Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In January 2018, Lichter filed a personal injury action against Christopher for injuries she suffered in a car accident in February 2016, not knowing that Christopher had died in June 2017. An estate was never opened for Christopher following his death. In April 2018, Lichter successfully moved (735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b)(2)) to appoint Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate for the purpose of defending the lawsuit. Lichter subsequently filed an amended complaint, naming Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate and the defendant. Counsel for Christopher’s insurer, State Farm, appeared on behalf of the defendant. In March 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss Lichter’s complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)), arguing that the action was time-barred because Lichter never moved to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate before the statute of limitations expiring, as required by 735 ILCS 13- 209(c).The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the case; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Subsection (b)(2), relating to the appointment of a special representative is not limited to situations where the plaintiff is aware of the defendant’s death. It was enacted to streamline the court process when there is no personal representative in place to defend a lawsuit. A plaintiff who learns of a defendant’s death after the statute of limitations has expired is not required to move to appoint a personal representative through the probate court. View "Lichter v. Porter Carroll" on Justia Law

The parents, now deceased, established the Trust. Their daughter is the trustee. There are four other children. The Trust is a 70 percent shareholder of the Company. Each sibling owns an equal share of the remaining 30 percent. A Company shareholder agreement provides that any shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the company can take various actions in their “sole discretion,” including borrowing, lending, and transferring assets. The Trust's balance, after expenses and specific distributions, shall be distributed equally to five sub-trusts benefiting the five siblings. Among the Trust’s liabilities are outstanding loans made by the Company. Two siblings filed a petition to instruct the trustee, to take specified actions, including directing the Company to borrow substantial sums of money to pay estate taxes owed by the Trust. The Company responded to the Petition.The court held that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary, it lacked standing to participate in proceedings on the Petition. The court of appeal remanded, finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Probate Code section 1043(a), authorizes “interested persons” to respond or object at or before a hearing in a trust proceeding. The probate court must make the discretionary determination of whether the Company is an interested person. View "Colvis v. Binswanger" on Justia Law

Appellant is the only child of the late J.B. Appellant opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Appellant any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Appellant appealed. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the phrase “has received notice” is also inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. The Legislature could have drafted subdivision (c) to apply to those will proponents who receive notice of some post-hearing event, such as issuance of a probate order or letters of administration. It did not. The court explained that limiting the application of section 8226, subdivision (c) to those who receive notice under section 8110 will not, as Appellant argues, hinder the prompt administration of estates. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

When Frank died, Leslie, his daughter, was appointed as executor and personal representative of the estate, Independent Administration of Estates Act (Prob. Code, 10400). In his will, Frank confirmed his surviving spouse’s (Caroline’s) interest in their community and quasi-community property, and bequeathed all of his separate property, plus his one-half interest in their community and quasi-community property, to his three children, explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not their mother. Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the probate action a complaint for partition by sale of real property, claiming that Caroline improperly withdrew proceeds from a reverse mortgage and other allegedly fraudulent conduct. Caroline argued Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity.The probate court granted the motions to strike with leave to amend to give Leslie the opportunity to retain counsel. The court determined that Leslie’s complaint “primarily consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The court of appeal affirmed. Leslie’s complaint is a claim against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona; her conduct in filing briefs and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of law. View "Estate of Sanchez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

Husband Steven McAnulty was married twice: once to Plaintiff Elizabeth McAnulty, and once to Defendant Melanie McAnulty. Husband's first marriage ended in divorce; the second ended with his death. Husband’s only life-insurance policy (the Policy) named Defendant as the beneficiary. But the Missouri divorce decree between Plaintiff and Husband required Husband to procure and maintain a $100,000 life-insurance policy with Plaintiff listed as sole beneficiary until his maintenance obligation to her was lawfully terminated (which never happened). Plaintiff sued Defendant and the issuer of the Policy, Standard Insurance Company (Standard), claiming unjust enrichment and seeking the imposition on her behalf of a constructive trust on $100,000 of the insurance proceeds. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. By stipulation of the parties, Standard was dismissed with respect to this appeal. The only question to be resolved was whether Plaintiff stated a claim. Resolving that issue required the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26 in Comment g to § 48 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (the Restatement (Third)), which would recognize a cause of action in essentially the same circumstances. Because the Tenth Circuit predicted the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26, the Court held Plaintiff has stated a claim of unjust enrichment, and accordingly reversed the previous dismissal of her case. View "McAnulty v. McAnulty, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her brother, the executor of their father's estate, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“RICO Amendment”), which provides that “no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of [RICO].” 18 U.S.C.1964(c).The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not barred by the RICO Amendment because the fraud she alleged was not related to the “purchase or sale of securities.” The alleged frauds committed by her brother "only incidentally involved securities, unlike a securities broker who sells client securities in breach of his duty to execute securities transactions in the best interests of the client." View "D'Addario v. D'Addario" on Justia Law

The putative intervenors, the Robert T. Keeler Foundation (the Foundation) and Peter Mithoefer, the fiduciary for the Estate of Robert T. Keeler (the Estate), appealed circuit court orders which: (1) denied their motion to intervene in proceedings brought under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) by petitioner, the Trustees of Dartmouth College (Dartmouth), and assented to by respondent, the New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT), to modify the restrictions governing an institutional fund created by a charitable gift pursuant to the last will and testament of Robert T. Keeler; and (2) granted Dartmouth’s assented-to application to modify. On appeal, the putative intervenors argued they had “special interest” standing pursuant to In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266, 274-75 (2019), and that granting the assented-to application was error. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the putative intervenors’ motion to intervene for lack of standing and, therefore, necessarily also affirmed the decision to grant the assented-to application. View "In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

Consolidated appellate proceedings involved a dispute between the trustees and beneficiaries of the Bellingrath-Morse Foundation Trust ("the Trust"). In appellate case no. SC-2023-0001, beneficiaries of the Trust, Rhodes College, Huntingdon College, and Stillman College, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court Court to vacate its November 23, 2022, order granting the trustees of the Trust relief from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(5), Ala.R.Civ.P. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0011, the beneficiaries appealed the same circuit-court order granting Rule 60(b)(5) relief to the trustees. Walter Bellingrath (deceased) established the charitable Trust in 1950. Bellingrath contributed to the Trust, including the Bellingrath Gardens ("the Gardens"). The trustees and beneficiaries disagreed as to whether the Trust indenture contemplated a subsidy of the Gardens by the Trust: the trustees believed the Gardens were a "purpose" of the Trust requiring perpetual funding; the beneficiaries believed the Gardens were merely an asset of the Trust and subject to closure if not profitable. A 1981 agreement limited the payments or distributions by the Trust for the support of the Gardens. In a 2003 amendment to the 1981 agreement, the beneficiaries gave up their right to request the trustees seek court instructions concerning whether the Gardens should be open or not, and the trustees agreed that they would not increase the payments for the support of the Gardens above 20% of the total annual distribution amount without the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries. In 2017, the trustees contended their ability to maintain the Gardens had been substantially impaired by the funding restraints of the 1981 agreement and the 2003 amendment, and they sought instructions on how the existing funding agreement regarding the Gardens should be revised. After the Alabama Supreme Court released its opinion in "Ex parte Huntingdon College," the trustees immediately moved the circuit court seeking relief from the 2003 judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), alleging that new circumstances had arisen since the 2003 judgment was entered, rendering prospective application of the 2003 judgment inequitable. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0001, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the beneficiaries demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its November 2022, Rule 60(b) order. In appellate case no. SC-2023-0011, the Court dismissed the appeal filed by the beneficiaries concerning that same order. View "Ex parte Huntingdon College, et al." on Justia Law

Michael Ewing, in his capacity as personal representative, appealed a district court’s judgment, amended judgment, and order on motion to show cause. Ewing was the personal representative of the estate of Chiyoko Ewing, his mother. Chiyoko died in 1989 leaving a will devising all of her property in equal shares to her four children: Ewing, Jeffery Ewing, Sherry Ewing, and Nancy Burkhart. At the time of her death, Chiyoko owned a home in Grand Forks as well as various items of personal property located within the home. Following her death, Jeffery lived in and maintained the home, paid the real estate taxes and the mortgage, and made substantial improvements to the home. Jeffery died in 2019. Ewing filed an “Inventory and Appraisement” identifying the property owned by Chiyoko at the time of her death. An evidentiary hearing was held to determine ownership of the property. The court found the siblings agreed they did not want to sell the home to a stranger. The issues of whether oral agreements between Jeffery and the siblings were contested. In March 2021, the district court entered a judgment, finding Jeffrey's estate owned the home. Ewing appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal concluding the administration of the estate was not complete because the personal property was not addressed. In January 2022, another evidentiary hearing was held to address ownership of the items of personal property identified on the inventory list. While it was disputed at the evidentiary hearings, the district court found the siblings already divided the personal property amongst themselves by agreement. The district court entered an amended judgment finding all items of personal property, with two exceptions not at issue here, were assets of Jeffery's estate, and ordered Ewing to return those items to the estate. Jeffrey's estate moved to hold Ewing in contempt for failing to return the ordered items to the estate. This motion was granted, and Ewing appealed, arguing the court erred in finding an oral contract between the parties, mutual assent on all terms of the contract, and partial performance of an oral agreement sufficient to remove it from the statute of frauds. Ewing also argued the district court’s findings of fact regarding ownership of personal property, whether the real property was maintained, responsibility for administration costs, and the award and offset of damages were clearly erroneous. Finding no reversible errors, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Ewing" on Justia Law