Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After a jury found CSX solely liable for injuries suffered by an employee of General Mills and awarded the employee damages, CSX filed this action for indemnification from General Mills. The district court dismissed on the ground that the contract between the parties barred indemnification for damages arising from CSX's sole negligence. In reaching this result, the district court applied a federal rule of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the relative fault of General Mills for the injury suffered by its employee. The court held, however, that federal common law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court that exercised diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether collateral estoppel bars the complaint of CSX for indemnification. The court declined to decide the dispute regarding one element of collateral estoppel as defined by Georgia law: the earlier litigation must have been between identical parties. The court also declined to decide the alternative argument raised by CSX, whether the Sidetrack Agreement requires indemnification assuming CSX was solely at fault. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Myra Furcron appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mails Centers Plus, LLC (“MCP”) on Furcron’s claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. In addressing Furcron’s sexual harassment claim, the district court found that Furcron failed to produce sufficient evidence that the alleged harassment was based on sex. On the retaliation claim, the district court found that Furcron failed to demonstrate that she engaged in protected activity and that Defendant’s defense was a pretext for her termination. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. The Court concluded that questions of fact remained on Furcron's harassment claim. The Court concluded that her allegations with respect to the pretext argument. View "Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC" on Justia Law

This case began as a contract dispute between two corporations: PTA-FLA, Inc., and ZTE USA, Inc. Shortly thereafter, three corporations affiliated with PTA-FLA filed similar cases against ZTE USA and its parent corporation, ZTE Corp., in several different federal district courts. All of the parties involved in these disputes participated in a consolidated arbitration proceeding that resulted in a zero-dollar award binding ZTE USA and the four affiliated plaintiff corporations. ZTE USA then moved the district court in the Middle District of Florida to reopen PTA-FLA’s case, join the three other plaintiff corporations to the case, and, finally, to confirm the arbitrator’s award against all four plaintiff corporations. But before the district court could rule on that motion, PTA-FLA (the original plaintiff) voluntarily dismissed its claims. The district court eventually confirmed the arbitral award against all parties, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction (grounded in diversity of citizenship) to confirm the award against the original parties and supplemental jurisdiction to confirm the award against the later-joined parties despite PTA-FLA’s voluntary dismissal and the reduction in the amount in controversy. The three joined parties appealed the confirmation of the award, claiming that the district court was without subject matter or supplemental jurisdiction. After careful review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction and, accordingly, affirmed. View "PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a labor dispute involving the H-2A visa program. Defendant Consolidated Citrus Limited Partnership (“Consolidated Citrus”) appealed from the district court’s order granting judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and holding Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer. All original plaintiffs were Mexican nationals who came to the United States temporarily to work as harvesters on citrus groves in central Florida. These plaintiffs entered the United States legally under the federal H-2A visa program. During the 2005-06 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus struggled to find sufficient labor to meet its harvesting needs. Starting with the 2006-07 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus began working with labor contractors to hire temporary foreign workers. One such labor contractor was defendant Ruiz Harvesting, Inc. (“RHI”), owned by Basiliso Ruiz (“Ruiz”). Consolidated Citrus expected the temporary workers to be at their assigned groves at some time in the early morning, but RHI personnel ultimately decided what time the workers would arrive. Each day, RHI transported workers to and from the groves in RHI vehicles. Under the H-2A program regulations, agricultural workers compensated on a piece-rate basis must be paid at least the equivalent of the wages they would have received under the applicable “adverse effect wage rate” (“AEWR”), which was the hourly minimum set by the Department of Labor. Where a worker’s piece-rate wages did not add up to the wages the worker would have earned under the hourly rate, the employer had to supplement that worker’s earnings to meet that minimum wage. The supplemental amount was known as “build-up” pay. RHI perpetrated a kickback scheme to recoup this build-up pay: on payday, RHI employees drove the H-2A temporary workers to a bank where the workers cashed their paychecks. The workers then returned to the RHI vehicle, where an RHI employee collected cash from each worker in an amount equal to that worker’s build-up pay. H-2A workers were told to return money only to Ruiz and RHI and only when the workers’ paychecks included build-up pay. No one from Consolidated Citrus demanded that H-2A temporary workers return their build-up pay, and no H-2A temporary worker ever complained directly to Consolidated Citrus about RHI’s kickback scheme. After careful review of this matter, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. To the extent that the district court held Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer for purposes of the plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims, the Court affirmed. The Court reversed, however, the district court’s determination that the FLSA “suffer or permit to work” standard applied to the breach of contract claims for purposes of determining whether Consolidated Citrus qualified as a joint employer under the H-2A program. The case was remanded to the district court to apply, in the first instance, that governing standard of common law agency for purposes of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. View "Garcia-Celestino, et al. v. Consolidated Citrus Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

In February 2014, appellant-plaintiff Glynn Hotz purchased 16,000 shares of appellee-defendant Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. (“Galectin”), a small biopharmaceutical company headquartered in Norcross, Georgia. The price for Galectin common stock was $17.90 per share. In July 2014, news outlets began to report that Galectin had paid promotional firms to write flattering articles about Galectin and to “tout” Galectin’s stock price. Days later, Galectin’s stock price crashed, losing over half its value, falling from a price of $15.91 per share to $7.10 per share in one day. After suffering stock losses, Hotz filed a consolidated class action complaint against Galectin in May 2015. Hotz appealed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. Hotz argued: (1) that Galectin made material misstatements and omissions of fact by not disclosing that it had paid the promotional firms to tout Galectin stock; and (2) that certain Galectin officers and directors were liable for the company’s actions in their personal capacity as “controlling persons” of Galectin under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. After thorough review, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Hotz v. Galectin Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

Wright filed suit in federal court against Pilot, alleging that Pilot and certain Pilot employees systematically shortchanged some trucking companies with whom Pilot had discount agreements by failing to give them the agreed-upon benefits. Wright filed claims under both state and federal law. At issue here is whether federal courts that are given original subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law claims by the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), retain that jurisdiction even when the class claims are dismissed before the class is certified. The district court found that CAFA does not vest the federal courts with original jurisdiction over state-law claims after the class claims are dismissed. Pilot argues that CAFA conferred original jurisdiction over all of Wright’s claims at the time Wright filed them, such that the jurisdiction could not have divested when the class claims were later dismissed. Here, Wright first filed directly in federal court under CAFA but now wishes to refile in state court. When the post-filing action that did away with the class claims is not an amendment to the complaint, the court saw no basis for distinguishing cases originally filed in federal court under CAFA from those removed to federal court. Therefore, the court concluded that CAFA continues to confer original federal jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims in this suit. Because CAFA vested the district court with original jurisdiction over the remaining claims, there was no need for it to analyze supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wright Transportation, Inc. v. Pilot Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant after she slipped and fell on one of defendant's cruise ships. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court's judgment for defendant. In this case, plaintiff’s cruise ticket contains several restrictions governing plaintiff’s right to sue defendant. Most importantly, the ticket contains a time limitation within which to file suit and a forum-selection clause. Plaintiff argues that she should be deemed to have satisfied the one-year limitation period because she filed suit in state court within a year and that filing equitably tolled the limitation. The court found that equitable tolling does not apply under these circumstances where defendants warned plaintiff that it intended to enforce the forum-selection clause and plaintiff nonetheless filed suit in the wrong forum. When plaintiff finally filed suit in the correct forum, she did so after expiration of the time period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chang v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against various local government defendants, claiming unjust enrichment and seeking disgorgement of traffic fines plaintiffs allege were imposed in violation of Florida law. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court held in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Kissimmee Util. Auth., that an order denying Florida sovereign immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Because CSX is still controlling on that point of law, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The court also denied defendants' motion for a frivolity determination and sanctions because the jurisdictional argument raised by defendants is not entirely meritless. View "Parker v. City Of Apopka" on Justia Law

After ending their marriage, Ex-Wife and Ex-Husband commenced proceedings in the Moscow Court for division of marital assets. In the Russian Dispute, Ex-Wife claimed that Ex-Husband was concealing and dissipating marital assets through and with the assistance of “offshore companies” around the world. In the United States, Ex-Wife sought information from Gabriella Pugh and her employer in Atlanta, Georgia - Trident - that she expected would reveal Ex-Husband’s beneficial ownership of Bahamian corporation, Tripleton. On referral, the Magistrate Judge granted Ex-Wife's ex parte Application for Judicial Assistance and authorized service of two subpoenas. In these consolidated appeals, Trident challenges the district court's order allowing discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 (Appeal No. 15-13008 (“First Appeal”)) and imposing contempt sanctions (Appeal No. 15-15066 (“Second Appeal”)). The court agreed with the district court that the location of responsive documents and electronically stored information - to the extent a physical location can be discerned in this digital age - does not establish a per se bar to discovery under section 1782; having rejected the Extraterritoriality Argument, the court agreed with the district court that significant “circumstantial evidence” established that Trident Atlanta had “control” over responsive documents in the physical possession or custody of Trident Bahamas; and therefore the court affirmed as to the First Appeal. The court rejected Trident Atlanta's frivolous jurisdictional argument; the Contempt Order is supported by the evidence; and therefore the court affirmed the Second Appeal. View "Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the EPA and the Corps' joint promulgation of the Clean Water Rule, which defines the term “Waters of the United States” for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) gives courts of appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over challenges to the rule. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs in this case also filed in this court what they termed a “protective” petition for direct review of their Clean Water Rule challenge. The court concluded that, because of the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the Clean Water Rule, those opposing the rule are not being harmed by it in the interim. And, if the Sixth Circuit holds that the rule is invalid, that will end the matter, subject (as all panel decisions are) to the possibility of en banc and certiorari review. In any event, the decision of that court will likely narrow and refine, if not render moot, at least some of the issues this court asked the parties to brief. For all of these reasons, the court exercised its discretion to stay its hand in this case pending a decision of the Sixth Circuit or further developments. Accordingly, the court held the appeal in abeyance and ordered the district court to stay all further proceedings. View "State of Georgia v. McCarthey" on Justia Law