Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In entertaining defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial, the district court applied the filing deadline found in the Federal Civil Rules and thus found the motion timely. The court disagreed and held that when trying a case arising under title 11 of the United States Code, a district court (just like a bankruptcy court) must apply the filing deadline found in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure when addressing a Rule 50(b) motion. The court vacated the district court's order granting defendants relief and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's award because, under the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, defendants' Rule 50(b) post-trial motion was untimely. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9015 requires that such motions be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment. In this case, defendants filed their renewed motion 28 days after the entry of judgment. View "Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC" on Justia Law

Tamaz, a Saudi Arabian company, appealed the denial of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a default judgment against it as void for lack of service of process. Tamaz argues that the district court erred in concluding that De Gazelle had properly served it using Federal Express, when that means of service is not specifically authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and De Gazelle had not received prior court authorization to serve Tamaz using that method. The court agreed, concluding that when De Gazelle FedExed the summons and complaint to Tamaz’s post office box on September 21, 2013, it was not acting pursuant to a court order. In fact, De Gazelle did not seek court authorization to serve Tamaz via Federal Express until the magistrate judge denied its first motion for a default judgment on the ground that De Gazelle failed to show that service via FedEx was authorized under Rule 4. Furthermore, the magistrate judge’s reliance, in later finding that service had been effected on September 21, 2013, on evidence showing that Althawadi, Tamaz’s registered agent, had actual notice of the lawsuit was misplaced, since notice does not confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant when it has not been served in accordance with Rule 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "De Gazelle Group, Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment" on Justia Law

Bersin filed suit, alleging that it had been induced into investing more than $350,000 in a BWB franchise through fraud and misrepresentations, some of which concerned OBWB’s advertising of patented technology. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its case against OBWB in state court; nor did the district court err in declining to hold Bersin in contempt. The court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, deprived the district court of the power to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its state court suit. Even if the district court had the power to issue such an injunction, it would have been improper on the merits to bind Bersin to a settlement release it had no part in negotiating and from which it obtained no benefit. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co., Inc. v. Bersin Bagel Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Twenty-one months after plaintiff filed an employment discrimination case against US Steel, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. When U.S. Steel learned of the bankruptcy case - that plaintiff's Chapter 7 petition had not disclosed the employment-discrimination claims she was pursuing and that the Chapter 7 Trustee was treating the bankruptcy as a “no asset” case and had filed a Report of No Distribution with the bankruptcy court - it moved the district court alternatively to dismiss the case or for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel as formulated in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., and Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., controlled its decision. The court concluded that New Hampshire v. Maine did not govern the district court's application of judicial estoppel in this case. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred in failing to give the New Hampshire factors appropriate weight and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring her claims on the basis of judicial estoppel. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying Eleventh Circuit precedent, namely Burnes and Robinson, where the bankruptcy court in those cases accepted the debtor's failure to disclose as property of the bankruptcy estate claims the debtor was litigating in federal district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slater v. US Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The Tribe appealed from two orders and a final judgment in a fraud-and-embezzlement-related RICO suit against former tribal officials, several attorneys, a law firm, and Morgan Stanley. In this case, the undisputed current leaders of the Tribe seek entry into federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction based on federal statutory claims against Tribal and non-Tribal members alike. On the pleadings as presented at this stage of the proceedings, general justiciability concerns regarding intra-Tribal conflicts do not defeat jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim, however, because the Tribe did not challenge the dismissal on these grounds in its opening brief and because the complaint lacks the requisite specificity and fails to state a plausible claim. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. Cypress" on Justia Law

The company appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of a dispute between the Company and the Union in June 2012 and the district court's enforcement of the resulting arbitration award in favor of the Union in December 2014. Although the June 2012 order was a final decision when it was issued, the Company did not appeal it until after the district court entered the December 2014 order. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the first order. In regards to the December 14 order, the court affirmed because no basis exists to vacate the arbitration award in this instance. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Union's motion for attorney's fees. The court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "United Steel v. Wise Alloys, LLC" on Justia Law

Key TV, a local over-the-air broadcaster, filed suit against Comcast, owner and operator of a cable television system serving the same area, alleging that it was unlawfully overcharged for the right to broadcast its content over Comcast's cable system and that Comcast illegally discriminated against it by not carrying the station in high definition or including it on Comcast's "hospitality tier." Key TV also filed two state law claims. The district court stayed the entire case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine pending resolution of Key TV's federal law claims by the FCC. The court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal where this stay does not end the litigation on the merits and it does not leave the district court without anything to do but execute the judgment. The court further concluded that the collateral order doctrine does not apply to save appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Beach TV Cable Co. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC" on Justia Law