Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Sheldon Hathaway became embroiled in a stranger-originated-life-insurance (STOLI) scheme at the involving his neighbor, Jay Sullivan. Here, Intervenor Defendant-Appellant Windsor Securities, LLC (Windsor) loaned Defendant-Appellant the Sheldon Hathaway Family Trust (the Trust) $200,000 to finance the initial premium on a life insurance policy (the policy) for Hathaway. In exchange, Windsor “receive[d] a moderate return on [its] investment” if a trust repaid the loan. Alternatively, Windsor “foreclose[s] on the life insurance policy that was pledged as collateral” when a trust fails to do so. That’s what happened here. But before Windsor could profit from its investment, Plaintiff-Appellee PHL Variable Insurance Company (PHL) sought to rescind the policy based on alleged misrepresentations in Hathaway’s insurance application. The district court ultimately granted PHL’s motion for summary judgment on its rescission claim, and allowed And it allowed PHL to retain the premiums Windsor already paid. On appeal, Windsor and the Trust (collectively, the defendants) argued the district court erred in granting PHL’s motion for summary judgment because there was at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether PHL waived its right to rescind the policy. Alternatively, they argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment because, at a minimum, a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to: (1) whether the application contained a misrepresentation; and (2) whether PHL relied on that misrepresentation in issuing the policy. Finally, even assuming summary judgment was appropriate, defendants argued the district court lacked authority to allow PHL to retain the paid premiums. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding no genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether PHL waived its right to rescind the policy. Nor was there any genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the application contained a misrepresentation or whether PHL relied on that misrepresentation in issuing the policy. Lastly, the Court held the district court had authority to allow PHL to retain the paid premiums. View "PHL Variable Insurance v. Sheldon Hathaway Family Trust" on Justia Law

The State Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) filed a petition for an ex parte protective order on behalf of an elderly woman against her adult daughter and caregiver, after receiving allegations of financial abuse made by the elderly woman’s other family members. The superior court found those allegations to be unfounded and denied the protective order. The elderly woman’s estate and the caregiver daughter sought attorney’s fees against the State in connection with both the protective order and conservatorship proceedings. The superior court awarded full reasonable fees arising from the denial of the protective order, finding that OPA’s protective order petition was brought without “just cause,” under the fee-shifting provision of AS 13.26.131(d). The superior court declined to award attorney’s fees arising from the proceeding to establish a conservatorship because the State had not “initiated” the conservatorship proceeding as required for fees under AS 13.26.131(d). The State appealed the first award, and the caregiver daughter and the estate of the woman cross-appealed the denial of the second award. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that AS 13.26.131 did not apply to elder fraud protective order proceedings; nor did Alaska Civil Rule 82. Instead, AS 44.21.415 contained a cost-recovery mechanism that allowed private parties to recover attorney’s fees against the State in such proceedings. So the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s fee award in the elder fraud protective order proceeding. And because the State did not initiate the conservatorship proceeding here, no attorney’s fees are available against the State in that proceeding. View "Alaska Office of Public Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R." on Justia Law

Sarunas Abraitis, the former executor of his mother’s estate, applied to admit his mother’s will to probate. The will provided that if Abraitis’s father predeceased his mother, her entire estate would be divided equally between Abraitis and his brother, Vytautas. The matter was assigned to Judge Laura Gallagher. While the estate was being administered, Vytautas died. Abraitis subsequently filed an application to probate a different, later will that his mother executed and that bequeathed to him the entire estate. Vytautas’s former wife, Vivian, filed a complaint to contest the later will. The action was also assigned to Judge Gallagher. Abraitis filed two actions in prohibition alleging that Judge Gallagher lacked jurisdiction. As grounds for the writ, Abraitis referred to collateral proceedings regarding his mother’s guardianship and federal and state tax proceedings, arguing that because none of the parties objected or moved to intervene in the tax cases, the probate court was precluded from hearing any matter concerning the estate. The court of appeals dismissed Abraitis’s complaints in prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abraitis had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that Judge Gallagher did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the probate court action. View "State ex rel. Abraitis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a notice of appeal from a probate order approving a settlement agreement among Appellants. Upon Appellee’s motion, the circuit court extended the time to lodge the record. Appellee subsequently filed a motion asking the court to enter a nunc pro tunc order clarifying its findings of fact relating to the order granting the extension because that order did not include the findings required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 5(b). The circuit court entered the nunc pro tunc order. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in entering the nunc pro tunc order because Rule 5(b) had not been complied with at the time the original motion for extension of time was granted. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s nunc pro tunc order, as the extension order complied with Rule 5(b); (2) affirmed the circuit court’s order approving the settlement agreement, as the settlement was in the best interest of the Estate of J.D. Ashley, Sr.; and (3) denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellee’s appeal and their motion for sanctions, as Appellee timely lodged the record for his appeal and Appellee’s appeal was not frivolous. View "Ashley v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Father, a Florida resident, filed this diversity suit against Daughter, a Massachusetts resident, in the District of Massachusetts, alleging that Daughter, to whom he had given a power of attorney, breached her fiduciary duty to him. The jury returned a verdict in Father’s favor. Daughter appealed, and Father cross-appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Daughter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) did not err in awarding Father prejudgment interest from the date that he filed this lawsuit rather than the date Daughter breached her fiduciary duty. View "Berkowitz v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist, three stepchildren of Clarence Erickson and two spouses of the stepchildren, appealed a judgment granting a motion by Clarence Erickson's biological son, Curtis Erickson, to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). After Clarence Erickson died in December 2010, Curtis petitioned to rescind certain real and personal property transfers by Clarence to the appellants and to invalidate his September 2010 will. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment concluding that undue influence was exerted over Clarence when executing his will and while transferring real and personal property to the appellants, that Clarence lacked capacity to transfer money and real property, and that Clarence lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. The court denied the appellants' motion to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b). The appellants then moved to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), asking the district court to require repayment of the purchase prices the appellants paid for real property transfers invalidated by the court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for clerical errors or mistakes arising from oversight or omission under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Curtis Erickson's motion to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a). View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

Norman Ussery appealed a circuit court order dismissing his action in a will contest against Alan Terry ("Alan"), as executor of the estate of Donald R. Terry ("Donald"). Ussery argued that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint conflicted with "Hons v. A. Bertolla & Sons," (537 So.2d 456 (Ala. 1988)), a case in which the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the application of sections 43-8-199 and -200, Ala. Code 1975, included in the will-contest provisions of the Code. Alan argued in response: (1) that Ussery appealed as to only one of two grounds that Alan said were the circuit court's bases for dismissal; (2) that the circuit court ruled that joinder of indispensable parties was not possible and that Ussery failed to appeal that ruling; (3) that the circuit court correctly dismissed the will contest pursuant to the joinder requirements under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) that "Hons" should have been overruled to the extent that it held that absent parties could be joined beyond the six-month period prescribed by 43-8-199. The Supreme Court disagreed with Alan's contentions on appeal, and reversed the circuit court. "After Ussery filed his complaint, the circuit court first should have determined whether it was a proper complaint under the provisions of 43-8-199. Then, if it was determined that the complaint met the statutory requirements, the circuit court, upon appropriate motion, should have joined 'interested parties' who were absent." View "Ussery v. Terry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition against their stepfather, to recover property belonging to their mother’s estate and sought damages of double the value of the property, based on Probate Code 859: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to ... an elder, ... or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse … the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered [and] in the court’s discretion ... for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Staggers died. His son was substituted in as the respondent in the probate proceeding. The court held that double damages and attorney fees under section 859 were punitive in nature and not available against the son, based on Code of Civil Procedure 377.42, which excepts from recovery against a successor “damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or exemplary damages.” The court of appeal vacated, reasoning that section 859 damages may be punitive in nature, but are not punitive damages. View "Hill v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a timely post-probate will contest but failed to timely issue a citation to Respondent, the executor of the estate, in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 137.090. Appellant filed a petition to enlarge time for issuing citations. The probate commissioner recommended that the petition be granted, determining that Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.25 granted the court discretion to extend the time limit for issuing citations. The district court dismissed the will contest, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits. The court did not address whether Rule 2.25 applied in this matter. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order, holding (1) a failure to timely issue citations to the estate’s personal representative and the will’s devisees constitutes grounds for dismissal of a will contest; (2) Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits; but (3) the district court erred in failing to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule 2.25 when requesting an enlargement of time to issue the citations. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Black" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law