Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this companion case to Van Dusen v. Swift, No. 15-15257 (“Van Dusen III”), Swift seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to vacate its case management order and decide the petition to compel arbitration without discovery or trial. The court concluded that the Bauman factors weigh against the grant of mandamus relief; Swift has a remedy in urging its position before the district court in dispositive motions and, if the district court is adverse to Swift, in the form of direct appeal following the issuance of a final order; normal litigation expense does not constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant relief, and the discovery cost has already been incurred; and most crucially, in the absence of controlling precedent, the district court order was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court concluded that Swift is not entitled to the extraordinary relief of the issuance of a writ of mandamus. View "In re Swift Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Swift misclassified her and others as independent contractors, as well as alleging violations of federal and state labor laws. On appeal, plaintiff objected that section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, prevented the district court from compelling arbitration. The district court granted Swift's motion to compel arbitration. The court clarified that the district court - not the arbitrator - must decide the section 1 issue. The district court then set out to determine the section 1 exemption issue. Swift moved for an order to stay proceedings, including discovery, and for an order setting a briefing schedule to determine the section 1 issue without resort to discovery and trial. The district court denied Swift’s motion. It also concluded that the order was not immediately appealable. The court concluded that that, absent statutory authorization, district court certification, or application of the collateral doctrine, the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed. In this case, this is not an appeal from a motion explicitly brought under the FAA or unmistakably invoking its remedies. Because the district court did not deny a petition to order arbitration to proceed, there is no jurisdiction under section 16(a)(1)(B). View "Van Dusen v. Swift Transportation" on Justia Law

In the midst of a federal investigation into activities of the former Governor of Oregon, John Kitzhaber, a grand jury subpoena seeks a broad range of information from the State of Oregon. For several years before Kitzhaber left office, copies of his personal emails were archived on Oregon’s computer servers. Because this cache would be turned over to the government under the subpoena, Kitzhaber argues the subpoena is unreasonably broad. The government disclaims any interest in Kitzhaber’s communications with his personal attorneys but argues it is otherwise entitled to everything it has requested. The court agreed with Kitzhaber that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in much of his personal email (although the Fourth Amendment’s protection does not extend to any use of a personal email account to conduct public business), and that the subpoena in this case - which is not even minimally tailored to the government’s investigatory goals - is unreasonable and invalid. The court disagreed, however, that Kitzhaber may assert the attorney-client privilege for his communications, including communications regarding potential conflicts of interest and ethics violations, with the State of Oregon’s attorneys. Whatever privilege may protect those communications belongs to the State of Oregon, not to Kitzhaber as an individual officeholder in his personal capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to quash the government’s present subpoena in its entirety. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Jim Little, the Executive Director of Employee Relations at the District, alleging sex discrimination for acts that had occurred in 2008. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice based on lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. Plaintiff later filed suit in 2013 against Little and the District, alleging sex discrimination claims, under state and federal law, stemming in part from her termination in 2010. The district court held that the earlier dismissal was res judicata and barred this action. The court held - consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and at least three sister circuits - that an earlier dismissal on alternative grounds, where one ground is a lack of jurisdiction, is not res judicata. Therefore, the court concluded that res judicata does not bar this action. The court reversed the dismissal in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claim because plaintiff's lawyer clearly and expressly abandoned the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's state-law claims to the extent that they rely solely on events that occurred more than three years before the filing of the complaint in this case. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, at least two claims are timely: (1) plaintiff's claim alleging discriminatory firing in 2010; and (2) a hostile work environment claim founded in part on actions occurring within the limitations period. The court remanded. View "Ruiz v. Snohomish County PUD" on Justia Law

Appellants are a sub-class of moderately to severely disabled children who have moved to intervene in a class action brought on behalf of all disabled students in the LAUSD against the LAUSD (the Chanda Smith Litigation). Appellants seek to intervene to challenge the legality of a new policy, adopted by LAUSD in 2012 as part of a renegotiation of the Chanda Smith parties’ settlement. The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and further erred when it found intervention unnecessary to protect appellants’ interest in ensuring the receipt of public education consistent with their disabilities and federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. LAUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 108 individuals with property near the Boeing facility, filed suit against Boeing and Landau in state court, alleging that for several decades Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its facility in Auburn, Washington, and that for over a decade Landau had been negligent in its investigation and remediation of the resulting pollution. Boeing removed to federal court based on diversity and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court remanded to state court finding that there was not complete diversity and plaintiffs' action came within the single-event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction. In this appeal, Boeing argued that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they seek “significant relief” from Landau, the in-state defendant, and that Landau’s conduct does not form “a significant basis of the claims asserted,” as required by section 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). The court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pled both that they are seeking “significant relief” from Landau and that Landau’s alleged conduct forms a “significant basis” for their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Telesocial, a San Francisco start-up, entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) regarding a possible agreement to acquire Telesocial's software application named "Call Friends." This dispute stems from Telesocial's allegations that Orange violated federal and state laws by stealing Telesocial's technology to create its own product called "Party Call." Orange and its employees seek a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. 1651 directing the district court to vacate its order denying Orange’s motion to dismiss, and direct an entry of judgment dismissing Telesocial’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). The court applied the Bauman v. United States factors and concluded that the district court did not commit clear legal error in determining that the NDA did not cover the claims at issue; Orange has the ability on direct appeal to attain the relief it desires; Orange will not be prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; and the district court’s decision does not raise a novel issue that affects the international business community. Accordingly, the court denied Orange’s petition for writ of mandamus. View "Orange, S.A. v. USDC for the Northern Dist. of CA, San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two governmental organizations that provide legal representation to capital defendants and prisoners, filed suit raising numerous challenges to the Attorney General's regulations implementing the certification procedure for fast-tracking federal habeas cases for capital prisoners. On summary judgment, the district court sustained most of plaintiffs’ challenges, found the regulations arbitrary or capricious in several respects, and enjoined the regulations from going into effect. The court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this action. The court declined plaintiffs’ request for a limited remand to allow their clients an opportunity to intervene. The court stated that the Attorney General has not yet made any certification decisions, and, thus, challenges to the procedures and criteria set forth in the regulations are not yet ripe for review. View "Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. USDOJ" on Justia Law