Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

Offenesia Yako Bavilla died in 2010. In 1987, Offenesia executed a will that left most of her assets to her children Etta and Steven. In the mid-2000s Offenesia was elderly and "slipping mentally." In November 2005 a doctor wrote that Offenesia's "mental status has declined significantly," that she "has become nearly mute," and that she "appears to hallucinate." The doctor concluded that "[d]ue to her dementia, her condition is quite likely to continue to deteriorate." In February 2006, Offenesia executed a new will, prepared by Alaska Legal Services Corporation. This new will eliminated Etta from any inheritance but still included her brother, Steven. The 2006 will included a statement explicitly "revoking all prior wills and codicils." This appeal stemmed from Etta's attempt to informally probate the 1987 will. Because Offenesia signed a new will in 2006, the superior court did not accept Etta's informal probate of the 1987 will. Etta, acting pro se, attempted to contest the validity of the 2006 will by filing a motion to amend her probate of the 1987 will to include a challenge to the 2006 will. Her motion to amend was denied, as was her motion for recusal of the magistrate judge who recommended denial of that amendment. On appeal, Etta challenged the superior court's denial of her motion to amend her pleadings and the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. After review, the Supreme Court remanded for the superior court to allow Etta to amend her pleadings but affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. View "In Re Estate of Bavilla" on Justia Law

Reverend Flesher participated in benefits plans administered by the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board (MMBB), a New York not‐for‐profit corporation. Flesher entered into the plans while married to Snow. Snow, also a reverend and MMBB policyholder, was listed as the primary beneficiary on both of Flesher’s plans. Snow’s father was the contingent beneficiary. When Flesher and Snow divorced in 2008 they signed a Marital Settlement Agreement; each agreed to relinquish rights to inherit from the other and was allowed to change the beneficiaries on their respective MMBB plans. Flesher, then domiciled in Colorado, died in 2011 without changing his beneficiaries. MMBB , unable to determine how to distribute the funds, and filed an interpleader suit. The district court discharged MMBB from liability, applied New York law, and held that Flesher’s estate was entitled to the funds. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question: whether a governing‐law provision that states that the contract will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York, in a contract not consummated pursuant to New York General Obligations Law 5‐1401, requires the application of New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law 3‐5.1(b)(2), which may, in turn, require application of the law of another state. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute over the administration of a family trust and the interpretation of trust documents. After a bench trial, the court decided in favor of plaintiff Adam Blumberg, the step-grandson of defendant Gloria Minthorne. Gloria was ordered by the court to file an accounting and quitclaim certain property to Adam. Gloria appealed. She quitclaimed that property to her daughter and failed to file the accounting. Adam moved to dismiss the appeal, citing the disentitlement doctrine. The Court of Appeal agreed with Adam that this was one of the rare cases where applying this doctrine was appropriate due to Gloria’s flagrant violation of the court’s orders. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Blumberg v. Minthorne" on Justia Law

Kuznar left Poland and moved to the United States, leaving his wife, Emilia, and son Thomas. In the U.S., he married Anna without divorcing Emilia. Anna collected spousal pension benefits after his 1995 death. In 1997, Thomas, now living in the U.S., opened probate in Illinois state court, on his mother’s behalf. The probate court ordered Anna to pay Emilia the amount she had collected from Mitchell’s pension fund. Emilia died before judgment entered; the Appellate Court remanded. In 2011 Thomas opened administration of Emilia’s estate and renewed his motion for summary judgment in the 1997 case, on behalf of Emilia’s estate. Anna filed notice of removal. Thomas filed notice of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Anna then argued that she had removed the 1997 case, not the 2011 case, and that no dismissal could be valid unless it dismissed the 1997 case entirely. The district judge reasoned that Anna’s submissions indicated that she was attempting to remove a “new action” filed in the 2011 probate case. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal was effective. Thomas was entitled to accept Anna’s “doubtful” characterization of his motion and voluntarily dismiss the supposed “new action” rather than dispute Anna’s shifting characterization of his filings. View "Kuznar v. Kuznar" on Justia Law

J.G.S. was a 90-year-old retired attorney and owned a number of multi-family rental properties. In 2008, J.G.S. suffered a stroke. In 2013, the Petitioners in this proceeding, J.G.S.'s four children, C.C., C.S., J.F.S., and J.S., became significantly concerned J.G.S. was no longer able to care for himself or his financial affairs. Petitioners were specifically concerned that J.G.S. was no longer able to maintain and repair the rental properties, was failing to collect rent from some tenants, and had gifted three multi-family rental properties to a tenant who had managed the properties for him. Petitioners filed an ex parte petition in the district court for the appointment of a temporary guardian and temporary conservator, seeking an immediate emergency guardianship and conservatorship. The court appointed a temporary guardian and a temporary conservator. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. On that same day, J.G.S. was personally served with a notice of the hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian and conservator, with a copy of the temporary petition attached as an exhibit to the notice. The district court held a hearing on the temporary order, found that an emergency guardianship was not necessary, and vacated the temporary order. The court appointed a visitor and psychologist to evaluate J.G.S. In October 2013, the court held a three-day hearing on Petitioners' request for a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. The court ultimately held that while a guardianship was not necessary, there was clear and convincing evidence of a need for a conservatorship to manage J.G.S.'s financial affairs. The court appointed a conservator for an indefinite period. J.G.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because of a failure of service of process. J.G.S. claimed that Petitioners did not personally serve him with the petition seeking permanent or indefinite appointment of a guardian and conservator, or with any of the supporting affidavits, which J.G.S. contended the law required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had personal jurisdiction over J.G.S. and the court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator. As such, the Court affirmed. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S." on Justia Law

Korie Saylor appealed the grant of summary judgment denying her claim for an elective share of the estate of her deceased husband, Woodie Saylor. Woodie and Korie married in October 2005. Woodie died in May 2011. In addition to Korie, Woodie was survived by Jonathan Saylor, an adult son from Woodie's previous marriage. Contemporaneously with the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, Jonathan, as personal representative of the estate, also filed a document executed by Korie. In that document, Korie acknowledged that she had received notice of the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, and she consented to the admission of the will to probate without further notice to her. Korie did not file a petition for an elective share within six months after the will was admitted to probate. Jonathan objected objected to Korie's request for an extension of time to file her petition for an elective share. The probate court entered an order granting Korie's request for an extension of time and an order allowing Korie's claim to take an elective share of the estate. The latter order did not adjudicate the amount of that elective share; it set a date on which the probate court would conduct a hearing to determine that amount and then enter a further order with respect thereto. In November 2012, the personal representative filed a motion for a summary judgment at the circuit court as to Korie's claim for an elective share, alleging that the probate court should have denied Korie's claim on grounds that her petition was not timely filed and that, under the circumstances presented, the probate court had no authority to extend the time for Korie to exercise her right of election. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was correct in rejecting Korie's untimely petition for an elective share.View "Saylor v. Saylor" on Justia Law

The decedent died from electrocution while working on a telephone pole that was the purported partial responsibility of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Appellants, the decedent’s sisters, filed a wrongful death suit against PREPA and others in federal district court. PREPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that an additional, non-diverse member of the decedent’s estate, who was not made a party to the action, was indispensable, and his joinder destroyed the parties’ complete diversity. The district court agreed and dismissed the entire action, including the decedent’s estate survivorship action as well as individual actions by estate members and Appellants, who were not the decedent’s heirs. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Appellants’ personal actions, as the non-diverse absent party was not required to adjudicate the action because the members of the estate requested voluntary dismissal of their claims, which eliminated the survivorship action, leaving only Appellants’ claims, which were jurisdictionally sound.View "Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth." on Justia Law

In 2008, decedent Grady Williams Stevens was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and was given approximately four weeks to live. He began a strenuous regimen of pain medications to provide him relief during his last weeks, and his daughter, Sherry Ray, began caring for him at her home. On September 17, 2008, the decedent signed a will naming Ray as executrix and sole beneficiary and signed two deeds conveying certain real property to the decedent's brother, Propounder Thomas Stevens and his sister. The decedent died in October. The attorney who had prepared the decedent's will and the two deeds subsequently filed the will with the probate court. Ray never submitted the will for probate because she believed it to be the result of Propounder's undue influence over her father, that her father lacked the requisite mental capacity to understand what he was signing, and that her father would have wanted his estate, including the property he conveyed by the two deeds he signed before his death, to pass equally to her and her only sibling, Shane Stevens. Approximately nine months after the decedent died, Propounder submitted the will for probate and sought appointment as administrator of the estate. Ray and Shane Stevens filed caveats to the petition. Caveators claimed that Propounder Stevens exerted a predominant and undue influence on their father to induce him to sign the will and deeds and that their father lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed the will because he was heavily medicated and possessed insufficient mental capacity. The probate court issued an order denying Propounder's petition to probate, finding that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Propounder appealed to the superior court, which denied Caveators' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact remained. Caveators then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Propounder lacked standing to probate the will, which the court denied. After a bench trial, the court issued an order finding that the will was valid, the decedent did not lack testamentary capacity, and Propounder did not exert an undue influence over the decedent. After the court denied their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by denying their motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found the Propounder did not have standing to offer the will for probate because he was not an "interested person" as required by OCGA 53-5-2. Accordingly, the Court reversed.View "Ray v. Stevens" on Justia Law