Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In appeal no. 1161016, Margaret McGimsey, Cathy Cramer, Barbara McCollum, and Marilyn Busch (referred to collectively as "the nieces") appealed the grant of summary judgement entered in favor of Lynda Jeanette Gray, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Thomas Leonard Pitts, deceased, in a will contest they initiated following Pitts's death; the nieces also challenged the trial court's order directing them to reimburse Gray $8,393 for court costs and certain litigation expenses. In appeal no. 1161055, Gray cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its discretion by not also entering an award of attorney fees in her favor. The Alabama Supreme Court was satisfied the nieces identified evidence indicating: (1) Gray assisted Pitts in an initial attempt to revise his existing will sometime in 2010; (2) that Gray gave conflicting accounts regarding her presence in Pitts's meeting with hospice services that led to Howard contacting Pitts; (3) Gray helped with the scheduling of the meeting at which the November 2010 will was executed and arranged for the witnesses to be at that meeting; (4) that Gray was in the house both times Howard met with Pitts; and (5) that the nieces were not told about the November 2010 will when it was executed. This evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether there was undue activity on Gray's part in procuring the execution of the November 2010 will. Inasmuch as the nieces put forth substantial evidence of all three elements of an undue-influence claim, the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Gray on that claim, and that judgment was reversed. Moreover, inasmuch as section 43-8-196 Ala. Code 1975 provides that a will contestant is liable for the costs of the contest only if the contest "fails," the trial court's judgment was also reversed to the extent it ordered the nieces to reimburse Gray $8,393. View "McGimsey v. Gray" on Justia Law

A family rushed to the scene of a car accident, only to discover that it had been caused by a family member, who soon thereafter died from her traumatic injuries. The family brought a bystander claim against the deceased family member’s estate for negligent infliction of emotional distress, making the novel argument that, even though the family member was also the tortfeasor, the family could recover for its resulting emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate, reasoning that the family’s claim had no basis in current Alaska law. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, concurring that the family’s claim had no basis in Alaska law and also failed to satisfy the test set forth in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981) regarding expanding tort liability. View "Schack v. Schack" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from a 2010 civil suit filed by Carol Clement against Russell Puckett. After Puckett’s death in 2014, Clement substituted the Estate of Russell Puckett (the “Estate”) as the defendant in the suit and served the Estate. The Estate moved to dismiss the suit due to failure to timely serve process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The Estate argued that the statute of limitations had expired before Clement perfected service. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Estate appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Because the trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the Estate. View "Estate of Russell Puckett v. Clement" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of whether and to what extent superior courts have authority to intervene in the administration of nonintervention estates. Todd Rathbone was named personal representative of his mother's estate in her nonintervention will. Glen Rathbone, Todd's' brother and beneficiary of the will, took issue with Todd's administration of the estate and filed a petition requesting an accountancy under RCW 11.68.110. He then filed an action under chapter 11.96A RCW, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), requesting the trial court construe the will in his favor. The trial court held it had the authority to construe the will under RCW 11.68.070 and, in the alternative, TEDRA itself gave the trial court authority to construe the will. The court ruled in favor of Glen's construction of the will and overrode the interpretation of Todd. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the trial court had authority to construe the will but on the separate basis that Glen had invoked authority under RCW 11.68.110 when he filed his petition for an accounting. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutory provisions under TEDRA did not give the trial court authority to construe the will in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the authority invoked under the nonintervention statutes, such as RCW 11.68.110 and .070, was limited to resolving issues provided under each statute. View "In re Estate of Rathbone" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of whether and to what extent superior courts have authority to intervene in the administration of nonintervention estates. Todd Rathbone was named personal representative of his mother's estate in her nonintervention will. Glen Rathbone, Todd's' brother and beneficiary of the will, took issue with Todd's administration of the estate and filed a petition requesting an accountancy under RCW 11.68.110. He then filed an action under chapter 11.96A RCW, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), requesting the trial court construe the will in his favor. The trial court held it had the authority to construe the will under RCW 11.68.070 and, in the alternative, TEDRA itself gave the trial court authority to construe the will. The court ruled in favor of Glen's construction of the will and overrode the interpretation of Todd. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the trial court had authority to construe the will but on the separate basis that Glen had invoked authority under RCW 11.68.110 when he filed his petition for an accounting. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutory provisions under TEDRA did not give the trial court authority to construe the will in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the authority invoked under the nonintervention statutes, such as RCW 11.68.110 and .070, was limited to resolving issues provided under each statute. View "In re Estate of Rathbone" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Glenvin Albrecht ("Glenvin") appealed, and Mark Albrecht ("Mark"), the personal representative of the estate ("the Estate") of Sharleen Albrecht ("Sharleen"), cross-appealed orders in an informal probate denying Glenvin's claims against the Estate. Glenvin argued that the district court's decision to deny Glenvin a recovery of jointly held marital assets transferred by Sharleen to the parties' son, Mark, should be reversed because, prior to Sharleen's death, she transferred the assets in violation of restraining provisions in a pending divorce proceeding. Glenvin further contended the district court abused its discretion in denying Glenvin's request for a recovery under principles of equity and its finding that Sharleen had not engaged in economic misconduct during prior divorce proceedings was clearly erroneous. The Estate argued that the district court improperly extended the time to commence an action against the Estate and erred as a matter of law in determining that Glenvin held the status of a surviving spouse with regard to the Estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order holding that Glenvin was a surviving spouse, denying Glenvin's request for contempt, the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for equitable relief and the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for relief from Sharleen's economic waste. View "Estate of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Richard and Kathryn are the beneficiaries of their parents’ multi‐million dollar trust, which is administered by Richard, Kathryn, and a corporate trustee. When their father died, the two fell into “irreconcilable” disputes. Kathryn hired Oxford to advise her. The trust paid Oxford’s fees. Oxford advised Kathryn to create one trust for Kathryn and her children, and another for Richard and his. Richard agreed. They moved the trust's situs from Indiana to South Dakota. Ultimately, they could not agree on the terms. When Kathryn refused to sign Richard’s proposed agreement, he unsuccessfully petitioned a South Dakota state court to order the trust's division. Richard alleges that he suffered financial losses and that his sister refused to sign the agreement because she received negligent advice from Oxford. Richard sued Oxford on behalf of the trust, asserting his capacity as a beneficiary and a co‐trustee. The complaint identified Kathryn as an “involuntary plaintiff.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Richard lacks capacity to bring suit on behalf of the trust under either Illinois or South Dakota law, which prohibits a trust beneficiary from suing a third party on behalf of a trust (absent special circumstances that were not alleged). State law and the trust agreement require a majority of trustees to consent to such a suit; that consent was missing. View "Doermer v. Oxford Financial Group, Ltd." on Justia Law

In consolidated actions, brothers-appellants Alex and David Peterson claimed, among other things, that their mother, appellee Mary Peterson, and their brother, appellee Calhoun Peterson, had breached their duties as executors of the will of Mary’s husband, Charles Hugh Peterson, and as trustees of a bypass trust created by that will. This appeal stemmed from the superior court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment filed by Mary. Of the many allegations of the complaints, the superior court specifically addressed two of them: one was Alex’s and David’s allegation that Mary and Calhoun, as trustees, had not properly considered the testator’s stated intention “to provide for the proper support and education of my descendants taking into account and consideration any other means of support they or any of them may have to the knowledge of the Trustees.” With regard to this issue, the superior court ruled against Alex and David for two reasons: (1) because Item 21 of the will provided that a decision of the majority of the trustees would be controlling only so long as Mary was one of the majority, Alex and David would be entitled to income under the bypass trust only if Mary approved it; and (2) because of the requirement that Mary be a part of the majority of executors or trustees for one of their decisions to control, because of the benefits granted to Mary under the trusts, and because of her power to appoint trust property, the primary purpose of the trusts was to support Mary, and there was thus “no requirement that income be provided to either [Alex or David].” The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that based on the facts of record, these conclusions did not warrant the grant of summary judgment to Mary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sued Bartsch’s estate, claiming to be Bartsch’s son, unintentionally omitted from his father’s will. The court of appeal upheld a finding that Bartsch was aware of plaintiff’s existence when he executed his will, having reluctantly made court-ordered child support payments to plaintiff’s mother for many years. Plaintiff separately sued the attorney who represented the executor and the executor, alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, because the defendants stated under penalty of perjury that decedent had no children when they filed the probate petition, did not serve notice of their petition on plaintiff, and “willfully failed to inform the Court [that plaintiff was Bartsch’s son], depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to assert a claim. He also alleged that the way defendants stated the petition’s allegations made him believe that decedent “was not aware that he had a son or had forgotten it,” leading him to incur significant legal fees. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff could not establish any damages because it was established that he had no interest in Bartsch’s estate. His claims are based entirely on the defendants' representations in connection with the probate proceeding and are, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege, Civil Code 47(b). View "Herterich v. Peltner" on Justia Law