Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
Hill v. Martinson, et al.
Douglas Martinson II and Caleb Ballew ("the lawyers") represented Lesley Hatch in probate court in a dispute over the guardianship of her aunt, Brenda Cummings. During the proceedings, the lawyers withdrew from representing Hatch and filed a claim for attorney fees to be paid from Cummings's estate. The probate court entered a judgment on the merits of the underlying case and denied the lawyers' claim for fees. Over 30 days later, the lawyers moved the probate court to reconsider their claim. After a hearing, the probate court reversed course and entered an order awarding them their fees. Elizabeth Cummings Hill, acting on behalf of Cummings under a power of attorney, appealed. She argued the probate court did not have jurisdiction to grant the lawyers' motion because it was untimely. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, with instructions to vacate the order awarding attorney fees. View "Hill v. Martinson, et al." on Justia Law
Daily, et al. v. Esser
These consolidated appellate proceedings consisted of an appeal filed by Regina Daily ("Regina") and The Daily Catch, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Shores Seafood ("The Daily Catch") (case number SC-2022-0672); a cross-appeal by Greg Esser ("Greg") (case number SC-2022-0673); and a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Patrick Daily ("Patrick"), Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, Inc., d/b/a Remax of Orange Beach ("White Sands"), and Blue Palms, LLC (case number SC-2022-0992). The appeal, the cross-appeal, and the mandamus petition all involved the same underlying action filed by Greg -- in his individual capacity, in his capacity as the trustee of the Wallene R. Esser Living Trust ("the trust"), and in his capacity as an administrator ad litem of the estate of Wallene R. Esser ("the estate") -- against Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms. Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment awarding damages in favor of Greg and against Regina and The Daily Catch; the circuit court denied Greg's claims as to all the other defendants. Regina and The Daily Catch filed their appeal, and Greg filed his cross-appeal. Later, Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms petitioned for mandamus relief. Greg and Regina were Wallene's children and were beneficiaries to Wallene's estate. Generally, Greg alleged that "[t]he trust has been harmed and depleted by the acts and omissions of the defendants." Greg asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, requesting money damages and declaratory relief. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in case numbers SC-2022-0672 and SC-2022-0673, and granted the mandamus petition filed in case number SC-2022-0992. View "Daily, et al. v. Esser" on Justia Law
Tedesco v. White
This case arose out of disputes over the propriety and enforceability of amendments to Thomas Tedesco’s living trust, which was conceived of as part of a family estate plan Tedesco created with his late wife, Wanda. The trust came into being following Wanda Tedesco’s death in 2002, and it was later restated. The primary beneficiaries of the restated trust were the cotrustees. For their part, the cotrustees petitioned the court to validate a 2013 amendment, and thus to establish the invalidity of a purported 2020 amendment to the restated trust. The appeal before the Court of Appeal challenged a discovery sanction for $6,000. Counsel attempted to use the sanctions order as a basis for challenging the merits of the trial court’s nonappealable order quashing appellant Debra Wear's document subpoena, and then to further use the trial court’s analysis underlying that discovery ruling into a basis for reviewing a separate order the Court of Appeal already ruled could not be
appealed. The Court concluded all of this seemed to be in furtherance of counsel’s broader quest: to again collaterally attack the validity of a conservatorship over the Tedesco estate, which had been rejected by the probate and appellate courts in earlier proceedings. The Court determined its jurisdiction arose here on the limited issue of sanctions, and found Wear failed to challenge the probate court's pertinent determinations, "let alone demonstrate why the court abused its discretion in making them. We find no error in the court’s ruling." The Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Tedesco v. White" on Justia Law
Lichter v. Porter Carroll
In January 2018, Lichter filed a personal injury action against Christopher for injuries she suffered in a car accident in February 2016, not knowing that Christopher had died in June 2017. An estate was never opened for Christopher following his death. In April 2018, Lichter successfully moved (735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b)(2)) to appoint Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate for the purpose of defending the lawsuit. Lichter subsequently filed an amended complaint, naming Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate and the defendant. Counsel for Christopher’s insurer, State Farm, appeared on behalf of the defendant. In March 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss Lichter’s complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)), arguing that the action was time-barred because Lichter never moved to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate before the statute of limitations expiring, as required by 735 ILCS 13- 209(c).The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the case; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Subsection (b)(2), relating to the appointment of a special representative is not limited to situations where the plaintiff is aware of the defendant’s death. It was enacted to streamline the court process when there is no personal representative in place to defend a lawsuit. A plaintiff who learns of a defendant’s death after the statute of limitations has expired is not required to move to appoint a personal representative through the probate court. View "Lichter v. Porter Carroll" on Justia Law
Colvis v. Binswanger
The parents, now deceased, established the Trust. Their daughter is the trustee. There are four other children. The Trust is a 70 percent shareholder of the Company. Each sibling owns an equal share of the remaining 30 percent. A Company shareholder agreement provides that any shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the company can take various actions in their “sole discretion,” including borrowing, lending, and transferring assets. The Trust's balance, after expenses and specific distributions, shall be distributed equally to five sub-trusts benefiting the five siblings. Among the Trust’s liabilities are outstanding loans made by the Company. Two siblings filed a petition to instruct the trustee, to take specified actions, including directing the Company to borrow substantial sums of money to pay estate taxes owed by the Trust. The Company responded to the Petition.The court held that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary, it lacked standing to participate in proceedings on the Petition. The court of appeal remanded, finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Probate Code section 1043(a), authorizes “interested persons” to respond or object at or before a hearing in a trust proceeding. The probate court must make the discretionary determination of whether the Company is an interested person. View "Colvis v. Binswanger" on Justia Law
Bailey v. Bailey
Appellant is the only child of the late J.B. Appellant opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Appellant any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Appellant appealed. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the phrase “has received notice” is also inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. The Legislature could have drafted subdivision (c) to apply to those will proponents who receive notice of some post-hearing event, such as issuance of a probate order or letters of administration. It did not. The court explained that limiting the application of section 8226, subdivision (c) to those who receive notice under section 8110 will not, as Appellant argues, hinder the prompt administration of estates. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law
Estate of Sanchez
When Frank died, Leslie, his daughter, was appointed as executor and personal representative of the estate, Independent Administration of Estates Act (Prob. Code, 10400). In his will, Frank confirmed his surviving spouse’s (Caroline’s) interest in their community and quasi-community property, and bequeathed all of his separate property, plus his one-half interest in their community and quasi-community property, to his three children, explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not their mother. Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the probate action a complaint for partition by sale of real property, claiming that Caroline improperly withdrew proceeds from a reverse mortgage and other allegedly fraudulent conduct. Caroline argued Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity.The probate court granted the motions to strike with leave to amend to give Leslie the opportunity to retain counsel. The court determined that Leslie’s complaint “primarily consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The court of appeal affirmed. Leslie’s complaint is a claim against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona; her conduct in filing briefs and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of law. View "Estate of Sanchez" on Justia Law
Wolf v. Washington
At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law
McAnulty v. McAnulty, et al.
Husband Steven McAnulty was married twice: once to Plaintiff Elizabeth McAnulty, and once to Defendant Melanie McAnulty. Husband's first marriage ended in divorce; the second ended with his death. Husband’s only life-insurance policy (the Policy) named Defendant as the beneficiary. But the Missouri divorce decree between Plaintiff and Husband required Husband to procure and maintain a $100,000 life-insurance policy with Plaintiff listed as sole beneficiary until his maintenance obligation to her was lawfully terminated (which never happened). Plaintiff sued Defendant and the issuer of the Policy, Standard Insurance Company (Standard), claiming unjust enrichment and seeking the imposition on her behalf of a constructive trust on $100,000 of the insurance proceeds. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. By stipulation of the parties, Standard was dismissed with respect to this appeal. The only question to be resolved was whether Plaintiff stated a claim. Resolving that issue required the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26 in Comment g to § 48 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (the Restatement (Third)), which would recognize a cause of action in essentially the same circumstances. Because the Tenth Circuit predicted the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26, the Court held Plaintiff has stated a claim of unjust enrichment, and accordingly reversed the previous dismissal of her case. View "McAnulty v. McAnulty, et al." on Justia Law
D’Addario v. D’Addario
Plaintiff sued her brother, the executor of their father's estate, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“RICO Amendment”), which provides that “no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of [RICO].” 18 U.S.C.1964(c).The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not barred by the RICO Amendment because the fraud she alleged was not related to the “purchase or sale of securities.” The alleged frauds committed by her brother "only incidentally involved securities, unlike a securities broker who sells client securities in breach of his duty to execute securities transactions in the best interests of the client." View "D'Addario v. D'Addario" on Justia Law