Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Consolidated appellate proceedings involved a dispute between the trustees and beneficiaries of the Bellingrath-Morse Foundation Trust ("the Trust"). In appellate case no. SC-2023-0001, beneficiaries of the Trust, Rhodes College, Huntingdon College, and Stillman College, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court Court to vacate its November 23, 2022, order granting the trustees of the Trust relief from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(5), Ala.R.Civ.P. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0011, the beneficiaries appealed the same circuit-court order granting Rule 60(b)(5) relief to the trustees. Walter Bellingrath (deceased) established the charitable Trust in 1950. Bellingrath contributed to the Trust, including the Bellingrath Gardens ("the Gardens"). The trustees and beneficiaries disagreed as to whether the Trust indenture contemplated a subsidy of the Gardens by the Trust: the trustees believed the Gardens were a "purpose" of the Trust requiring perpetual funding; the beneficiaries believed the Gardens were merely an asset of the Trust and subject to closure if not profitable. A 1981 agreement limited the payments or distributions by the Trust for the support of the Gardens. In a 2003 amendment to the 1981 agreement, the beneficiaries gave up their right to request the trustees seek court instructions concerning whether the Gardens should be open or not, and the trustees agreed that they would not increase the payments for the support of the Gardens above 20% of the total annual distribution amount without the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries. In 2017, the trustees contended their ability to maintain the Gardens had been substantially impaired by the funding restraints of the 1981 agreement and the 2003 amendment, and they sought instructions on how the existing funding agreement regarding the Gardens should be revised. After the Alabama Supreme Court released its opinion in "Ex parte Huntingdon College," the trustees immediately moved the circuit court seeking relief from the 2003 judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), alleging that new circumstances had arisen since the 2003 judgment was entered, rendering prospective application of the 2003 judgment inequitable. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0001, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the beneficiaries demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its November 2022, Rule 60(b) order. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0011, the Court dismissed the appeal filed by the beneficiaries concerning that same order. View "Ex parte Huntingdon College, et al." on Justia Law

Michael Ewing, in his capacity as personal representative, appealed a district court’s judgment, amended judgment, and order on motion to show cause. Ewing was the personal representative of the estate of Chiyoko Ewing, his mother. Chiyoko died in 1989 leaving a will devising all of her property in equal shares to her four children: Ewing, Jeffery Ewing, Sherry Ewing, and Nancy Burkhart. At the time of her death, Chiyoko owned a home in Grand Forks as well as various items of personal property located within the home. Following her death, Jeffery lived in and maintained the home, paid the real estate taxes and the mortgage, and made substantial improvements to the home. Jeffery died in 2019. Ewing filed an “Inventory and Appraisement” identifying the property owned by Chiyoko at the time of her death. An evidentiary hearing was held to determine ownership of the property. The court found the siblings agreed they did not want to sell the home to a stranger. The issues of whether oral agreements between Jeffery and the siblings were contested. In March 2021, the district court entered a judgment, finding Jeffrey's estate owned the home. Ewing appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal concluding the administration of the estate was not complete because the personal property was not addressed. In January 2022, another evidentiary hearing was held to address ownership of the items of personal property identified on the inventory list. While it was disputed at the evidentiary hearings, the district court found the siblings already divided the personal property amongst themselves by agreement. The district court entered an amended judgment finding all items of personal property, with two exceptions not at issue here, were assets of Jeffery's estate, and ordered Ewing to return those items to the estate. Jeffrey's estate moved to hold Ewing in contempt for failing to return the ordered items to the estate. This motion was granted, and Ewing appealed, arguing the court erred in finding an oral contract between the parties, mutual assent on all terms of the contract, and partial performance of an oral agreement sufficient to remove it from the statute of frauds. Ewing also argued the district court’s findings of fact regarding ownership of personal property, whether the real property was maintained, responsibility for administration costs, and the award and offset of damages were clearly erroneous. Finding no reversible errors, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Ewing" on Justia Law

Richard Biddle and Brian Biddle questioned whether the Chancery Court of Tishomingo County, Mississippi had jurisdiction over their father’s estate. Brian and Richard also appealed the chancery court’s finding that there was no evidence of undue influence by their stepmother. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found venue and jurisdiction were proper and that no evidence of undue influence was presented. View "In The Matter of The Estate of Frederick Adams Biddle" on Justia Law

The estate of Joseph A. Muff brings three conversion claims against Wells Fargo Bank for allegedly failing to detect that Joseph’s stepson, Josh Paige, was stealing money from Joseph by way of fraudulently endorsed checks. After denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on all three claims. The estate appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint. Further, the court explained that because the Muff Corporate and Muff Farm accounts were not controlled by Wells Fargo, any injury to those accounts under a theory of conversion is not fairly traceable to Wells Fargo. In other words, the estate has not demonstrated a “causal connection” between the “injury”—Josh’s inappropriately removing funds from said accounts—and the “conduct complained of”—Wells Fargo’s allegedly allowing this to take place. Moreover, even assuming the existence of a confidential relationship under Iowa law could give the estate standing to sue, the factual record fails to support the existence of a confidential relationship in the first place. Because the estate has not demonstrated standing, the court wrote that it lacks jurisdiction over Count 3. As with Count 2, the district court should have dismissed the claim instead of entering summary judgment for Wells Fargo. However, unlike Counts 2 and 3, the estate has standing to pursue Count 1 in federal court. View "Larry Muff v. Wells Fargo Bank NA" on Justia Law

Years after their father’s death, Appellees filed a diversity lawsuit against their stepmother, Defendant,and the executor of their father’s estate to adjudicate rights to property owned by their father and Defendant. Before the district court, Appellees argued that their father, H.C. “Dude” Crain, Jr. (Dude), breached a property settlement agreement (PSA) that he entered into with their mother, Marillyn Crain (Marillyn), pursuant to Dude and Marillyn’s divorce. The PSA— which the Logan County, Arkansas Chancery Court ruled was “contractual and nonmodifiable”—required Dude to maintain a will whereby he would leave “one-half of [his] estate” to Appellees. However, at Dude’s death, no such will existed. Instead, Defendant took sole possession of Dude’s separate property and retitled all jointly owned assets in her name. After the ruling that Dude breached the PSA, the district court imposed a constructive trust over all property Dude owned immediately prior to his death. The district court then used the principles set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution to equitably divide the property, valued at nearly $100 million. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although there is an open, ongoing probate action in Arkansas state court, the district court has never attempted to interfere with that court’s possession of any of the property at issue there. Rather, the district court adjudicated the parties’ rights to the property and imposed a constructive trust on it. Therefore, the court held that the probate exception to subject matter jurisdiction does not apply. View "Lisa Crain v. Shirley Crain" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that all assets held by the Soad Wattar Revocable Living Trust—including the Wattar family home—were part of the bankruptcy estate of Richard Sharif. Sharif was the son of Soad Wattar, now de‐ ceased. As the sole trustee of the Wattar trust. Sharif’s sisters, Haifa and Ragda Sharifeh, soon launched an effort to keep the trust proceeds out of their brother’s bankruptcy estate. At issue in these appeals are the bankruptcy court’s rulings on three motions: (1) Haifa’s 2015 motion to vacate the court’s decision that all trust assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate; (2) the sisters’ joint 2016 motion for leave to sue the Chapter 7 trustee assigned to Sharif’s bankruptcy for purported due process violations; and (3) Ragda’s motion seeking both reimbursement of money she allegedly spent on the family home and the proceeds from Wattar’s life insurance policy, which the court had found to be an asset of the trust and therefore part of the bankruptcy estate.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that even if Haifa were really the executor, she simply waited too long to assert the estate’s rights. In the bankruptcy and district courts, the trustee raised the equitable defense of laches, which cuts off the right to sue when (1) the plaintiff has inexcusably delayed bringing suit and (2) that delay harmed the defendant. Next, the court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the motion did not set forth a prima facie case for a right to relief against the trustee. View "Estate of Soad Wattar v. Horace Fox, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity suit against his former stepfather, Defendant, alleging that Defendant owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose the existence of certain Settlement Funds arising from the wrongful death of Plaintiff’s biological father. The Eleventh Circuit previously certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose a claim.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on the failure to disclose claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court should only have granted Defendant summary judgment if there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the tort claim and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all evidence and making all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Here, a reasonable jury could find the following facts at trial:4 (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship such that, under Georgia law, the statute of limitations could be tolled, and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be supported; (2) at the time Plaintiff turned 18, at least $50,000 of the Settlement Funds remained in the Charles Schwab account; (3) Plaintiff had a right to take control of the Settlement Funds when he turned 18; (4) Defendant had a duty to disclose the existence of the Settlement Funds and turn over control of those funds to Plaintiff when he turned 18; (5) Defendant failed to do so, and (6) Plaintiff would have taken control of the funds when he turned 18. View "Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant Elkin King sued Appellee Forrest King, Jr., his former stepfather, in federal district court, alleging that Forrest had concealed, misused, and converted the proceeds of a wrongful death settlement that had been placed in an account for Appellant’s benefit when Appellant was a minor, and Forrest was the custodian. Appellant further alleged that Forrest’s actions had allowed Appellant’s mother, Peggy Fulford, to spend the funds remaining in the account after Appellant turned 18 years old. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Forrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the misuse claim and held that Appellant had forfeited his conversion claim. But as to the concealment claim, the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court, seeking clarification of the parameters of Georgia’s duty to disclose in a confidential relationship. The Supreme Court responded to the Eleventh Circuit’s certified questions: when a confidential relationship is also a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary’s fraudulent breach of the duty to disclose can give rise to a breach-of-fiduciary-duty tort claim if that breach violates a fiduciary’s duty to act with the utmost good faith. "But whether a fiduciary has failed to act with the utmost good faith in a particular circumstance is a question of fact, not law." Accordingly, the Supreme Court answered the Eleventh Circuit’s first question and declined to answer the other two questions. View "King v. King" on Justia Law