Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After William Davidson was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he filed suit against numerous defendants that he contended were responsible for his exposure to asbestos. After Davidson died, Davidson’s estate and family did not substitute as proper plaintiffs. Instead, a motion to dismiss was filed and granted without prejudice. Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed the instant survival and wrongful death action bringing similar claims to those in the first suit. All of the defendants in Davidson II were parties to Davidson I with the exception of the nondiverse Louisiana Defendants whose joinder is contested in this appeal: Graves and Taylor. Georgia-Pacific timely removed this case on the ground that the Louisiana citizenship of Graves and Taylor should be ignored because they had been improperly joined. Plaintiffs sought remand. The magistrate judge issued an order granting the motion to remand. After piercing the pleadings, the district court concluded that Graves and Taylor had been improperly joined and dismissed Graves and Taylor with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the denial of their motion to remand. Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that a motion to remand is a dispositive matter on which a magistrate judge should enter a recommendation to the district court subject to de novo review. In light of the district court’s discretion in deciding whether to pierce the pleadings, it was not error to do so here given the unusual procedural posture of this case that meant there was already a lengthy record at the outset of this second lawsuit. However, the district court erred in applying the improper joinder standard to that record. The court did not believe that the existence of a developed record in the first lawsuit warrants expanding the improper joinder standard to allow the absence of evidence alone to satisfy it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that their membership contracts did not strictly comply with several technical provisions of the Texas Health Spa Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 702.304, 702.305, 702.401, 702.402(a)(2). The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their membership dues, and because 24 Hour’s alleged violations of the Act did not cause plaintiffs actual damages or any other form of economic harm, plaintiffs have sustained no economic injury. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not suffered a non-economic injury where plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable statutory injury under the Act. The Act does not authorize members to sue health clubs for technical statutory violations which cause the member no harm. Moreover, the Act does not authorize health club members to recover statutory or nominal damages for mere technical violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Mississippi's Attorney General, James M. Hood III, appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Hood from enforcing an administrative subpoena or bringing any civil or criminal action against Google "for making accessible third-party content to internet users." The court concluded that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief because neither the issuance of the non-self-executing administrative subpoena nor the possibility of some future enforcement action created an imminent threat of irreparable injury ripe for adjudication. The court noted that it expressed no opinion on the reasonableness of the subpoena or on whether the conduct discussed in the parties’ briefs could be held actionable consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Google, Inc. v. Hood" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound, plaintiff filed suit against the Lancaster police and fire departments, law enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel. The district court dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that there was federal-question jurisdiction and the wrongful death claims should not have been dismissed; it was error for the district court - ruling without benefit of the court's decision on this issue of first impression - to dismiss Rodgers’s survival action solely because she was proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate; a person with capacity under state law to represent an estate in a survival action may proceed pro se if that person is the only beneficiary and the estate has no creditors; the court remanded for further determination as to whether Rodgers is the sole beneficiary; and the court expressed no view on the merits of Rodgers's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon. Defendant claimed that the district court erroneously applied the cross reference in USSG 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) without giving defendant a three-level attempt reduction under USSG 2X1.1(b)(1). Applying the court's precedent, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to a reduction under section 2X1.1(b)(1) because no evidence before the district court supported its finding that defendant was en route to deliver the ammunition for smuggling to Mexico when he was arrested. After the three-level reduction, the offense level under section 2X1.1 for attempted exportation of ammunition is not greater than the offense level under section 2K2.1 for being a felon in possession of ammunition, and the district court therefore erred in applying the cross reference in section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Appellants, investors who suffered financial losses as a result of R. Allen Stanford’s Ponzi scheme, alleged that Appellee, a clearing broker for Stanford Group Company, failed to disclose adverse financial information. A FINRA panel rejected appellants' claims but awarded them $10,000 in compensation for certain arbitration-related expenses. In this interlocutory appeal, appellants challenge the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, appellee's motion to confirm an arbitration award. At issue was whether the amount in controversy for establishing diversity jurisdiction over a petition to confirm an arbitration award is the amount awarded by the arbitration panel or the amount previously sought in the arbitration proceeding. The court affirmed the judgment and adopted the better reasoned approach to the amount in controversy under these circumstances. The court held that monetary amount sought in the underlying arbitration is the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. View "Pershing, LLC v. Kiebach" on Justia Law

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Entergy filed a reverse-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, suit against EPA to prevent the disclosure of documents requested by Sierra Club via a FOIA request. Sierra Club appealed the district court's denial of its motion to intervene. The court concluded that adversity of interest exists between Sierra Club and EPA because Sierra Club’s interests diverge from EPA’s interests in manners germane to this case. Because adversity of interest exists, any same-ultimate-objective presumption of adequate representation is overcome, and the requirement that Sierra Club’s interests be inadequately represented by EPA is satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that Sierra Club is entitled to intervene of right. The court reversed and remanded. View "Entergy Gulf States LA, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petrobras and Underwriters filed suit against Vicinay, the manufacturer of an underwater tether chain that broke just after being installed to secure the piping system for oil production from the Outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico. The district court granted summary judgment for Vicinay based upon the maritime law economic loss doctrine. Underwriters then sought leave to amend their complaint, alleging, for the first time, that Louisiana law, not maritime law, applied to this dispute under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2). The court held that the choice of law prescribed by OCSLA is statutorily mandated and is consequently not waivable by the parties. The court also held that the applicable law is that of the adjacent state of Louisiana, not admiralty law. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's denial of Underwriters' motion to amend and remanded for application of Louisiana law. View "Petrobras America Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A." on Justia Law

R. Allen Stanford made charitable donations to all three petitioners before the SEC's determination that Stanford and his companies were operating a Ponzi scheme. Before the Court is a Petition for Rehearing, treated as a motion for reconsideration, of the order of January 22, 2016, denying the Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed by Petitioners St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and ALSAC. In this case, neither side of this dispute has cited any controlling cases interpreting the federal question jurisdiction statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. 754, and both sides have focused on cases which they claim are more analogous to section 754 than to the other side’s line of cases. The court found the answer to the question far from clear, so the court could not say the district court “clearly and indisputably erred,” if it erred at all. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. View "In re: American Lebanese Syria, et al." on Justia Law