Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Entergy filed a reverse-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, suit against EPA to prevent the disclosure of documents requested by Sierra Club via a FOIA request. Sierra Club appealed the district court's denial of its motion to intervene. The court concluded that adversity of interest exists between Sierra Club and EPA because Sierra Club’s interests diverge from EPA’s interests in manners germane to this case. Because adversity of interest exists, any same-ultimate-objective presumption of adequate representation is overcome, and the requirement that Sierra Club’s interests be inadequately represented by EPA is satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that Sierra Club is entitled to intervene of right. The court reversed and remanded. View "Entergy Gulf States LA, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petrobras and Underwriters filed suit against Vicinay, the manufacturer of an underwater tether chain that broke just after being installed to secure the piping system for oil production from the Outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico. The district court granted summary judgment for Vicinay based upon the maritime law economic loss doctrine. Underwriters then sought leave to amend their complaint, alleging, for the first time, that Louisiana law, not maritime law, applied to this dispute under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2). The court held that the choice of law prescribed by OCSLA is statutorily mandated and is consequently not waivable by the parties. The court also held that the applicable law is that of the adjacent state of Louisiana, not admiralty law. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's denial of Underwriters' motion to amend and remanded for application of Louisiana law. View "Petrobras America Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A." on Justia Law

R. Allen Stanford made charitable donations to all three petitioners before the SEC's determination that Stanford and his companies were operating a Ponzi scheme. Before the Court is a Petition for Rehearing, treated as a motion for reconsideration, of the order of January 22, 2016, denying the Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed by Petitioners St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and ALSAC. In this case, neither side of this dispute has cited any controlling cases interpreting the federal question jurisdiction statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. 754, and both sides have focused on cases which they claim are more analogous to section 754 than to the other side’s line of cases. The court found the answer to the question far from clear, so the court could not say the district court “clearly and indisputably erred,” if it erred at all. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. View "In re: American Lebanese Syria, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a settlement agreement entered into by BP and a class of parties harmed by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Claimants filed a “Motion for Authority to File Wetlands Claims” with the district court, invoking the district court’s supervisory authority over the interpretation and implementation of the settlement agreement. Claimants asked the district court to either determine that all seven of their claims were formally submitted in July 2012 before the six-month deadline had passed or excuse the missed six-month deadline and allow them to file claims anew. The district court denied the motion in a summary order. The court declined to deem claimants to have submitted claims on the parcels at issue in July 2012. The settlement agreement clearly designates the claim form as the manner in which claims should be submitted, and no claim forms were submitted for the two parcels at issue in July 2012, or at any time before the six-month window had closed. The court also declined to exercise any discretion it may have to excuse claimants’ failure to meet the six-month deadline. Finally, the court rejected claimants' due process claim as forfeited. Regardless, the enforcement of a properly noticed deadline generally does not effect a due process violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from injuries sustained by a platform worker employed by Vertex. Continental appealed the district court's final judgment in favor of Tetra and Maritech, requiring Continental and its codefendant insured, Vertex, to indemnify them. The court concluded that the summary judgment record is inadequate to determine whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), requires the adoption of Louisiana law as surrogate federal law where the court cannot determine whether there is an OCSLA situs, the court cannot determine whether federal maritime law applies, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2780, is consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether LOIA must be adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA. The court remanded to the district court to determine the dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law. View "Tetra Tech. v. Vertex Servs." on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

The court previously found that NOV Norway had a contractual right to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The remaining defendants, nonsignatories to that agreement, contend that they are also entitled to arbitration. The district court found that NOV LP was contractually entitled to arbitration and ordered arbitration within the Southern District of Texas. The district court's order was interlocutory. Consistent with the purpose of Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(3), and every circuit that has considered the issue, the court held that Section 16 forbids appellate review. The court also concluded that the court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Additionally, despite having nothing to appeal, NOV Norway was listed as an appellant within the defendants’ notice of appeal. The appeals brought by NOV LP and NOV Norway are dismissed. View "Al Rushaid v. National Oilwell Varco, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall off a chair at a Home Depot, he filed suit in state court against Home Depot and the general manager of the store he was injured in. A month later, Home Depot removed to federal court. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, omitting the general manager and adding SMI as a defendant. After serving SMI, plaintiff learned that ASM, not SMI, was the distributor of the chair and therefore plaintiff filed a second amended complaint replacing SMI with ASM as defendant. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order dismissing, without prejudice, Home Depot and ASM and requiring that any suits that plaintiff refiles against those parties be brought in the same court. The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose the refiling restriction on ASM. The court also agreed with plaintiff that the district court erred in dismissing Home Depot, but concluded that the error, being without prejudice, was harmless. Finally, the court agreed with plaintiff that the imposition of the refiling restriction with respect to Home Depot was an abuse of discretion and therefore affirmed the judgment as modified to omit that condition. View "Bechuck v. Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Luvata filed suit against Danfoss US, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent design. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the parties’ stipulation of dismissal without prejudice does not convert the district court’s non-final ruling into a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "Luvata Grenada, L.L.C. v. Danfoss, L.L.C." on Justia Law