Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Timothy LaBatte, a class member in a class action against the USDA, seeks to intervene in that class action – despite the fact that the action was settled and closed – after his claim for compensation under the terms of the action’s settlement agreement was denied. The district court determined that it lacked ancillary jurisdiction to hear LaBatte's challenge. The court affirmed, concluding that LaBatte’s motion to intervene is unrelated to the underlying lawsuit and the district court was not required to hear LaBatte’s motion in order to effectuate its decrees. View "Keepseagle v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

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The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law

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Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

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Cincinnati filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a duty to defendant or indemnify claims brought against its insured, All Plumbing, for sending unsolicited faxed advertisements alleged to be in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court ruled that Cincinnati could not assert any of its defenses to coverage under the primary liability provision of the policy because it had failed to reserve its rights, but could assert such defenses under the excess liability provision. However, the district court did not address the asserted defenses under that provision. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final decision as to all requested relief where the district court's decision did not resolve all of Cincinnati’s rights and liabilities under the excess liability provision of the policy. View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. All Plumbing, Inc." on Justia Law

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Douglas B. Huron and the Society filed suit against OPM and its Director challenging the agency’s approval of health benefits plans for federal employees that exclude or limit insurance coverage of speech-generating devices. The court concluded that Huron and the Society never identified a procedural injury or raised procedural standing before the district court, and instead argued vigorously for “traditional” standing until their briefing on appeal. Huron’s and the Society’s appellate about-face on the nature of Huron’s claimed injury leaves them no viable basis on which to establish standing. Because Huron and the Society forfeited twice over the claims on which they predicate standing, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Huron v. Cobert" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that new regulations promulgated by the USDA may result in an increase in foodborne illness from contaminated poultry. The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact and dismissed their claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that standing should have been evaluated under the motion to dismiss standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the district court erred by using the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment. On the merits, the court concluded that, because plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that the NPIS substantially increases the risk of producing unwholesome, adulterated poultry compared to the existing inspection systems, they do not have standing. Further, plaintiffs' self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the NPIS, and their subjective fear does not give rise to standing. The court also concluded that FWW has not alleged an injury to its interest to give rise to organizational standing. Because plaintiffs have failed to establish that they will likely suffer a substantive injury, their claimed procedural injury necessarily fails. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs failed to show any cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

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Dalton Trucking and ARTBA challenged the EPA's final decision authorizing California regulations intended to reduce emissions of particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen from in-use nonroad diesel engines. Dalton Truck sought review of the same EPA decision at the same time in the Ninth Circuit, where ARTBA intervened in Dalton Trucking's behalf. Before this court, Dalton Trucking and ARTBA argue that the Ninth Circuit is the proper venue for their challenges and seek dismissal or transfer of their petitions for review. The court agreed that, pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), venue is not proper in this court because EPA’s decision does not satisfy either of the statutory avenues for filing in the D.C. Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for review. View "Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

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The District and the Police Department appealed from the district court's grant of preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of a “good reason” standard in the D.C. Code provision governing the issuance of licenses for the carrying of concealed weapons, D.C. Law 20-279, 3(b). The court noted that the controlling fact in this case is the identity of the judge who decided it in the district court – The Honorable Senior United States District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., of the Northern District of New York. Although Judge Scullin served under a properly issued designation, that designation was limited to specific and enumerated cases. The court concluded that the present litigation is not one of those cases. The court concluded that, like the designated judge in Frad v. Kelly, Judge Scullin had a limited designation that did not extend beyond the specifications of that designation. Accordingly, the court vacated the order based on jurisdictional grounds. View "Wrenn v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

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The Secretary issued regulations setting out reasonable cost limits (RCLs) for specified medical services and establishing certain exceptions to those limits. Canonsburg claimed that the Secretary has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., because her method of calculation is inconsistent with governing regulations and was promulgated without notice and comment. In light of Canonsburg I, the district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issue preclusion barred Canonsburg’s suit. The court concluded that the Secretary did not waive her issue preclusion affirmative defense by not raising it at the administrative stage. Moreover, the Secretary asserted it, expressly and properly, in district court and the court is free to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine to Canonsburg's complaint. In light of the Supreme Court's plain language in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I and II), the court's own construction of the Chenery doctrine and no persuasive case law to the contrary, the court concluded that the Chenery doctrine does not prohibit raising issue preclusion as an affirmative defense in district court even if the party raising the defense was not a party to the administrative proceeding or was otherwise unable to assert the defense at the administrative stage. Finally, the court rejected Canonsburg's claims of equitable considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Canonsburg General Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law