Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Todd Hill, Roy Hill, Brian Hill, and Debra Hill Stewart were the children of Leroy Hill, who died testate in 2009. Deborah D. Hill, Leroy’s second wife, offered Leroy's will for probate. The Hill children hired attorneys Vincent Kilborn III and David McDonald to bring a breach-of-contract action against the estate and Deborah, alleging breach of an agreement between Leroy and the Hills' mother at the time Leroy divorced the Hills' mother in 1984 to make a will leaving the Hills a coffee company and a family ranch. The Hills and the attorneys entered into a retainer agreement, which required the Hills to pay the attorneys "40% of any recovery, in the event there is a recovery, with or without suit." According to the agreement, "recovery" included cash, real or personal property, stock in the Leroy Hill Coffee Company, and all or part ownership in the family ranch. After a trial, a judgment was entered for the Hills ordering specific performance of the contract, which required the conveyance of the coffee company and the ranch to the Hills. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. At issue before the Supreme Court involved the attorney fee. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its discretion when it failed to order the payment of the attorney fee in accordance with the retainer agreement. The Hills petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate two order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, they argued that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine the 40% contingency fee owed the attorneys was an administrative expense of the estate and, consequently, that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when any subsequent order at issue in this case. The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court had jurisdiction over the administration of the estate, so the petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1150162) was denied; the orders pertaining to payment of the retainer were reversed (case no. 1150148) and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Brian Ray appealed a circuit court judgment in a will contest transferred to the circuit court from the Tallapoosa Probate Court. The will contest in this case was transferred to the circuit court pursuant to 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court held previously that the jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by this section was statutory and limited. A circuit court, however, was not limited to the issues presented to the probate court prior to the transfer, and a circuit court could, in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allow additional issues in the will contest, "provided those issues can properly be raised in a will contest." In this case, it appeared that the only issues raised by the contestants were those issues set forth in their complaint contesting Huett's will, and the only ones properly before the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after Ray's arguments on appeal, that the circuit court should have decided the case on the issues actually raised in the contest -- i.e., testamentary capacity, valid execution, and undue influence. Because it did not stick to the issues raised, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for the circuit court to decide the specific will contest issues before it, and to enter a judgment either upholding or denying the contest. View "Ray v. Huett" on Justia Law

Alabama resident Joan McCullough Scott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Probate Court to vacate its order requiring all Alabama resident-beneficiaries of the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange to pay the probate court distributions they received from a concurrent administration of the estate in London, England. Lange was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1930. In 1953 she married a Danish citizen and moved to Copenhagen. She divorced her husband in 1961, and in 1962 she became a resident of London, where she resided until her death in 2010. Despite living overseas for the majority of her adult life, Lange retained her United States citizenship, and she never became a British citizen. At her death, Lange owned the several parcels of real property in England, a small sum of money in an English bank account, some personal property located in England, and approximately $350,000 in personal property located in Alabama. The probate court granted Lange's nephew, Charles Lange Clark's petition on the day it was filed and issued him letters of administration. Clark hired legal counsel in London to assist in the administration of the estate overseas. At some point in the relationship, Clark terminated the London firm, and the firm invoiced Clark for work done to the point of termination. Clark did not pay the invoice, and the firm sued him in England. Clark sought indemnification as to costs incurred in defending against the London law firm, and asked the Alabama Probate Court for relief. At the time of Clark's motion, he had already distributed all but approximately $70 of the assets under his control. Scott did not object to the motion for indemnification, nor the probate court's order granting the motion. An "Order of Escrow" was entered, requiring all beneficiaries of the estate in Alabama to pay the probate all monies that had been previously paid out so that a determination could be made about Clark's indemnification claim. The monies asked for included money any Alabama beneficiary received from the English administration of the estate. In her writ application, Scott argued that the probate had no jurisdiction as to the estate assets she received from the English administration. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, granted Scott's petition, issued the writ, and directed the probate court to vacate the escrow order. View "Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott." on Justia Law

Walker Inman executed an inter vivos trust and a last will and testament. After Mr. Inman died, Daralee Inman, his wife, petitioned the district court for probate of Mr. Inman’s estate. Two years after the probate was opened, Wyoming Trust Company (WTC) filed a petition seeking to be appointed as the conservator of the minor children in the probate action. The district court granted the petition. WTC, as conservator for the minor children, filed a separate complaint for declaratory relief and damages, together with a petition to remove trustees, alleging six causes of action. The cases proceeded simultaneously over the next two years. The district court later ordered the cases consolidated. The court then issued its decision and order, interpreting a trust provision and holding that the Wyoming Probate Code governs the transfer of property to the trust but making no final determination of either of the two consolidated matters. Daralee Inman appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the order was not a final appealable order. View "In re Estate of Inman" on Justia Law

While a resident at Cleveland Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, (“Cleveland”), Annie Mae Gully fell and broke her hip. Following complications from a surgical procedure to repair her hip, Gully died six days later. Subsequently, suit was filed against Cleveland, alleging claims of negligence and gross negligence. Following a verdict in the Estate's favor, Cleveland moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury had been allowed to hear undisclosed opinions from an expert and improper closing argument from counsel for the Estate. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with this contention, reversed the trial court, and remanded for a new trial. View "Cleveland Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC v. Estate of Annie Mae Gully" on Justia Law

Drew Bowers (Ward) sustained a traumatic brain injury in 1981. As a result of the injury, he required 24-hour care. His mother, Patricia Bowers Edwards (Guardian) was appointed guardian of her son's person and property in 2004. As guardian, she was responsible for hiring approximately ten caretakers for Drew in his private residence. Two of the ten caretakers contracted to provide services for Drew were domestic workers, Deborah Sizemore and Brad Garrett. In 2013, Sizemore filed a "charge of discrimination" pursuant to the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, with the Attorney General's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement, claiming that her hours were dramatically reduced when she told the guardian she suffered from narcolepsy. Sizemore also claimed that she was sexually harassed at work by a male co-worker. She identified co-worker Garrett as a supporting witness in her complaint. The Guardian terminated the employment of both Sizemore and Garrett when she received the complaint from the Attorney General. The Guardian admitted she discharged Sizemore and Garrett from employment because the complaint was "the straw that broke the camel's back." Guardian moved for summary judgment arguing that Drew was the actual employer and that under section 1301 of the Act, a natural person did not meet the definition of "employer." Guardian further argued that under section 1302(B) of the Act, the prohibition of discriminatory practices did not apply to " . . .employment in the domestic service of the employer." The trial court denied Guardian's motion for summary judgment and Guardian brought this original action asserting immunity under the Act. Finding that indeed, Guardian was immune from suit under the Act, and that the trial court erred by not dismissing this case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case. View "Edwards v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law

The decedent in this case executed two wills, the first in West Virginia in 2012 and the second in New York in 2014. The named executor of the West Virginia will (Plaintiff) filed a complaint in a West Virginia circuit court challenging the validity of the New York will. The executrix of the New York will (Defendant) moved to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, Defendant argued that the West Virginia Court lacked jurisdiction because a New York probate court had already decided the New York will was valid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the final order from the New York court did not foreclose further inquiry into the decedent’s will by a West Virginia court; (2) Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s only avenue to challenge the probate of the New York will in West Virginia was before the county commission was unavailing; and (3) Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that the probate of the New York will was improper. View "Mason v. Torrellas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contested the legality of the decedent’s will. Plaintiff then filed a second notice of claim seeking reimbursement of money advanced to the decedent. A number of motions subsequently followed, along with an affidavit filed by Plaintiff indicating his intention to remove the case to the superior court for a jury trial. After a hearing, the probate court concluded that some of the matters were eligible for removal and the remainder were not. Plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the matters decided at the hearing. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, as an appeal, it was untimely. Plaintiff argued in response that the action was not an appeal but an action challenging the probate court’s retention of jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments, concluded that Plaintiff’s action was untimely, and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly treated the present action as an appeal but incorrectly determined that the appeal was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-186(a). Under the facts of this case, however, the appeal was filed prematurely. View "Connery v. Gieske" on Justia Law

Margie Wylie appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Montgomery Probate Court's decision removing her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as personal representative. The record lacked supporting documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court nor the circuit court provided sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of that decision. The Court therefore reversed that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming that award and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell" on Justia Law