Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Kansas landowners sued, alleging that the government had taken their land without compensation by conversion of a rail corridor to a trail under the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment concerning five claims and certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court concerning the scope of Kansas railroad easements. That court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to accept the certified question. The Claims Court then granted plaintiffs summary judgment plus attorney fees under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Act, 42 U.S.C. 4654(c), calculated using the lodestar method, where a reasonable number of hours expended is multiplied by the prevailing rate in the relevant community. Based on the “no-interest rule,” historical rates, rather than rates in force at the end of litigation, were to be used. Counsel sought $2,017,987 in fees and $201,924 in costs, based, in part, on rates in effect in Washington D.C. The court reduced the number of hours and applied the St. Louis rate for hours expended until 2010 and Washington D.C. rates for later work. The Federal Circuit denied a request to supplement the record and affirmed, upholding the reductions imposed by the lower court. View "Biery v. United States" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, patent-holder plaintiffs market drugs and have patents in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations publication (Orange Book), 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1). Mylan filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA), 21 U.S.C. 355(j), seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of the drugs, certifying that the Orange Book patents are invalid or would not be infringed by the proposed drugs. The plaintiffs sued in Delaware under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). Mylan is incorporated in, and has its principal place of business in, West Virginia and submitted its ANDAs in Maryland; it intends to direct sales into Delaware, among other places, once it has FDA approval. Mylan sent notices to the plaintiffs in New York, Ireland, Delaware and Sweden. One plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware, the U.S. subsidiary of another has its principal place of business in Delaware. Both have sued others for infringement in Delaware. Each district court concluded that Delaware had sufficient contacts related to the subject of these cases to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mylan. The judges disagreed about whether Delaware could exercise general personal jurisdiction (independent of suit-related contacts) on the ground that Mylan consented to jurisdiction in registering to do business. Each declined to dismiss. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the issue of specific jurisdiction, declining to address general personal jurisdiction. View "Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, patent-holder plaintiffs market drugs and have patents in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations publication (Orange Book), 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1). Mylan filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA), 21 U.S.C. 355(j), seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of the drugs, certifying that the Orange Book patents are invalid or would not be infringed by the proposed drugs. The plaintiffs sued in Delaware under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). Mylan is incorporated in, and has its principal place of business in, West Virginia and submitted its ANDAs in Maryland; it intends to direct sales into Delaware, among other places, once it has FDA approval. Mylan sent notices to the plaintiffs in New York, Ireland, Delaware and Sweden. One plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware, the U.S. subsidiary of another has its principal place of business in Delaware. Both have sued others for infringement in Delaware. Each district court concluded that Delaware had sufficient contacts related to the subject of these cases to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mylan. The judges disagreed about whether Delaware could exercise general personal jurisdiction (independent of suit-related contacts) on the ground that Mylan consented to jurisdiction in registering to do business. Each declined to dismiss. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the issue of specific jurisdiction, declining to address general personal jurisdiction. View "Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

Halo, a Hong Kong company that designs and sells high-end modern furniture, owns two U.S. design patents, 13 U.S. copyrights, and one U.S. common law trademark, all relating to its furniture designs. Halo’s common law trademark, ODEON, is used in association with at least four of its designs. Halo sells its furniture in the U.S., including through its own retail stores. Comptoir, a Canadian corporation, also designs and markets high-end furniture that is manufactured in China, Vietnam, and India. Comptoir’s furniture is imported and sold to U.S. consumers directly at furniture shows and through distributors, including in Illinois. Halo sued, alleging infringement and violation of Illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices statutes. The district court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that the balance of interests favored Canada and that Canada, where the defendants reside, was an adequate forum. The Federal Circuit reversed. The policies underlying U.S. copyright, patent, and trademark laws would be defeated if a domestic forum to adjudicate the rights they convey was denied without a sufficient showing of the adequacy of the alternative foreign jurisdiction; the Federal Court of Canada would not provide any “potential avenue for redress for the subject matter” of Halo’s dispute. View "Halo Creative & Design, Ltd. v. Comptoir des Indes Inc." on Justia Law

Karen Dixon, recently substituted as appellant for her deceased husband Donald, and appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decision dismissing her appeal based on a nonjurisdictional timeliness defense that Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert McDonald waived. Mr. Dixon was diagnosed in 2003 with sarcoidosis of the lungs and transverse myelitis. He filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) seeking benefits for his sarcoidosis, which he alleged was connected to his service. A VA regional office denied Mr. Dixon’s claim, and the Board of Veterans Appeals affirmed. Acting pro se, Mr. Dixon filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court sixty days beyond the 120-day filing deadline set out in 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court denied Mr. Dixon equitable tolling. He obtained pro bono counsel and filed a request for reconsideration of this denial, but the Veterans Court denied that request too. Mr. Dixon appealed, but then he died of his medical conditions while his appeal was pending. The Federal Circuit reversed because the Veterans Court’s denial of an extension of time had effectively denied Mr. Dixon’s new pro bono counsel access to evidence he would need to prove his claim. On remand, the Veterans Court substituted Mrs. Dixon and requested briefing from the parties on whether equitable tolling excused Mr. Dixon’s late filing. The Secretary responded by waiving his objection. Because the Veterans Court did not have the sua sponte authority to grant the Secretary relief on a defense he waived, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Mrs. Dixon’s appeal and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Queen’s University at Kingston, Canada, owns patents directed to Attentive User Interfaces, which allow devices to change their behavior based on the attentiveness of a user—for example, pausing or starting a video based on a user’s eye-contact with the device. Queen’s sued, alleging that Samsung’s SmartPause feature infringed those patents. Throughout fact discovery, Queen’s University refused to produce certain documents. It produced privilege logs that withheld documents based on its assertion of a privilege relating to communications with its patent agents. A magistrate granted Samsung’s motion to compel, finding that the communications between Queen’s University employees and their non-attorney patent agents are not subject to the attorney-client privilege and that a separate patent-agent privilege does not exist. The district court declined to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal, but agreed to stay the production of the documents at issue pending a petition for writ of mandamus. The Federal Circuit granted that petition, finding that, consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 501, a patent-agent privilege is justified “in the light of reason and experience” and extends to communications with non-attorney patent agents when those agents are acting within the agent’s authorized practice of law before the Patent Office. View "In Re: Queen's Univ. at Kingston" on Justia Law

Binzel, which manufactures welding equipment, owns the German DE 934 patent, filed in 1997, and the U.S. 406 patent, issued in 2002, which claims priority to the German application, for a method of manufacturing a contact tip for metal inert gas welding. Lismont, a resident of Belgium asserts that, beginning in 1995, he developed the method disclosed in both patents for Binzel and, that by mid-1997, he had disclosed the details to Binzel. Lismont contends that, despite Binzel's representations that he was the first to conceive of this method, Binzel filed the DE 934 application naming its employee, Sattler, as the inventor. In 2000-2002 Lismont initiated suits in the German Federal Court and sought information about the countries in which Binzel was pursuing patents and about the manufacture and sales of contact tips that used the method at issue. The German courts ruled against Lismont, finding that he failed to prove that he had an inventorship interest. The German Supreme Court rejected his appeal in 2009. Lismont then filed actions in the German Constitutional Court and in the European Court of Human Rights. In 2012, Lismont initiated U.S. litigation seeking to correct inventorship of the 406 patent (35 U.S.C. 256(a)). After discovery concerning the issue of laches, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed: Lismont failed to rebut the presumption of laches. View "Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004-2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars from the UK into the U.S. and deposited estimated duty payments. Ford later concluded that its estimates had been too high and filed nine reconciliation entries, seeking a refund of about $6.2 million. Customs may liquidate an entry within one year after filing, 19 U.S.C. 1504(a). It may extend that period if it needs additional information or if the importer requests an extension, for a maximum of three one-year extensions. Otherwise the entry “shall be deemed liquidated at the rate ... asserted by the importer.” When an entry is deemed liquidated, Customs may not recalculate the duty owed. Ford asserted the rate in its reconciliation entries rather than the rate asserted at the time of entry. Ford sought a declaratory judgment that its entries had been liquidated as a matter of law in 2009. The Court of International Trade dismissed some claims as barred by the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 2636(i) and declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, declining to address the statute of limitations and noting that all of Ford’s entries have now liquidated; Customs denied the protest for Ford’s 2005 entries, and Ford has filed a section 1581(a) challenge. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Waters’ patent relates to systems that use highly compressed gas, compressible liquid, or supercritical fluid. In liquid chromatography. The patent is directed to using a pump as a pressure source for supercritical fluid chromatography (SFC), a more efficient and advanced form of chromatography. SFC uses pumps to regulate the flow of compressible fluids, such as supercritical carbon dioxide, through a column. The patent provides an alternative SFC system, allowing the effective use of a less expensive pump than was required by prior art. In 2011, Waters sued Aurora for infringement. Aurora sought inter partes reexamination of all claims, citing new prior art. In response to an initial Office Action rejecting all claims, Waters amended independent claims and added dependent claims, with an additional limitation. In 2012 Agilent acquired substantially all of Aurora’s assets, agreeing to be bound by the outcome of the reexamination proceedings.The Board reversed all of the rejections, listing Aurora as the third-party requester and Aurora’s counsel as counsel for the third-party requester. The Federal Circuit dismissed Agilent’s appeal; Aurora, not Agilent, is the third-party requester. Agilent lacked a cause of action to appeal. View "Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Waters Techs. Corp." on Justia Law

International Boundary and Water Commissioner Ruth hired McCarthy as an attorney in 2009. Within months, McCarthy had prepared four legal memoranda challenging Commission activities as “gross mismanagement,” contrary to existing law, and characterizing certain officers as lacking “core competencies.” McCarthy submitted a report: “Disclosures of Alleged Fraud, Waste and Abuse” to the Office of Inspector General (OIG), and other federal agencies and informed Ruth of his reports. Ruth terminated McCarthy’s employment, citing McCarthy’s failure to support the executive staff in a constructive manner. McCarthy filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging whistleblower retaliation, citing his report to OIG, but not the legal memoranda, as protected activity. Existing precedent held that reports made in the course of an employee’s normal duties and reports made to a supervisor about a supervisor’s conduct were not protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 103 Stat. 16. The administrative judge found no retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed in 2012. While McCarthy’s petition was pending, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 1465-76, under which McCarthy’s legal memoranda could be protected disclosures. The Act can be applied retroactively to pending cases. McCarthy did not raise the change in law while his petition for rehearing was pending. The Federal Circuit affirmed MSPB’s refusal to reopen his case. McCarthy has not exhausted OSC remedies with respect to the memoranda, rendering the MSPB without jurisdiction. View "McCarthy v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law