Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a health care liability suit against defendants in federal court under the court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction. Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires plaintiffs in health care liability cases to serve an expert report within 120 days after the filing of a defendant’s original answer. Following limited discovery, defendants moved to dismiss because plaintiffs had failed to serve an expert report in accordance with section 74.351’s requirements. The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice. The court held that section 74.351 answers the same question as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37, and these Rules represent a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking authority. Accordingly, a federal court entertaining state law claims may not apply section 74.351. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Passmore v. Baylor Health Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in state court challenging the use of red light cameras within Texas and, more specifically, the legislation authorizing such cameras, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 707.001(3), 707.002. The case was removed to federal court based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand to state court. The court concluded that the district court erred by deeming plaintiff's remand motion untimely where plaintiff acted diligently to gather evidence and file his motion to remand the case. The court concluded that the home state exception applies in this case where a person generally familiar with the case and with the English language would not expect all 58 different defendants to be primary defendants. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion for not remanding and vacated the judgment, remanded with instructions. View "Watson v. City of Allen, TX" on Justia Law

Grupo Mexico is closely connected to litigation pending in Mexico and sought discovery from SAS and Highland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782. On appeal, SAS asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Congress has not enacted any statute or rule that gave the district court the jurisdiction to issue a Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 subpoena for service on SAS, a Cayman Islands citizen, in the Cayman Islands or the jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena against SAS after SAS failed to respond. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the untimely filing, which objected to the manner of service in the Cayman Islands and the absence of a court order from a Cayman Islands court, waived SAS’s personal jurisdiction defense. The court affirmed the district court's order affirming the magistrate judge’s grant of the motion to compel document production. View "Grupo Mexico SAB de CV v. SAS Asset Recovery, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Commission may refuse a permit to any applicant who has not been a citizen of Texas for at least one year before filing an application. This case stems from the original plaintiffs' attempt to acquire a night club twenty-five years ago. The district court declared the residency requirement invalid and permanently enjoined the Commission from enforcing it. The district court denied TPSA's motion for relief from the injunction under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b), concluding that there was no case or controversy because the original plaintiffs had not appeared and seemed to lack an ongoing interest and because TPSA lacked standing. The court concluded that, although the original plaintiffs have not appeared and may no longer possess any direct stake in the outcome of the proceeding, there remains a live case or controversy because of the intervention of Fine Wine and Southern Wine. Their intervention ensures that this proceeding involves an actual dispute between adverse litigants. The court also concluded that TPSA has associational standing to bring its Rule 60(b) motion where the interests of TPSA’s members in the enforcement of the residency requirement are germane to TPSA’s purpose, and neither TPSA’s claim for relief nor the relief it requests requires the participation of its individual members. Addressing the injury in fact prong and the redressability prong, the court concluded that TPSA has standing. On the merits, the court concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize states to impose a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers. Finally, TPSA has failed to address the district court’s holding that Texas’s residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered an order denying the motion on the merits. View "Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n" on Justia Law

After William Davidson was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he filed suit against numerous defendants that he contended were responsible for his exposure to asbestos. After Davidson died, Davidson’s estate and family did not substitute as proper plaintiffs. Instead, a motion to dismiss was filed and granted without prejudice. Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed the instant survival and wrongful death action bringing similar claims to those in the first suit. All of the defendants in Davidson II were parties to Davidson I with the exception of the nondiverse Louisiana Defendants whose joinder is contested in this appeal: Graves and Taylor. Georgia-Pacific timely removed this case on the ground that the Louisiana citizenship of Graves and Taylor should be ignored because they had been improperly joined. Plaintiffs sought remand. The magistrate judge issued an order granting the motion to remand. After piercing the pleadings, the district court concluded that Graves and Taylor had been improperly joined and dismissed Graves and Taylor with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the denial of their motion to remand. Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that a motion to remand is a dispositive matter on which a magistrate judge should enter a recommendation to the district court subject to de novo review. In light of the district court’s discretion in deciding whether to pierce the pleadings, it was not error to do so here given the unusual procedural posture of this case that meant there was already a lengthy record at the outset of this second lawsuit. However, the district court erred in applying the improper joinder standard to that record. The court did not believe that the existence of a developed record in the first lawsuit warrants expanding the improper joinder standard to allow the absence of evidence alone to satisfy it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that their membership contracts did not strictly comply with several technical provisions of the Texas Health Spa Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 702.304, 702.305, 702.401, 702.402(a)(2). The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their membership dues, and because 24 Hour’s alleged violations of the Act did not cause plaintiffs actual damages or any other form of economic harm, plaintiffs have sustained no economic injury. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not suffered a non-economic injury where plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable statutory injury under the Act. The Act does not authorize members to sue health clubs for technical statutory violations which cause the member no harm. Moreover, the Act does not authorize health club members to recover statutory or nominal damages for mere technical violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Mississippi's Attorney General, James M. Hood III, appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Hood from enforcing an administrative subpoena or bringing any civil or criminal action against Google "for making accessible third-party content to internet users." The court concluded that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief because neither the issuance of the non-self-executing administrative subpoena nor the possibility of some future enforcement action created an imminent threat of irreparable injury ripe for adjudication. The court noted that it expressed no opinion on the reasonableness of the subpoena or on whether the conduct discussed in the parties’ briefs could be held actionable consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Google, Inc. v. Hood" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound, plaintiff filed suit against the Lancaster police and fire departments, law enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel. The district court dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that there was federal-question jurisdiction and the wrongful death claims should not have been dismissed; it was error for the district court - ruling without benefit of the court's decision on this issue of first impression - to dismiss Rodgers’s survival action solely because she was proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate; a person with capacity under state law to represent an estate in a survival action may proceed pro se if that person is the only beneficiary and the estate has no creditors; the court remanded for further determination as to whether Rodgers is the sole beneficiary; and the court expressed no view on the merits of Rodgers's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon. Defendant claimed that the district court erroneously applied the cross reference in USSG 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) without giving defendant a three-level attempt reduction under USSG 2X1.1(b)(1). Applying the court's precedent, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to a reduction under section 2X1.1(b)(1) because no evidence before the district court supported its finding that defendant was en route to deliver the ammunition for smuggling to Mexico when he was arrested. After the three-level reduction, the offense level under section 2X1.1 for attempted exportation of ammunition is not greater than the offense level under section 2K2.1 for being a felon in possession of ammunition, and the district court therefore erred in applying the cross reference in section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Appellants, investors who suffered financial losses as a result of R. Allen Stanford’s Ponzi scheme, alleged that Appellee, a clearing broker for Stanford Group Company, failed to disclose adverse financial information. A FINRA panel rejected appellants' claims but awarded them $10,000 in compensation for certain arbitration-related expenses. In this interlocutory appeal, appellants challenge the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, appellee's motion to confirm an arbitration award. At issue was whether the amount in controversy for establishing diversity jurisdiction over a petition to confirm an arbitration award is the amount awarded by the arbitration panel or the amount previously sought in the arbitration proceeding. The court affirmed the judgment and adopted the better reasoned approach to the amount in controversy under these circumstances. The court held that monetary amount sought in the underlying arbitration is the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. View "Pershing, LLC v. Kiebach" on Justia Law