Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Brian Cole was killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2001. Brian Cole’s Estate had a court-approved contingency fee contract with Eugene Tullos, and only Eugene Tullos, to represent the Estate in wrongful death litigation. The Ferrell Group claimed this contract rendered it an interested party entitled to notice of the Estate’s final accounting under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-295. The trial court found that the Ferrell Group was not an interested party pursuant to the notice statute. Because the Ferrell Group did not probate a claim or have a contract with the Estate, or otherwise show a direct pecuniary interest in the Estate, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian K. Cole, Deceased" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Christine Davidson was the court-appointed conservator of the person and estate of Lorraine Presha from 2009 to 2015. Presha died in March 2015. In June 2015, Davidson filed a combined petition for: (1) approval of the sixth and final accounting, and (2) conservator’s fees. Davidson sought conservator’s fees in the amount of $12,621.60. The probate court ordered conservator’s fees in the amount of $7,000. Davidson contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) examining Davidson’s billing practices; (2) utilizing its finding that Davidson’s billing practices were improper when ruling upon Davidson’s petition for compensation; (3) vitiating the finality of prior cases for which Davidson served as the conservator; and (4) not utilizing the enumerated factors when ruling on her petition for compensation. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Conservatorship of Presha" on Justia Law

Cortese is the daughter of Francesca, and the stepdaughter of Robert. Attorney Sherwood handled their legal matters under Robert’s direction. Cortese alleges Robert promised her that, upon his death, “he would treat her equally as his other children.” Sherwood drafted Francesca’s will and represented Robert as executor during the administration of Francesca’s estate after Francesca’s 1997 death. Robert was worth $2 billion; Francesca’s estate was valued at $2 million. Robert became the trustee and life beneficiary of Francesca’s trust. Cortese and her sister were remainder beneficiaries. “Relying on Robert’s promises and [Sherwood]’s representations, [Cortese] did not challenge Robert’s acts as executor.” In 2008, “in reliance on promises,” by Sherwood and Robert, Cortese “reluctantly agreed to terminate the Trust … without the advice of counsel.” Cortese alleges the termination favored Robert, causing Cortese and her sister to bear unnecessary capital gains tax. After Robert’s 2016 death, Cortese was not a beneficiary of Robert’s estate. Cortese alleged breach of fiduciary duty against Sherwood and Topham, as co-trustees of Robert’s trust; third-party liability for breach of trust against Sherwood; and return of trust property against both. The court dismissed the second claim against Sherwood, apparently for failure to comply with Civil Code 1714.10: A party must establish a reasonable probability of prevailing before pursuing a “cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his ... client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.” The court of appeal agreed. Cortese alleged Sherwood conspired with Robert and induced her to forego challenges to Robert’s actions--conduct arising from the compromise of a dispute. No statutory exceptions apply. View "Cortese v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers shot and killed Purnell, who died intestate. Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of the estate. Murray, Purnell’s mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration to act on behalf of her son’s estate. Murray filed a lawsuit on behalf of the estate alleging excessive force against the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment but allowed her claims against the officers to proceed to a jury trial. The officers' defense was that they had used deadly force in self-defense. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the officers. Murray filed a pro se notice of appeal. The Third Circuit ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of Purnell’s estate. Under 28 U.S.C. 1654, “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Although an individual may represent herself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. The Third Circuit then dismissed Murray’s appeal: a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate. View "Murray v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michele Boulet appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss her petition for modification of the guardianship of C.H. In 2017, petitioner petitioned for modification of the guardianship of C.H., a developmentally disabled adult who has had a guardian since 2009. C.H.’s first guardian, a member of her immediate family, was removed in 2015 after being substantiated for financial exploitation of C.H. The Commissioner of the Department of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL) was subsequently appointed as C.H.’s guardian. Petitioner was a friend of C.H.’s family. Shortly after petitioner filed her petition for modification of guardianship, C.H. moved to dismiss through counsel to dismiss on grounds that petitioner did not have standing to petition the court for modification of C.H.’s guardianship. In October 2017, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, deciding, in accordance with C.H.’s argument, that petitioner lacked standing to petition for modification of the guardianship. The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on either the petition for modification or the motion to dismiss. Petitioner raised several arguments in favor of reinstating her petition; as one of her arguments resolved this appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed it alone. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s interpretation of the statute defining who has standing to petition for a modification of guardianship was inconsistent with the plain language and purpose of Vermont’s guardianship provisions. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of C.H." on Justia Law

Defendants Aurora Healthcare, Inc., and Aurora Cares, LLC, d/b/a Tara Cares (referred to collectively as "Aurora"), and Birmingham Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC ("Birmingham East") appealed a circuit court denial of their motion to compel arbitration of an action filed against them by Sharon Ramsey, as administratrix of the estate of her mother, Mary Pettway, deceased. Ramsey cross-appealed the decision denying her motion for a partial summary judgment concerning the validity of the subject arbitration agreement. In 2003, Mary Pettway, then 75 years old, was discharged from the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB Hospital"). On the same day, Pettway was admitted to a nursing home owned and operated by the defendants. During Pettway's admission to the nursing home, Ramsey met with Faye Linard, an administrative assistant, who presented Ramsey with an admissions agreement that included several documents, including a "Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement." Ramsey refused to sign the arbitration agreement; signing it was not a prerequisite to Pettway's admission to the nursing home. Pettway developed an infection, and, as a result, she was returned to UAB Hospital. Pettway was readmitted to the nursing home a few days later. Ramsey stated in an affidavit that late in the evening on November 26, 2003, she received a telephone call from the admissions office at the nursing home and was asked to return to the nursing home because "there were some documents that I had not signed the first time my mother was admitted and I needed to come in to sign them." An arbitration agreement containing a signature with the name "Sharon Ramsey" dated November 26, 2003, appeared in the record. Ramsey contended the signature was not authentic, and she asserted that, even if it was genuine, the signature was obtained by misrepresentation. After her appointment as administratrix of Pettway's estate, Ramsey filed a complaint against defendants alleging a variety of statutory and common-law claims allegedly arising from Pettway's death, including a wrongful-death claim. Defendants sought to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court discerned the parties' appeal and cross-appeal were premature because they sought review of a nonfinal judgment. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. View "Ramsey v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Charlotte Harbin appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Glenn Estess, Jr., as personal representative of the estate of Lecil V. Thomas; Richard Thomas; and Roger Thomas. Lecil and Tommie Thomas were married and had three children, one of whom predeceased them. They had two surviving sons, Richard and Roger. Lecil executed a will in 1995, and executed a codicil to that will in 2003. Tommie died in 2005. Lecil executed a second codicil to his will in 2008. According to Harbin, she and Lecil started dating after Tommie's death. She also asserted that they lived together off and on until September 2009, when, she says, they started living together as husband and wife. Lecil died in 2013. On May 30, 2013, Estess filed a petition for probate of Lecil's will, listing Harbin as Lecil's "putative common-law wife." The probate court admitted the will to probate and granted Estess letters testamentary. In 2014, Harbin filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Lecil's estate, asserting she was Lecil's common-law wife at the time of his death and that she had become Lecil's common-law wife after he had executed the will that had been admitted to probate. Estess filed an objection to Harbin's petition, and later, after the matter was removed to circuit court, Estess filed a renewed objection to Harbin's petition seeking a share as an omitted spouse. Richard and Roger Thomas intervened, seeking a judgment to declare Harbin was not Lecil's common-law wife at the time of his death, thus not making her an omitted spouse entitled to a share of Lecil's estate. The circuit found Harbin's claim time barred; she appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute controlling Harbin's omitted spouse's share of the estate, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harbin v. Estess" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether the rebuttable presumption of undue influence was applicable when the decedent’s attorney breaches Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.8(c), which generally prohibited an attorney from preparing an instrument giving the attorney or his or her close family a substantial gift. Appellants argued that a breach of MRPC 1.8(c) automatically rendered an instrument void, while the appellee attorney argued that, rather than an invalidation of the instrument, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arose in these circumstances. After considering the applicable provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and the underlying principles of probate law, the Michigan Supreme Court determined a rebuttable presumption applied to these circumstances. "[T]he adoption of MRPC 1.8(c) has no effect on this conclusion because a breach of this rule, like breaches of other professional conduct rules, only triggers the invocation of the attorney disciplinary process; it does not breach the statutory law of EPIC." View "In re Mardigian Estate" on Justia Law

This case concerned the improper administration of a trust and resulting litigation. Della Roberts created the trust at issue with the help of her only son, James Roberts, shortly before she died in 1996. James Roberts was married to Mary Sue Roberts and they had three children: petitioners Jay Roberts and Ashley Roberts McNamara (“the Robertses”), and Andrew Roberts. The trust named James as the initial trustee, and provided that all of Della Roberts’s grandchildren were beneficiaries of the trust. James administered the trust until his death in 2012. As trustee, James was obliged to undertake certain duties delineated in the trust. After James died, the trust provided that Mary Sue was to succeed him as trustee. In response, the Robertses invoked the provision of the trust permitting removal of the trustee upon a majority vote of the trust beneficiaries and they removed Mary Sue as successor trustee. In April 2013, the Robertses filed a motion in district court in Colorado to have themselves named as permanent cotrustees in place of Mary Sue. Mary Sue responded, arguing that the Colorado court lacked jurisdiction because she and James had moved from Colorado to West Virginia in 1999, approximately three years after the trust was created in Colorado. In June 2013, the district court rejected Mary Sue’s jurisdictional challenge, and, in early August, granted the Robertses’ motion and appointed the Robertses as cotrustees. Meanwhile, in May 2013, while the Robertses were litigating the trusteeship issue in Colorado, Mary Sue filed a separate action against the Robertses in state court in West Virginia, again claiming that jurisdiction properly lay in West Virginia. The Robertses appeared and removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, the federal district court concluded that Colorado had jurisdiction over the trust, and therefore dismissed Mary Sue’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Mary Sue sought review in the Fourth Circuit, but voluntarily dismissed her appeal in early 2014. As a result of the litigation in West Virginia, the Robertses incurred substantial attorney’s fees. The Colorado Supreme Court held that an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 13-17-102, C.R.S. (2017), was limited to conduct occurring in Colorado courts. View "Roberts v. Bruce" on Justia Law

A former agent appointed under a power of attorney, successfully defended an accounting of his actions, expenditures, and fees against objections and counterclaims by his former principal. At issue in this appeal was whether the former agent was entitled to reimbursement from his former principal for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in maintaining that defense. The superior court denied the agent’s request for attorney’s fees because the dispute occurred in the context of a guardianship proceeding and because the request did not meet the requirements of AS 13.26.291, which governed cost-shifting in guardianship proceedings. The agent appealed, arguing: (1) AS 13.26.291 did not apply; (2) that he was entitled to attorney’s fees based on his authority as an agent to hire an attorney under AS 13.26.665(m); and (3) he was entitled to attorney’s fees based on common law principles, equity, and considerations of public policy. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded neither statute applied, but that the agent could be entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees under the common law of agency and as a matter of equity. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cottini v. Berggren" on Justia Law