Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against various local government defendants, claiming unjust enrichment and seeking disgorgement of traffic fines plaintiffs allege were imposed in violation of Florida law. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court held in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Kissimmee Util. Auth., that an order denying Florida sovereign immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Because CSX is still controlling on that point of law, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The court also denied defendants' motion for a frivolity determination and sanctions because the jurisdictional argument raised by defendants is not entirely meritless. View "Parker v. City Of Apopka" on Justia Law

After ending their marriage, Ex-Wife and Ex-Husband commenced proceedings in the Moscow Court for division of marital assets. In the Russian Dispute, Ex-Wife claimed that Ex-Husband was concealing and dissipating marital assets through and with the assistance of “offshore companies” around the world. In the United States, Ex-Wife sought information from Gabriella Pugh and her employer in Atlanta, Georgia - Trident - that she expected would reveal Ex-Husband’s beneficial ownership of Bahamian corporation, Tripleton. On referral, the Magistrate Judge granted Ex-Wife's ex parte Application for Judicial Assistance and authorized service of two subpoenas. In these consolidated appeals, Trident challenges the district court's order allowing discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 (Appeal No. 15-13008 (“First Appeal”)) and imposing contempt sanctions (Appeal No. 15-15066 (“Second Appeal”)). The court agreed with the district court that the location of responsive documents and electronically stored information - to the extent a physical location can be discerned in this digital age - does not establish a per se bar to discovery under section 1782; having rejected the Extraterritoriality Argument, the court agreed with the district court that significant “circumstantial evidence” established that Trident Atlanta had “control” over responsive documents in the physical possession or custody of Trident Bahamas; and therefore the court affirmed as to the First Appeal. The court rejected Trident Atlanta's frivolous jurisdictional argument; the Contempt Order is supported by the evidence; and therefore the court affirmed the Second Appeal. View "Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the EPA and the Corps' joint promulgation of the Clean Water Rule, which defines the term “Waters of the United States” for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) gives courts of appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over challenges to the rule. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs in this case also filed in this court what they termed a “protective” petition for direct review of their Clean Water Rule challenge. The court concluded that, because of the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the Clean Water Rule, those opposing the rule are not being harmed by it in the interim. And, if the Sixth Circuit holds that the rule is invalid, that will end the matter, subject (as all panel decisions are) to the possibility of en banc and certiorari review. In any event, the decision of that court will likely narrow and refine, if not render moot, at least some of the issues this court asked the parties to brief. For all of these reasons, the court exercised its discretion to stay its hand in this case pending a decision of the Sixth Circuit or further developments. Accordingly, the court held the appeal in abeyance and ordered the district court to stay all further proceedings. View "State of Georgia v. McCarthey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County after he suffered injuries while aboard a vessel traveling in the Coral Park Canal, a drainage canal in the County. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. At issue is whether a canal is navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1333, if an artificial obstruction prevents vessels from using the canal to conduct interstate commerce. Because the Coral Park Canal cannot support interstate commerce, the court concluded that it cannot satisfy the location requirement of admiralty jurisdiction. The court concluded that extending jurisdiction to waters incapable of commercial activity serves no purpose of admiralty jurisdiction. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's injuries did not occur on navigable waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction because an artificial obstruction prevents vessels from traveling from the Coral Park Canal to places outside of Florida. View "Tundidor v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Between June 15, 2012, and November 15, 2012, the District Court entered a series of orders granting summary judgment and assessing attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of Crum & Forster in a suit about the scope of an insurance policy under Florida law brought by Hartford. Hartford appealed and the court ordered the parties to take part in a mediation conference. After mediation failed to resolve Hartford's appeal, a second mediation resulted in a conditional settlement agreement. The court granted the parties’ joint motion to stay Hartford’s initial appeal, so the parties could file their motion to vacate those orders in the district court pursuant to Rule 60(b). The district court, invoking the Supreme Court’s U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company v. Bonner Mall Partnership decision, concluded that there are no “exceptional circumstances” warranting vacatur of the contested orders. The court followed the approach taken by the First and Second Circuits, which embraces the equitable nature of the Supreme Court’s Bancorp inquiry. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion where it misapplied Bancorp because of the exceptional circumstances in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated. View "Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins." on Justia Law

The Secretary determined that Bayou Shores was not in substantial compliance with the Medicare program participation requirements, and that conditions in its facility constituted an immediate jeopardy to residents’ health and safety. The bankruptcy court assumed authority over Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements as part of the debtor’s estate, enjoined the Secretary from terminating the provider agreements, determined for itself that Bayou Shores was qualified to participate in the provider agreements, required the Secretary to maintain the stream of monetary benefit under the agreements, reorganized the debtor’s estate, and finally issued its Confirmation Order. The district court upheld the Secretary’s jurisdictional challenge and reversed the Confirmation Order with respect to the assumption of the debtor’s Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements. The court concluded that the statutory revision in this case does not demonstrate Congress's clear intention to vest the bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over Medicare claims. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the provider agreements in this case. The bankruptcy court was without 28 U.S.C. 1334 jurisdiction under the 42 U.S.C. 405(h) bar to issue orders enjoining the termination of the provider agreements and to further order the assumption of the provider agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Florida Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

In entertaining defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial, the district court applied the filing deadline found in the Federal Civil Rules and thus found the motion timely. The court disagreed and held that when trying a case arising under title 11 of the United States Code, a district court (just like a bankruptcy court) must apply the filing deadline found in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure when addressing a Rule 50(b) motion. The court vacated the district court's order granting defendants relief and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's award because, under the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, defendants' Rule 50(b) post-trial motion was untimely. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9015 requires that such motions be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment. In this case, defendants filed their renewed motion 28 days after the entry of judgment. View "Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC" on Justia Law

Tamaz, a Saudi Arabian company, appealed the denial of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a default judgment against it as void for lack of service of process. Tamaz argues that the district court erred in concluding that De Gazelle had properly served it using Federal Express, when that means of service is not specifically authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and De Gazelle had not received prior court authorization to serve Tamaz using that method. The court agreed, concluding that when De Gazelle FedExed the summons and complaint to Tamaz’s post office box on September 21, 2013, it was not acting pursuant to a court order. In fact, De Gazelle did not seek court authorization to serve Tamaz via Federal Express until the magistrate judge denied its first motion for a default judgment on the ground that De Gazelle failed to show that service via FedEx was authorized under Rule 4. Furthermore, the magistrate judge’s reliance, in later finding that service had been effected on September 21, 2013, on evidence showing that Althawadi, Tamaz’s registered agent, had actual notice of the lawsuit was misplaced, since notice does not confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant when it has not been served in accordance with Rule 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "De Gazelle Group, Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment" on Justia Law

Bersin filed suit, alleging that it had been induced into investing more than $350,000 in a BWB franchise through fraud and misrepresentations, some of which concerned OBWB’s advertising of patented technology. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its case against OBWB in state court; nor did the district court err in declining to hold Bersin in contempt. The court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, deprived the district court of the power to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its state court suit. Even if the district court had the power to issue such an injunction, it would have been improper on the merits to bind Bersin to a settlement release it had no part in negotiating and from which it obtained no benefit. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co., Inc. v. Bersin Bagel Group, LLC" on Justia Law