Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Respondent-trustee Bonnie Katzenstein, representing the Feinberg Family Trust (dated October 30, 1984), filed a petition after Rober Feinberg had passed away. Mr. Feinberg was the cosettlor and former cotrustee of the Trust and the named insured in two life insurance policies. In the Petition, the Trustee sought: (1) a determination that the Trust is the beneficiary of, and therefore entitled to the proceeds from, one of the insurance policies; and (2) damages against Chabad of Poway (Chabad) for interfering with the payment of that policy's benefits to the Trust. Chabad responded by filing a document entitled "Claimant's Objection and Counter Claim [sic] to Petition filed by Trustee to Determine Ownership of Life Insurance Policy Proceeds" (Objection and Counterclaim). In an unsigned minute order following summary judgment proceedings initiated by Trustee, the court sua sponte struck Chabad's Objection and Counterclaim on the basis that the Code of Civil Procedure precluded a party from seeking affirmative relief in an answer. Chabad appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the unsigned minute order was not an appealable order under either the Code of Civil Procedure or the Probate Code. As such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Chabad's appeal, and dismissed it. View "Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Accelerated Receivable Solutions (ARS) filed a creditor’s claim against the Estate of Margaret A. Hauf (Estate). The Estate rejected ARS’s claim, filed the notice of rejection in district court, and mailed the rejection notice to ARS via certified mail. The mailed notice was returned to the Estate unclaimed. Approximately four months later, counsel for ARS learned that the postal service had erroneously stamped the the certified mailing unclaimed and returned it to the sender. ARS filed a complaint in district court objecting to the disallowance of its claim and seeking judgment on the claim. The district court dismissed the complaint as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing ARS’s complaint against the Estate where the Estate strictly complied with the statutory notice requirements in rejecting ARS’s claim and where ARS failed timely to file its complaint after receiving constitutionally adequate notice of the Estate’s rejection of ARS’s claim. View "Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf" on Justia Law

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

Offenesia Yako Bavilla died in 2010. In 1987, Offenesia executed a will that left most of her assets to her children Etta and Steven. In the mid-2000s Offenesia was elderly and "slipping mentally." In November 2005 a doctor wrote that Offenesia's "mental status has declined significantly," that she "has become nearly mute," and that she "appears to hallucinate." The doctor concluded that "[d]ue to her dementia, her condition is quite likely to continue to deteriorate." In February 2006, Offenesia executed a new will, prepared by Alaska Legal Services Corporation. This new will eliminated Etta from any inheritance but still included her brother, Steven. The 2006 will included a statement explicitly "revoking all prior wills and codicils." This appeal stemmed from Etta's attempt to informally probate the 1987 will. Because Offenesia signed a new will in 2006, the superior court did not accept Etta's informal probate of the 1987 will. Etta, acting pro se, attempted to contest the validity of the 2006 will by filing a motion to amend her probate of the 1987 will to include a challenge to the 2006 will. Her motion to amend was denied, as was her motion for recusal of the magistrate judge who recommended denial of that amendment. On appeal, Etta challenged the superior court's denial of her motion to amend her pleadings and the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. After review, the Supreme Court remanded for the superior court to allow Etta to amend her pleadings but affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. View "In Re Estate of Bavilla" on Justia Law

Reverend Flesher participated in benefits plans administered by the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board (MMBB), a New York not‐for‐profit corporation. Flesher entered into the plans while married to Snow. Snow, also a reverend and MMBB policyholder, was listed as the primary beneficiary on both of Flesher’s plans. Snow’s father was the contingent beneficiary. When Flesher and Snow divorced in 2008 they signed a Marital Settlement Agreement; each agreed to relinquish rights to inherit from the other and was allowed to change the beneficiaries on their respective MMBB plans. Flesher, then domiciled in Colorado, died in 2011 without changing his beneficiaries. MMBB , unable to determine how to distribute the funds, and filed an interpleader suit. The district court discharged MMBB from liability, applied New York law, and held that Flesher’s estate was entitled to the funds. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question: whether a governing‐law provision that states that the contract will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York, in a contract not consummated pursuant to New York General Obligations Law 5‐1401, requires the application of New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law 3‐5.1(b)(2), which may, in turn, require application of the law of another state. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute over the administration of a family trust and the interpretation of trust documents. After a bench trial, the court decided in favor of plaintiff Adam Blumberg, the step-grandson of defendant Gloria Minthorne. Gloria was ordered by the court to file an accounting and quitclaim certain property to Adam. Gloria appealed. She quitclaimed that property to her daughter and failed to file the accounting. Adam moved to dismiss the appeal, citing the disentitlement doctrine. The Court of Appeal agreed with Adam that this was one of the rare cases where applying this doctrine was appropriate due to Gloria’s flagrant violation of the court’s orders. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Blumberg v. Minthorne" on Justia Law

Kuznar left Poland and moved to the United States, leaving his wife, Emilia, and son Thomas. In the U.S., he married Anna without divorcing Emilia. Anna collected spousal pension benefits after his 1995 death. In 1997, Thomas, now living in the U.S., opened probate in Illinois state court, on his mother’s behalf. The probate court ordered Anna to pay Emilia the amount she had collected from Mitchell’s pension fund. Emilia died before judgment entered; the Appellate Court remanded. In 2011 Thomas opened administration of Emilia’s estate and renewed his motion for summary judgment in the 1997 case, on behalf of Emilia’s estate. Anna filed notice of removal. Thomas filed notice of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Anna then argued that she had removed the 1997 case, not the 2011 case, and that no dismissal could be valid unless it dismissed the 1997 case entirely. The district judge reasoned that Anna’s submissions indicated that she was attempting to remove a “new action” filed in the 2011 probate case. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal was effective. Thomas was entitled to accept Anna’s “doubtful” characterization of his motion and voluntarily dismiss the supposed “new action” rather than dispute Anna’s shifting characterization of his filings. View "Kuznar v. Kuznar" on Justia Law

J.G.S. was a 90-year-old retired attorney and owned a number of multi-family rental properties. In 2008, J.G.S. suffered a stroke. In 2013, the Petitioners in this proceeding, J.G.S.'s four children, C.C., C.S., J.F.S., and J.S., became significantly concerned J.G.S. was no longer able to care for himself or his financial affairs. Petitioners were specifically concerned that J.G.S. was no longer able to maintain and repair the rental properties, was failing to collect rent from some tenants, and had gifted three multi-family rental properties to a tenant who had managed the properties for him. Petitioners filed an ex parte petition in the district court for the appointment of a temporary guardian and temporary conservator, seeking an immediate emergency guardianship and conservatorship. The court appointed a temporary guardian and a temporary conservator. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. On that same day, J.G.S. was personally served with a notice of the hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian and conservator, with a copy of the temporary petition attached as an exhibit to the notice. The district court held a hearing on the temporary order, found that an emergency guardianship was not necessary, and vacated the temporary order. The court appointed a visitor and psychologist to evaluate J.G.S. In October 2013, the court held a three-day hearing on Petitioners' request for a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. The court ultimately held that while a guardianship was not necessary, there was clear and convincing evidence of a need for a conservatorship to manage J.G.S.'s financial affairs. The court appointed a conservator for an indefinite period. J.G.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because of a failure of service of process. J.G.S. claimed that Petitioners did not personally serve him with the petition seeking permanent or indefinite appointment of a guardian and conservator, or with any of the supporting affidavits, which J.G.S. contended the law required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had personal jurisdiction over J.G.S. and the court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator. As such, the Court affirmed. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S." on Justia Law