the opportunity to correct its allegations. In this case, the amended complaint remedied the deficiencies of the original complaint, alleging the parties were of diverse citizenship; alleged that NewGen was an LLC organized in Wisconsin and that its sole member was a citizen of Wisconsin when the complaint was filed; and alleged that Safe Cig was an LLC organized in California with five members, each of which was a citizen of California at the time the complaint was filed. The court also concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the amended complaint corrected any defect in the pleadings. Because the only real challenge to jurisdiction concerned the sufficiency of the pleadings, the amended allegations - which were undoubtedly legally sufficient - resolved the only question ever raised regarding the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The court further concluded that the district court’s decision to enter default judgment was not an abuse of discretion where none of the district court's factual findings were in clear error. Finally, the court upheld the district court's damage award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NewGen v. Safe Cig" on Justia Law
Sony Electronics v. HannStar Display Corp.
After Sony and HannStar engaged a mediator to resolve a price-fixing dispute, the mediator proposed settlement in an email exchange. Both parties accepted by email, but when HannStar refused to comply, Sony filed suit to enforce the agreement. The district court denied Sony’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the California Evidence Code’s mediation privilege bars introduction of the settlement emails. The parties stipulated to a final judgment. The court held that, because at the time the parties engaged in mediation, their negotiations concerned (and the mediated settlement settled) both federal and state law claims, the federal law of privilege applies. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying California privilege law to resolve this dispute. The court reversed and remanded. View "Sony Electronics v. HannStar Display Corp." on Justia Law
Polo v. Innoventions Int’l
Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Innoventions, alleging several causes of action, including four class claims. The gravamen of her complaint was that Innoventions had marketed a product called DiabeStevia with “grossly misleading and exaggerated claims” concerning its use and effectiveness. Innoventions removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The district court subsequently dismissed the case. The court held that the rule that a removed case in which the plaintiff lacks Article III standing must be remanded to state court under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) applies as well to a case removed pursuant to CAFA as to any other type of removed case. The court rejected Innoventions' three arguments to the contrary. Finally, the court could not say with “absolute certainty” that remand would be futile. Therefore, the district court should have remanded this case to state court pursuant to section 1447(c). The court reversed and remanded. View "Polo v. Innoventions Int'l" on Justia Law
Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians
Plaintiff, a member of the Tribe, filed suit against the Tribe in California state court for employment-related claims. The Tribe timely removed to district court and then moved to dismiss based on tribal immunity. The district court denied the motion based on the ground that the Tribe unequivocally waived its immunity by removing the action to federal court. The court followed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity from suit. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians" on Justia Law
Weeping Hollow Ave. Trust v. Spencer
This case concerns a dispute between the parties over who has priority ownership of property located in Las Vegas. Nevada has a statute that gives a homeowners’ association lien priority over “all other liens and encumbrances” (subject to some limited exceptions) for up to nine months of unpaid HOA fees. NEV. REV. STAT. 116.3116(2)–(3). After the HOA foreclosed on property that Ashley Spencer bought, Weeping Hollow purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Just over two months after the HOA foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo attempted to foreclose on the property under its 2008 deed of trust. Weeping Hollow filed suit in state court against Spencer, Wells Fargo, and a title insurance company. Wells Fargo removed to federal court. The district court then granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Weeping Hollow’s complaint. After the district court issued its ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an opinion that expressly abrogates the district court’s interpretation of the HOA statute. Under the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding, a foreclosure on an HOA lien extinguishes an earlier-recorded security interest even though the HOA lien was recorded later. The court held that the district court erred in applying the fraudulent-joinder doctrine to this case. Because Spencer was not shown to be fraudulently joined, her presence in the action divests the district court of diversity jurisdiction and the district court must remand the case to state court. Since this case should never have made it into federal court, the court has no reason to address Wells Fargo’s constitutional and state-law arguments. View "Weeping Hollow Ave. Trust v. Spencer" on Justia Law
In re Swift Transportation
In this companion case to Van Dusen v. Swift, No. 15-15257 (“Van Dusen III”), Swift seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to vacate its case management order and decide the petition to compel arbitration without discovery or trial. The court concluded that the Bauman factors weigh against the grant of mandamus relief; Swift has a remedy in urging its position before the district court in dispositive motions and, if the district court is adverse to Swift, in the form of direct appeal following the issuance of a final order; normal litigation expense does not constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant relief, and the discovery cost has already been incurred; and most crucially, in the absence of controlling precedent, the district court order was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court concluded that Swift is not entitled to the extraordinary relief of the issuance of a writ of mandamus. View "In re Swift Transportation" on Justia Law
Van Dusen v. Swift Transportation
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Swift misclassified her and others as independent contractors, as well as alleging violations of federal and state labor laws. On appeal, plaintiff objected that section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, prevented the district court from compelling arbitration. The district court granted Swift's motion to compel arbitration. The court clarified that the district court - not the arbitrator - must decide the section 1 issue. The district court then set out to determine the section 1 exemption issue. Swift moved for an order to stay proceedings, including discovery, and for an order setting a briefing schedule to determine the section 1 issue without resort to discovery and trial. The district court denied Swift’s motion. It also concluded that the order was not immediately appealable. The court concluded that that, absent statutory authorization, district court certification, or application of the collateral doctrine, the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed. In this case, this is not an appeal from a motion explicitly brought under the FAA or unmistakably invoking its remedies. Because the district court did not deny a petition to order arbitration to proceed, there is no jurisdiction under section 16(a)(1)(B). View "Van Dusen v. Swift Transportation" on Justia Law