Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, GayLe Schleve, the personal representative of the estates of Viola J. Heath and Caleb C. Heath, appealed orders from the District Court of Dunn County, North Dakota, that granted Wells Fargo Bank's motions to vacate previous orders establishing the authority of domiciliary foreign personal representatives and letters testamentary related to the estate of Viola J. Heath, and determining heirs and successors in the estate of Caleb C. Heath.Viola and Caleb Heath were residents of Montana who owned mineral rights in Dunn County, North Dakota. After their deaths, litigation ensued over the distribution of these mineral rights. The orders being challenged in this appeal had resulted in the mineral rights being transferred to the heirs of Viola Heath.Wells Fargo, as successor to Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co., the trustee appointed in Caleb Heath's will, claimed an ownership interest in the mineral rights and challenged the transfer of those rights to the heirs of Viola Heath. Wells Fargo argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the orders, and that the orders should be vacated because they were manifestly unjust and based on incorrect applications of the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Wells Fargo had standing to challenge the orders. The court also held that the district court had erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order in the Estate of Viola J. Heath. However, the Supreme Court remanded for further determination of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties in the Estate of Viola J. Heath, and whether relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).Finally, the Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting Wells Fargo's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the order in the Estate of Caleb C. Heath without sufficient findings related to timeliness. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Heath" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Mrs. Tokowitz the right to a spousal election against her late husband's will. The late Mr. Tokowitz had left his estate to a revocable trust and made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz in his will. The court held that Mrs. Tokowitz was not deprived of her spousal election right simply because her husband's property was transferred to his trust through a pour-over will. The court reasoned that property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the decedent's probate estate until the will is probated. Only after probate does it pass in accordance with section 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust terms. The court also found that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming at the time of his death, as evidenced by his will, making Mrs. Tokowitz eligible for the spousal election under Wyoming law. The court declined to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz's rights as a beneficiary under the trust, stating that issues relating to the trust were outside of its jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Tokowitz v. Tokowi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard an appeal by Kelly Maltais contesting the dismissal of her probate appeal by the Superior Court. Kelly challenged the last will and testament of her father, Laurent E. Maltais, alleging fraud, duress, and undue influence, and asserting that her father lacked testamentary capacity. Kelly's probate appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court on the grounds that it was filed 32 days after the probate court order, two days beyond the statutory 30-day limit for appeal. Kelly argued that the 30th day fell on a Saturday, and under Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, she had until the following Monday to file her appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Superior Court, ruling that the computation of time for the 30-day deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in order to give appellants the full benefit of all the time allowed, even if it necessitates giving an additional day. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Maltais v. Maltais" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, UMB Bank, N.A. (UMB) filed a complaint against Jessie Benton and her children, alleging that they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by committing acts of mail, wire, and bank fraud. The dispute arose from the management of a family trust, which included works of art, real estate, and personal effects. The beneficiaries of the trust accused UMB of mismanagement and sued UMB in a separate Missouri state court case. UMB then filed this federal case, arguing that the beneficiaries and their attorney engaged in fraudulent activities to force UMB to increase trust distributions or resign as trustee.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss UMB's complaint for failure to state a civil RICO claim. The court agreed that UMB failed to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. Although UMB might be able to prove that three communications to media outlets qualify as predicate acts of mail, wire, or bank fraud, these acts did not show a pattern of racketeering activity because they occurred within a few days and targeted a single victim (UMB). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of UMB's post-judgment motions for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was both untimely and futile. View "UMB Bank v. Guerin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute over a trust established by a deceased father, James. Brian Spears, the son, filed a petition seeking to be named a creditor of his father's trust and to remove his stepmother, Therese Spears, as trustee. The trial court dismissed Brian's petition on the grounds that he did not file an amended pleading after the court sustained Therese's demurrer to the petition, with leave to amend. Brian appealed this decision, arguing that he did in fact file an amended pleading, reasserting only his claim to be named as a creditor of the trust.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four agreed with Brian. The court found that Brian's subsequent filing, titled "Creditor's Claim," was intended to be his amended pleading. It provided additional detail about the oral agreements underlying his claim, and it was filed under the same case number as his original petition.However, the court also agreed with Therese that the statute of limitations barred recovery on one of the alleged agreements underlying Brian's creditor's claim. The court found that the two-year statute of limitations for an action based on the breach of an oral contract had expired for one of the agreements before James's death.The court reversed the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that although Brian's creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations insofar as it rests on one of the alleged oral agreements, the trial court erred in dismissing Brian's creditor's claim to the extent it rests on the other alleged agreement. View "Spears v. Spears" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was called to determine issues regarding the distribution of assets under a will and trust, and personal jurisdiction. The case arose from a dispute between two brothers, John R. Luongo and Michael A. Luongo Jr., regarding their mother's estate and a trust she established. The Superior Court had previously divided the property of the estate between the brothers and dismissed two counts of John's complaint, arguing that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Michael.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to distribute the assets under the will and the related trust. The authority to resolve disputes over the distribution of assets under a will rests solely with the Probate Court. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's order distributing the assets of the estate.Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that the Superior Court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Michael for claims related to the trust. This was due to the fact that the trust was established as a Massachusetts trust with its principal place of administration in Massachusetts and the process to transfer the trust’s administration to Maine was not completed by either trustee.The court affirmed the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3 of John’s complaint, related to the trust, but vacated the judgment in all other respects, including Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. The case was remanded for dismissal of the remaining counts of John’s complaint and Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. View "Luongo v. Luongo" on Justia Law