Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff contested the legality of the decedent’s will. Plaintiff then filed a second notice of claim seeking reimbursement of money advanced to the decedent. A number of motions subsequently followed, along with an affidavit filed by Plaintiff indicating his intention to remove the case to the superior court for a jury trial. After a hearing, the probate court concluded that some of the matters were eligible for removal and the remainder were not. Plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the matters decided at the hearing. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, as an appeal, it was untimely. Plaintiff argued in response that the action was not an appeal but an action challenging the probate court’s retention of jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments, concluded that Plaintiff’s action was untimely, and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly treated the present action as an appeal but incorrectly determined that the appeal was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-186(a). Under the facts of this case, however, the appeal was filed prematurely. View "Connery v. Gieske" on Justia Law

Margie Wylie appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Montgomery Probate Court's decision removing her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as personal representative. The record lacked supporting documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court nor the circuit court provided sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of that decision. The Court therefore reversed that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming that award and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell" on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Greco, Jr. was the trustee of his parents’ trust and the administrator of their estates. He used money from the trust and estates to fund litigation against his sister and others, purportedly to recover money they owed to the trust and estates. After he allegedly spent considerably more money on litigation than he could have possibly recovered, his sister, plaintiff Cara Lyn Greco, brought two lawsuits against him, one at the trial court and one at the probate court, to recover the money he spent, plus penalties. She claimed the prior litigation was a personal vendetta. Clyde Jr. responded to each lawsuit by filing separate special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In each case, the special motion to strike was denied. On appeal, Clyde Jr. contended he met his burden on the first prong of section 425.16 by establishing that Cara Lyn’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity, funding litigation. He further argued that Cara Lyn could not meet her burden on the second prong of section 425.16 to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of each claim because all her claims are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found the gravamen of most of Cara Lyn’s claims was the alleged wrongful taking from the trust and estates and that was not a protected activity under section 425.16. The courts properly denied Clyde Jr.’s special motion to strike as to these claims. The one exception was Cara Lyn’s claim for constructive fraud based on Clyde Jr.’s alleged misrepresentations about the underlying litigation. While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigation are protected activity, Clyde Jr. did not show it was covered by the litigation privilege. The Court remanded this matter back to the probate court for a determination of whether Cara Lyn met her evidentiary burden under the second prong of section 425.16 analysis. View "Greco v. Greco" on Justia Law

Lenard E. Noice worked as a conductor for Petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). He fell from a BNSF train that was moving at speed and perished. Respondent, Lenard Noice II, acting as personal representative for Noice (the Estate), filed a wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA), asserting, among other claims, that BNSF negligently permitted the train from which Noice fell to operate at an excessive speed. The undisputed facts established that the train from which Noice fell never exceeded the speed limit for the class of track upon which it was operating. BNSF moved for summary judgment arguing that the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the Estate’s FELA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FRSA did not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim. Because FRSA contained no provision expressly precluding the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim and because permitting the Estate’s FELA claim to proceed furthered the purposes of both statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative of the Estate of Theodore Meiners, filed an action seeking enforcement of a divorce settlement agreement entered into between Theodore and his former wife, Colleen Meiners. The district court granted summary judgment to Colleen on some claims and to Plaintiff on other claims. The district court certified its ruling as final pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the district court’s summary judgment ruling was not properly certified as a final, appealable order pursuant to Rule 54(b). Remanded with directions. View "Meiners v. Meiners" on Justia Law

Defendants Providence Hospital and Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a BMA Magnolia a/k/a Fresenius Medical Care Magnolia Grove separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Pamela Howard died in 2012. One of Pamela's sons, Michael Darrick Howard ("Darrick"), petitioned the probate court to probate her will and to grant him letters testamentary. Attached to Darrick's petition was a document in which Pamela's other son, William Corey Howard ("Corey"), agreed that Darrick should be granted letters testamentary. In 2014, the probate court granted Darrick letters testamentary, establishing him as the personal representative of Pamela's estate. Under 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, only Darrick, as personal representative, had the authority to bring a wrongful-death action. However, Corey filed a wrongful-death action against the defendants, which had provided health-care services to their mother shortly before her death. Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that that Corey's wrongful-death action was a nullity because it had not been initiated by Darrick as personal representative of Pamela's estate. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the wrongful-death action filed against the defendants was indeed a nullity, it granted the petitions and issue mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Providence Hospital." on Justia Law

Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC ("Northstar"), and Maria Bolyard, CRNA; Parkway Medical Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Parkway Medical Center ("Parkway"); and Jeffrey Markham, M.D. ("Dr. Markham") (collectively referred to as "appellants"), filed three petitions for a permissive appeal of Circuit Court orders denying their motions for a summary judgment in a wrongful-death action brought by Paula Noble ("Paula"), as personal representative of the estate of Thomas Noble ("Thomas"). Thomas died in late 2011. In early 2012, Paula was appointed personal representative of Thomas' estate. When the business of the estate had closed, Paula petitioned to be discharged as personal representative. Then in 2013 (three days before the statute of limitations was set to run), Paula filed a wrongful-death action against the appellants. A month after filing her complaint, and having become aware of the fact that she lacked the representative capacity to maintain the wrongful-death action because she had been discharged and released as the personal representative of Thomas's estate before she commenced the action, Paula filed a petition to "re-open" Thomas's estate "so that she [could] continue as Personal Representative" for purposes of pursuing the wrongful-death action she filed. Appellants moved to dismiss, citing Paula's capacity to bring suit on behalf of the estate. After review, the Supreme Court found that Paula's initial complaint was a nullity. As a result, appellants were not under an obligation to raise the affirmative defense of capacity because the filing of Paula's complaint was "an act or proceeding in a cause which the opposite party may treat as though it had not taken place, or which has absolutely no legal force or effect." As such, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellants' summary-judgment motions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Markham v. Noble" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor obtained a judgment against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment creditor filed a petition under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL), Code Civ. Proc., 680.010 et seq., to invalidate the third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant appealed. The court concluded that the underlying order invalidating the third party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly denied the third party claimant's belated motion to vacate that order. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Torjesen, v. Mansdorf" on Justia Law

Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

Charlene Ivy was admitted to East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”) in May 2012, and she died on July 17, 2012. Alleging medical negligence by EMSH staff, Ivy’s son Spencer sent a Notice of Claim letter via certified mail dated July 11, 2013, to EMSH Director Charles Carlisle. Carlisle signed for the letter on July 15, 2013, as evidenced by a return receipt. The definitive question in this appeal was whether Carlisle, as the Director of the East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”), was the proper “chief executive officer” for notice purposes under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), as opposed to the Executive Director of the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). The trial judge found that “proper pre-suit notice” required service “upon the executive director of [DMH], not a facility manager of one of the institutions under its jurisdiction and control.” The trial judge found further that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Ivy had “failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 11-46-11(1)” and dismissed Ivy’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that EMSH’s Director was the CEO under the MTCA, and that Ivy provided the "proper pre-suit notice. View "Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital" on Justia Law