Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

On March 28, 2008, while Salata was cleaning property owned by Weyerhaeuser, she slipped and fell, claiming loose floor tiles were the cause. On March 8, 2010, Salata filed suit. The parties attempted voluntary mediation, but when they could not reach a settlement, Salata’s then-attorneys, were allowed to withdraw, and Salata’s current counsel, Elrabadi, took over on March 14, 2012. On February 26, 2013, Weyerhaeuser moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the court’s discovery order under FRCP 37, and for a want of prosecution under Rule 41(b); Weyerhaeuser also requested attorney’s fees. The court held a hearing on the motion. Elrabadi failed to appear. The court declined to impose sanctions, but dismissed the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. On May 9, 2013, Elrabadi filed a Motion to Reinstate. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but, on rehearing en banc, reversed, holding that the correct interpretation of “judicial district or similar legal entity” in section 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed. View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Anderson alleges that he was sexually abused by priests and other employees of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s and that, as a result of the abuse, he requires continuous psychological counseling and spent most of his adult life in penal institutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint explicitly acknowledged that the claims were barred by the Illinois statute of limitations or statute of repose. A 1991 statute of repose for actions based on childhood sexual abuse requires that all such claims be brought within two years of the date that the victim discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the abuse occurred, “but in no event … more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years,” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Although the statute was repealed effective January 1, 1994, the repeal does not avoid the impact as to Anderson because his claims were extinguished prior to the repeal. The court rejected claims of estoppel and waiver. View "Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago" on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 18002, provides $5 billion to reimburse employers and their proxies for outlays on early retirees’ medical care. WEA, which administers health-care programs on behalf of Wisconsin school districts, told them that it would collect on their behalf. It decided to use the money to reduce future premiums. The school districts claim that WEA should have rebated premiums for the years in which the retirees received the medical care that led to the federal payments. The difference matters to school districts that want to switch carriers. WEA’s plan to cut future rates, rather than provide rebates, gave it a competitive advantage. Districts filed suit, characterizing WEA’s choice to allocate no money to districts, that switch carriers as a form of conversion. All of the claims arise under state law and all litigants are citizens of Wisconsin. WEA removed to federal court, contending that the Act and its implementing regulations are the crux of the litigation. The Seventh Circuit ordered the case returned to state court, reasoning that the suit does not necessarily raise any issue of federal law and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011–15, gives states preeminence in the domain of insurance regulation. View "Hartland Lakeside Joint No. 3 Sch. Dist. v. WEA Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The Gagnards built a house in Los Altos, California, then sold the home to Goldman in January, 2004. Since then, Goldman has sued the Gagnards and those involved with the construction and sale of the house in various tribunals. In 2011, Goldman registered a foreign arbitral award in Illinois. She then sought citations to discover and collect assets. The district court issued denied reconsideration motions and granted a turnover order. After filing an appeal, the Gagnards paid $1.3 million to Goldman in satisfaction of the judgment. Goldman accepted the payment, and refunded money she had collected in excess of the judgment balance. The district discharged all pending citations and allowed the Gagnards to file a counterclaim against Goldman, claiming unjust enrichment, but subsequently dismissed the counter-complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the failure, by the Gagnards to act in a timely manner. View "Goldman v. Gagnard" on Justia Law

West Side Christian Church applied to the City of Evansville, Indiana, for a permit to set up its “Cross the River” display, consisting of 31 six-foot tall decorated crosses on four blocks of public Riverfront. After Evansville approved the application, residents sought an injunction, claiming that the display violated their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed. The City did not appeal, but West Side, which was an intervenor in the district court, did. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, finding that West Side did not have standing to appeal. The court could not redress any injury West Side might have suffered because Evansville was not party to this appeal and could prohibit the display regardless of any order issued. Any First Amendment injury West Side might have suffered from the injunction was not fairly traceable to, or caused by, Evansville. View "Cabral v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

Parmalat, a large Italian food and dairy company, entered bankruptcy in Italy and Bondi was appointed “extraordinary commissioner,” the equivalent of a bankruptcy trustee. In 2004 Bondi instituted, in New York, a proceeding under the since-repealed section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to enjoin any action against Parmalat with respect to property involved in the Italian bankruptcy, to consolidate claims against the company. Months later, Bondi filed suit in Illinois, against Thornton, an accounting company, claiming that Thornton contributed to the collapse of Parmalat by conducting fraudulent audits of in violation of Illinois tort law. The case was removed to federal court. The New York district court declined to abstain in light of the Illinois suit and granted Thornton summary judgment, on the ground that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Parmalat’s claim against the accounting company. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand to Illinois state court. The Illinois district court declined to remand to state court and upheld the in pari delicto ruling. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court was required to remand to the state court, but noted that the New York litigation remained unresolved. View "Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int'l" on Justia Law

Spaine was a seasonal employee from 2008 until 2011, helping low-income and disabled persons register for housing assistance. Spaine alleges that she was harassed and unfairly disciplined because of her race and that she was told, when her 2011 employment ended, that instead of being reinstated automatically as in the past, she would have to reapply the next year. Spaine interpreted this as termination. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging that she was harassed and eventually fired because she is African American. Months after filing that complaint, Spaine filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. Spaine was represented by counsel in the discrimination suit, but was without a lawyer in the bankruptcy case. On a schedule of personal property, Spaine was required to list contingent and unliquidated claims of all types. She listed nothing. In the separate financial statement, Spaine was required to list lawsuits to which she was party within the preceding year. She listed two eviction suits, but did not list her discrimination suit. A transcript of the creditors’ meeting shows that Spaine told the bankruptcy trustee about her discrimination lawsuit at the first opportunity after filing her incomplete schedules. Spaine also subsequently filed an affidavit indicating that she told the bankruptcy judge about the suit. The employer alleged that Spaine was trying to conceal the suit. Spaine successfully moved to reopen her bankruptcy. The discrimination suit was dismissed on estoppel grounds. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that material facts remained in dispute. View "Spaine v. Kane-Richards" on Justia Law