Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Tze Wung and related appellants moved the bankruptcy court to eliminate or suspend discharge under the bankruptcy plan of a judgment by Trendi Sportswear against debtor, Indu Craft. The bankruptcy court denied the motions and subsequently denied appellants' motions for reconsideration. Appellants then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders. Tze Wung later appealed the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) after the district court entered its judgment and past the 30-day time limit that was prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and incorporated into bankruptcy appeals through Rule 6(b)(1). Bank of Baroda moved to consolidate the three separate appeals, but Bank of Baroda made no mention of the fact that Tze Wung's appeal was untimely. The court concluded that Rule 6(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional rule. Where an opposing party fails to object to an untimely appeal to a court of appeals from a bankruptcy appellate panel or district court exercising appellate jurisdiction, the opposing party forfeits the objection, and the court has jurisdiction over the untimely appeal. Because Bank of Baroda waived its objection to Tze Wung's untimely appeal by failing to make such an objection, the court acted within its jurisdiction in allowing Tze Wung's appeal to proceed along with that of the other appellants in this matter. View "Tze Wung Consultants, Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a qui tam action against various providers of home health-care services and their officers, including Nursing Personnel. Plaintiff and the United States settled the claim against Nursing Personnel and the action remains pending against other defendants. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss two appeals of Nursing Personnel from an interlocutory order entered by the district court awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. The court concluded that the fee award did not have to be appealed until entry of an appealable judgment, and that the pending collateral order appeal in Case No. 13-1688, taken in the absence of an appealable judgment, has become moot upon the entry of a Rule 54(b) partial judgment. The court also concluded that the appeal in Case No. 14-251 from the Rule 54(b) partial judgment was timely. Therefore the court denied the collateral order appeal and dismissed that appeal as moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss and directed briefing of that appeal in the normal course. View "United States ex rel. Maurice v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action against defendants under the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., and under the New York False Claims Act, N.Y. Fin. Law 187 et seq. Before defendants filed an answer or made a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff sought to voluntarily dismiss the action. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice as to the United States and the State of New York, but with prejudice as to plaintiff. The court disagreed with the district court that the statement by plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff would not "pursue this matter any further" constituted "the plain English equivalent of a request that the Court dismiss the claim with prejudice." The court concluded that the plain language of the letter supplied no reason to conclude that plaintiff's counsel was requesting a dismissal with prejudice. In the absence of any indication by the plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), which governs the voluntary dismissal of an action, presumes that a voluntary dismissal under these circumstances is without prejudice. Accordingly, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. The court also rejected defendants' alternative argument that the dismissal should be analyzed under Rule 41(a)(2). The court vacated and remanded. View "Youseff v. Tishman Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims of medical malpractice, breach of contract, and negligence based on alleged failures by SGU to appropriately treat plaintiff's son's mental illness. The court concluded that the case was properly removed where a real party defendant in interest that owns and operates a non-juridical entity that was improperly sued in state court may remove a diversity case to federal court without filing an appearance in the state court prior to attempting removal. The court also concluded that the complaint was properly dismissed as time-barred where New York's rule tolling a limitations period because of a plaintiff's insanity, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208, applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "La Russo v. St. George's University School of Medicine" on Justia Law