Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

As part of a joint effort to construct a Zoroastrian worship center, the parties signed a ninety-nine-year lease on a parcel of property owned by Rustam Guiv in the Vienna area of Fairfax County, Virginia. After Rustam Guiv terminated the lease, the Center filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate the lease. After removal, the district court granted summary judgment to Rustam Guiv and awarded attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that Rustam Guiv presented sufficient evidence to show complete diversity between the parties, thereby establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The court also concluded that the undisputed material facts show that The Center breached the lease. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The court concluded, however, that the attorneys' fee award must be vacated where the district court correctly identified Rustam Guiv as the prevailing party but made no effort to narrow the fee award to its successful claims. Under Virginia law governing contractual fee-shifting provisions, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work performed only on its successful claims. View "Zoroastrian Center v. Rustam Guiv Found." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against employees of SCDC and others, alleging that the food served to him at a prison managed by the SCDC was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it is the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits. The court concluded that, because plaintiff was a nonparty to the earlier suit, he is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant action unless the state defendants are able to demonstrate that at least one of the six exceptions to the general rule against nonparty preclusion applies pursuant to Taylor v. Sturgell. Because the state defendants have not demonstrated that any of the exceptions apply, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duckett v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth, alleging that the Incumbent Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. 24.2-509(B), infringes on its First Amendment right to freedom of association by preventing it from determining the method of nomination in contravention of the terms of the Party's Plan of Organization. Senator Hanger and Moxley, who sought the Party’s nomination for Senator Hanger’s seat on the 24th District, both moved to intervene. The district court subsequently granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the Committee lacks standing to bring this suit because the language of the Plan is clear and unambiguous: the Plan delegates to the Committee the authority to determine the nomination method unless Virginia law otherwise limits that authority. Because the Party has made a voluntary choice to limit the Committee’s authority in this way, plaintiffs have “no complaint that the party’s right to govern itself has been substantially burdened by” the Act because “the source of the complaint is the party’s own decision.” Because neither Virginia law nor the Plan gives Moxley “a legally protected interest” in determining the nomination method in the first place, he fails to establish that he has standing independent of the Party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "24th Senatorial Dist. v. Alcorn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through her next friends and guardians, filed a complaint in state court against Matt Blair and Res-Care. Res-Care removed to federal court, asserting subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The district court sua sponte remanded the case back to state court, determining that federal diversity jurisdiction has not been established because Res-Care did not allege the state in which it had its principal place of business. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order because the district court based its remand order on a procedural defect in the removal notice. The court held that a district court exceeds its statutory authority when it remands a case sua sponte based on a procedural defect absent a motion from a party. In this case, the district court exceeded its statutory authority by remanding this case sua sponte. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jane Doe #1 v. Blair" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through her next friends and guardians, filed a complaint in state court against Matt Blair and Res-Care. Res-Care removed to federal court, asserting subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The district court sua sponte remanded the case back to state court, determining that federal diversity jurisdiction has not been established because Res-Care did not allege the state in which it had its principal place of business. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order because the district court based its remand order on a procedural defect in the removal notice. The court held that a district court exceeds its statutory authority when it remands a case sua sponte based on a procedural defect absent a motion from a party. In this case, the district court exceeded its statutory authority by remanding this case sua sponte. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jane Doe #1 v. Blair" on Justia Law

PHA filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo falsely represented that it would forbear collection of the principal balance of a line of credit, ultimately causing PHA to default and enter bankruptcy. PHA subsequently filed suit in Virginia state court, which Wells Fargo removed to federal court. Along with repeating the claims made in the bankruptcy adversary complaint, PHA alleged new theories of lender liability. The district court dismissed the suit. The court rejected PHA's contention that the district court erroneously gave res judicata effect to various sale orders issued during PHA’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, concluding that the elements of res judicata are satisfied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Providence Hall Assoc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Victims of a massive ponzi scheme centered in South Carolina obtained a judgment of over $150 million against Derivium and others. Plaintiffs are now pursuing others whom they claim also participated in the scheme. The district court granted Vision International's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2). The district court also granted Randolph Anderson, Patrick Kelley, and Total Eclipse's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim for aiding and abetting common law fraud. Plaintiffs filed separate appeals on the two rulings. The court consolidated the appeals. The court concluded that, because the parties engaged in full discovery on the jurisdictional issue and fully presented the relevant evidence to the district court, that court properly addressed Vision International’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion by weighing the evidence, finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and determining as a matter of law whether plaintiffs carried their burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over Vision International. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that South Carolina has not recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting common law fraud and that it is not the court's role as a federal court to so expand state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as to both appeals. View "Grayson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Perdue appealed the district court's dismissal of its breach of contract action against BRF for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Perdue has alleged few facts to satisfy its prima facie burden in support of personal jurisdiction. In this case, the only fact that it alleges that indisputably weighs in favor of jurisdiction is that the agreement at issue includes a Maryland choice-of-law clause. On the contrary, many undisputed facts indicate that a Maryland court does not have personal jurisdiction over BRF: the company employs no Maryland officers or agents and owns no property in the state; BRF did not initiate the negotiations that led to the agreement; no BRF employee traveled to Maryland in connection with the agreement; and BRF conducts no business in Maryland. In this case, BRF’s alleged breach of the agreement occurred not in Maryland, but in foreign countries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Senior Managing Attorney for CVLAS, filed suit alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and age. The district court granted CVLAS's motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that the order of dismissal was not a final and appealable order, and therefore, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions. The court held that the grounds for dismissal in this case did not clearly preclude amendment. View "Goode v. Central Virginia Legal Aid Society" on Justia Law