Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the estate of Linda C. Giguere, who passed away in 2021. Her will, dated 2013, nominated her husband, William Giguere, as the personal representative and established a trust for his benefit if she predeceased him. The will also stated that upon William's death, the remaining balance would be paid to his children. However, the will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate if William predeceased her, which he did in 2015. Linda did not execute a new will after William’s death. The will also explicitly stated that Linda's estranged daughter, Hilary Barlow, was to receive nothing.In the Cumberland County Probate Court, Hilary Barlow filed an application for the informal appointment of a personal representative of her mother’s estate. The court appointed Hilary as personal representative. Later, Eric and Mark Giguere, William's sons, filed petitions for the formal probate of the will and appointment of a personal representative. The court removed Hilary as personal representative and appointed Attorney LeBlanc as successor personal representative. Attorney LeBlanc filed a petition for instructions, asserting that the 2013 will did not dispose of Linda’s estate because it made no provision for the disposition of the residuary estate in the event that William predeceased Linda.The Probate Court rejected the request to reform the 2013 will to name Eric and Mark as residuary devisees, stating that the evidence was not clear and convincing. The court concluded that since the 2013 will did not fully dispose of Linda’s estate, the residuary estate passed by intestate succession to Hilary.On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Eric and Mark argued that the Probate Court’s finding was against the preponderance of the believable evidence. They contended that the absence of a provision disposing of the residuary estate must have been a scrivener's error. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment, stating that Eric and Mark failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Linda intended that they be the residuary devisees of her estate if William predeceased Linda. The court also concluded that the 2013 will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate in the event she survived William, and thus those assets passed by way of intestate succession to Hilary. View "Estate of Giguere" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a family dispute over the management of a trust established by Bernard and Jeannette Fenenbock. The trust was divided into three sub-trusts (Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C) to benefit their children, Glenna Fenenbock Gaddy and Mark Fenenbock. After Bernard's death, Glenna began serving as co-trustee with her mother Jeannette. Upon Jeannette's death, Glenna transferred shares from the sub-trusts to her own trust and sold them to her sons, Weston and Lane. Mark filed a lawsuit against Glenna, asserting that she had breached her duties as a trustee by transferring the shares without his approval as a co-trustee.The probate court ruled in favor of Mark, declaring that Mark is a co-trustee and that the transfer of shares to Glenna's Trust was void. The court ordered that the shares be restored to the sub-trusts. Glenna appealed this decision, and the court of appeals vacated the probate court’s order, concluding that the buyers of the shares, Weston and Lane, were “jurisdictionally indispensable parties” whose absence deprived the probate court of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction but erred by ordering Glenna to restore property she no longer owns or controls. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the probate court’s order, reversed the probate court’s order, and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. The court noted that any appropriate relief must come from Glenna or Glenna’s Trust or through the ultimate distribution of the assets remaining in the Sub-Trusts. View "IN THE MATTER OF TRUST A AND TRUST C. ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BERNARD L. AND JEANNETTE FENENBOCK LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Michael Hessler Living Trust. Michael Hessler, the settlor of the trust, had three children: Heidi Shaddick, Amber Rocha, and Brock Hessler. He also had a romantic relationship with Lori J. Miller. After Hessler's death, the successor trustee of the trust, Robert Hessler, deeded a house to Miller and allocated all inheritance tax to the trust's residuary, which was to be divided among Hessler's three children. The children sued, arguing that the inheritance tax should be equitably apportioned among all beneficiaries, including Miller.The case was initially filed in Lancaster County, but the trustee successfully moved to transfer the case to Scotts Bluff County, where the trust was registered. The children challenged this decision, arguing that the case should have been heard in Lancaster County, where the real estate in question was located.The county court for Scotts Bluff County granted Miller's motion for partial summary judgment on the inheritance tax issue, ruling that the language of the trust was clear enough to override the statutory pattern that would otherwise presume equitable apportionment of inheritance tax. The court concluded that the trust's language indicated that all inheritance taxes were to be paid from the trust's residue, not by the individual beneficiaries. The children appealed this decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It ruled that the order transferring venue to Scotts Bluff County was not a final order and could be challenged in the appeal. The court also found no error in the lower court's decision to admit an affidavit from the attorney who drafted the trust. Finally, the court agreed with the lower court's interpretation of the trust, concluding that the trust's language clearly indicated that inheritance taxes were to be paid by the trust rather than by the individual beneficiaries. View "In re Hessler Living Trust" on Justia Law

In 2015, Universitas Education, LLC initiated a lawsuit against Jack E. Robinson, III, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Robinson defended himself until his death in November 2017. After Robinson's death, the focus of the case shifted to finding a proper party to substitute as a representative of his estate. Universitas identified Lillian Granderson, Robinson's mother, as a suitable substitute and filed motions to substitute her into the case and to enter default judgment against her. The district court granted both motions.On appeal, Granderson argued that the district court erred in granting Universitas' motion to substitute and motion for default judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to substitute Granderson into the case, but vacated the default judgment. The court found that Granderson had defended the case and no entry of default had been entered against her, which was a requirement for a default judgment. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Universitas Education, LLC v. Granderson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the will of Dennis Schmeling, who left his farmland to his sister-in-law, Sharon, in his 2021 will. Two of Dennis's brothers and one nephew contested the will, alleging undue influence by Sharon. The Estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contestants could not show that the devise was the result of undue influence, based on a previous court decision (In re Estate of Tank). The circuit court agreed with the Estate, concluding that there was no evidence showing that Dennis had a testamentary disposition toward the contestants and that the contestants did not present evidence showing that Sharon participated in the drafting of the disputed will or engaged in acts of undue influence. The contestants appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had erred by granting summary judgment on grounds not raised by the parties and by granting the Estate's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that there were material issues of fact in dispute on the contestants' claim that the 2021 Will was the result of Sharon’s undue influence. Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the Estate’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court also found that the circuit court erred in denying the contestants' partial motion for summary judgment, as it was undisputed that neither the 2002 Will nor the 2021 Will contains language expressly disinheriting the contestants. View "In re Estate Of Schmeling" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will left by Robert Pettengill Beckey, who was survived by his three children, Sandra L. Arthur, Angela M. Beckey, and Timothy E. Beckey. The will included specific instructions for dividing real property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., Greene, ME, among the three children. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the will, particularly regarding Angela's share.Specifically, Angela's share was described in the will as "1/3 of property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., minus the valuation of a piece of land on water by property line of 'Caron's'". The Probate Court had ruled that this description was ambiguous and that Angela's share therefore fell into the residue of the estate, to be divided equally among the three children. However, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the ambiguity of the "minus" clause was irrelevant because Robert never conveyed any part of the land to Angela. Therefore, Angela was entitled to a one-third share of the Allen Pond Road property’s value without any reduction.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court's ruling was not consistent with Robert's intent for his children to receive equal shares of the property's value. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Estate of Robert Pettengill Beckey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition to defendant Denita D. Berg, preventing the Circuit Court of Grant County from enforcing orders to sell personal property before determining its ownership. The orders were part of a case brought by Denita Berg's stepchildren, who alleged that Berg had not properly inventoried their father's estate after his death and had committed fraud.The Supreme Court's decision was based on the fact that the orders to sell the property were issued despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact about who owned it. The Court explained that the circuit court's order was erroneous as a matter of law because it went beyond the requirements of Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment should only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.The Court concluded that the circuit court had exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering the sale of the property when ownership was still in dispute. Therefore, it granted a writ of prohibition, as moulded, to preclude the circuit court from ordering the sale of the disputed property. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. Berg v. Ryan" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Christopher O’Donnell, as the personal representative of the estate of Erica J. O’Donnell, appealed a judgment from the York County Probate Court. The court had approved a referee's report regarding the distribution of the estate. O’Donnell contested several aspects of the report, including the application of the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A of the Maine Revised Statutes to Erica J. O’Donnell's estate and the court’s decision to adopt the referee's report without holding a hearing on O’Donnell's amended objection.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court concluded that the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A, not Title 18-C, applied because Erica J. O’Donnell died before the effective date of Title 18-C. The court also rejected O’Donnell's argument that he was deprived of a hearing on the referee’s report, finding that a hearing was held after the referee's report and O’Donnell's objections were received. The court ruled that O’Donnell's amended objection lacked the required level of specificity to preserve his objection to the plan of distribution. View "Estate of Erica J. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana was presiding over a dispute regarding the reimbursement claim of Angela Mastrovito from the Estate of Rebekah Barsotti. Mastrovito, the mother of the deceased Rebekah Barsotti, had served as her court-appointed guardian after Rebekah went missing and was presumed dead following a reported drowning accident. Mastrovito filed a claim for $140,688.45 in expenses she allegedly incurred during her guardianship, including costs for rent, legal fees, meals, travel, and others. The claim was opposed by Rebekah's husband, David Barsotti, who was appointed as the personal representative of Rebekah's estate.The District Court denied Mastrovito's claim for three reasons: her appointment as a guardian was retroactively improper due to Rebekah's death, the claimed expenditures were unreasonable, and the claim lacked sufficient substantiation. Mastrovito appealed this decision, arguing that her appointment was not improper and that she was denied a fair hearing to present evidence in support of her claim.Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's denial of the claim. The court reasoned that even if Mastrovito's appointment was proper, she still failed to provide sufficient support for her claim. The court concluded that a hearing could not change the fact that Mastrovito's claim was facially insufficient. The court underscored the need for providing supporting evidence to determine the validity and reasonableness of claimed costs. View "In re Estate of Barsotti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision to reform an irrevocable trust to reflect the original intent of the settlor. The settlor, Elton G. Beebe Sr., created a trust in 1992 with the aim of providing lifetime benefits to 16 named individuals. However, he claimed that a scrivener’s error in the trust document led to a misunderstanding about the distribution of the trust's assets upon the death of the last named beneficiary. The trust document stated that the assets would be distributed to the descendants of all 16 beneficiaries, but Beebe claimed that his intention was for the assets to be distributed to his own lineal descendants.The trial court found that the settlor provided clear and convincing evidence of his original intent and the mistake in the trust document. It reformed the termination provision of the trust to reflect the settlor's intent. The decision was appealed by several parties who were not in agreement with the reformation.The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the termination provision in the trust was a mistake of expression that did not reflect Beebe's intent at the time the trust was created. The court did not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding. View "In the Matter of the Elton G. Beebe, Sr. Irrevocable Family Mortgage Trust v. Family Management, Inc." on Justia Law