Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

GSS appealed the district court’s dismissal of its second attempt to confirm a $44 million arbitral award entered against the Port Authority for breach of a construction contract. GSS first tried to confirm the award, but the district court found that it had no personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority. Then GSS filed its second petition, also naming the Republic of Liberia, which owns the Port Authority, as respondents. The district court again dismissed GSS’s petition, finding that issue preclusion barred relitigating its personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority and that GSS failed to demonstrate that Liberia was liable for the Port Authority’s alleged breach. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against Liberia for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 et seq.; affirmed the district court's dismissal of GSS's petition against the Port Authority on sovereign immunities grounds; and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing GSS's petition before allowing jurisdictional discovery. View "GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia" on Justia Law

Appellants received less than $6,000 in damages from their employers for unpaid overtime wages after eight years of litigation. In this appeal, appellants challenge the district court's fee award as too low, while the employers challenge it as too high. The court concluded that, while appellants’ fee petition originally was untimely, the court’s entry of an amended judgment created “[a] new period for filing” and cured that untimeliness, notwithstanding the fact that the petition was filed before entry of the new judgment. Therefore, appellants satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s dictates, leaving no ground on which to deny appellants’ fee petition in its entirety for lack of timeliness. On the merits, the court concluded that there is no support in the record for the district court’s finding that appellants failed to promptly provide a damages calculation that could have facilitated early settlement. This clear factual error requires remand. Additionally, because the court cannot ascertain whether or how significantly this mistaken factual finding impacted other aspects of the district court’s fee reasonability assessment, the court vacated the entire decision and remanded. View "Radtke v. Caschetta" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as a tenured professor at the University, he filed suit in state court against defendants, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. The case was removed to federal court and plaintiff missed the deadline to file a brief in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. Invoking Local Rule 7(b), the district court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that its merits were unopposed and thus conceded by plaintiff, thereby dismissing the complaint and case with prejudice. The district court then denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint as moot and, in the alternative, for failure to consult with opposing counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7(m). Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rules 59(e) and 60(b), which the district court also denied. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to extend time and its dismissal of the complaint. But the court reversed the district court insofar as it dismissed the complaint with prejudice and dismissed the case. In light of plaintiff’s efforts to respond, his lack of bad faith, the absence of any prejudice to defendants, and the short delay involved, dismissal of the complaint without prejudice would have been the proper route to accomplish Local Rule 7(b)’s docket-management objectives. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by instead dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Likewise, the district court also abused its discretion by dismissing the case when its dismissal of the complaint under Local Rule 7(b) should have been, at most, without prejudice. View "Cohen v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

CostCommand filed suit against Turner, WHA, and California defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that they engaged in a series of wrongful acts that essentially destroyed CostCommand’s business. The district court concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction and dismissed the case. In this case, no dispute exists as to the citizenship of any party except WHA. Applying the nerve-center test set out in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the court concluded that WHA maintained its principal place of business in Maryland, and thus citizenship for diversity purposes is in Maryland. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal. View "CostCommand, LLC v. WH Administrators, Inc." on Justia Law

Timothy LaBatte, a class member in a class action against the USDA, seeks to intervene in that class action – despite the fact that the action was settled and closed – after his claim for compensation under the terms of the action’s settlement agreement was denied. The district court determined that it lacked ancillary jurisdiction to hear LaBatte's challenge. The court affirmed, concluding that LaBatte’s motion to intervene is unrelated to the underlying lawsuit and the district court was not required to hear LaBatte’s motion in order to effectuate its decrees. View "Keepseagle v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law

Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

Cincinnati filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a duty to defendant or indemnify claims brought against its insured, All Plumbing, for sending unsolicited faxed advertisements alleged to be in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court ruled that Cincinnati could not assert any of its defenses to coverage under the primary liability provision of the policy because it had failed to reserve its rights, but could assert such defenses under the excess liability provision. However, the district court did not address the asserted defenses under that provision. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final decision as to all requested relief where the district court's decision did not resolve all of Cincinnati’s rights and liabilities under the excess liability provision of the policy. View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. All Plumbing, Inc." on Justia Law

Douglas B. Huron and the Society filed suit against OPM and its Director challenging the agency’s approval of health benefits plans for federal employees that exclude or limit insurance coverage of speech-generating devices. The court concluded that Huron and the Society never identified a procedural injury or raised procedural standing before the district court, and instead argued vigorously for “traditional” standing until their briefing on appeal. Huron’s and the Society’s appellate about-face on the nature of Huron’s claimed injury leaves them no viable basis on which to establish standing. Because Huron and the Society forfeited twice over the claims on which they predicate standing, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Huron v. Cobert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that new regulations promulgated by the USDA may result in an increase in foodborne illness from contaminated poultry. The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact and dismissed their claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that standing should have been evaluated under the motion to dismiss standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the district court erred by using the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment. On the merits, the court concluded that, because plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that the NPIS substantially increases the risk of producing unwholesome, adulterated poultry compared to the existing inspection systems, they do not have standing. Further, plaintiffs' self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the NPIS, and their subjective fear does not give rise to standing. The court also concluded that FWW has not alleged an injury to its interest to give rise to organizational standing. Because plaintiffs have failed to establish that they will likely suffer a substantive injury, their claimed procedural injury necessarily fails. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs failed to show any cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law