Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steven Christopher Jones ("Chris Jones") appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Tammy Brewster and Jeffrey Eugene Brewster in a will contest filed by Jones concerning the will of his father, Mike Jones. Chris Jones filed his will contest in the probate court because the probate court had not admitted the will to probate and had not appointed a personal representative of Mike Jones's estate. Contemporaneously with the will-contest complaint, Chris Jones filed a motion to transfer the will contest to the circuit court. Thus, he sought to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. The probate court certified the probate-court record to the circuit court, the circuit-court clerk docketed the case, and the circuit court held a trial. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the record, however, was devoid of a transfer order from the probate court, thereby depriving the circuit court subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the probate court did not enter a transfer order in this case, "the procedural requirements of 43-8-198 were not satisfied, and, as a result, the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the will contest." Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court was void and would not support Chris Jones's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Jones v. Brewster" on Justia Law

In 2010, the widow of a Taiwanese plastics magnate and billionaire filed suit against the trusts created before her husband's death, alleging that the transfer of a large portion of her husband's assets to the trusts unlawfully denied her the full marital estate to which she was entitled. The district court ultimately granted, subject to conditions, the trusts' motion to dismiss the complaint on forum non conveniens grounds.The DC Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court failed to give appropriate weight to the widow's legitimate choice of forum and erred in concluding that the private interest factors weighed slightly in favor of dismissal and in overemphasizing the public interest factors in deciding to dismiss this case on forum non conveniens grounds. In this case, the trusts failed to meet its heavy burden of showing that suit in the United States was so inconvenient as to be harassing, vexing, or oppressive. The court held that, the district court's errors, considered together, constituted a clear abuse of discretion. View "Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Trust" on Justia Law

Keshia Porter appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint as time barred. Porter’s husband, Delandis Richardson, was killed in an auto accident in Campbell County, Wyoming, on November 25, 2014. Within two years, on November 21, 2016, Vance Countryman filed a “Petition/Action for the Appointment of Wrongful Death Representative” in the District Court of Campbell County, Wyoming. Countryman requested appointment as Richardson’s WDR under Wyo. Stat. Secs. 1-38-101 to 105. The state court judge expressed concern that appointing Countryman, who would be acting as an attorney in the wrongful death suit, could pose ethical problems. On April 27, 2017, Porter filed an “Amended Petition/Action for the Appointment of Wrongful Death Representative” asking the court to appoint her as Richardson’s WDR. It stated that “[t]his petition is ‘made in a separate action brought solely for appointing the wrongful death representative’ pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-38-103(b).” The document was filed in the existing state court action. On July 10, 2017, the court appointed Porter the WDR for Richardson. Porter then filed this action against Ford Motor Company on August 7, 2017, as Richardson’s WDR. Ford moved to dismiss, arguing that Porter’s claims were barred by Wyoming’s two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Porter timely appealed. The Tenth Circuit determined that a WDR petition was filed by another putative representative within two years and Porter was appointed WDR in that state court action. She then filed the present suit within thirty days of her appointment. On these facts, the Court concluded Porter’s complaint was timely under Wyo. Stat. 1-38-103(b)(ii). Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Porter v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint filed by the trustee (Trustee) of the ABSHE 2006 residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) trust, without prejudice to refiling, holding that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) applies to an RMBS trustee’s second action when its timely first action is dismissed for failure to comply with a contractual condition precedent.The Trustee first filed an action against Defendant, the sponsor and seller of the trust securitization, and the action was dismissed for failure to comply with a contractual condition precedent, without prejudice to refiling. The Trustee then filed this action against Defendant claiming violations of representations and warranties regarding the quality of the loans contained in the trust. On appeal, Defendant argued that the first action should have been dismissed with prejudice. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Trustee’s failure to comply with a contractual condition precedent did not foreclose refiling of its action for alleged breach of RMBS representations and warranties pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a). View "U.S. Bank National Ass’n v DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Clifford Wright ("Wright"), the administrator of the estate of Mary Evelyn Wright ("Mary") appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of Dawn Reid, Phyllis Harris, and Tuwanda Worrills (collectively referred to as "the nurses"), who, during all relevant times, were employed by the Cleburne County Hospital Board, Inc., d/b/a Cleburne County Nursing Home ("the Hospital Board"). Mary complained she suffered injuries from a fall while a resident of a nursing home operated by the Hospital Board. Mary allegedly died from her injuries the day after her complaint was filed. Wright was appointed the administrator of Mary's estate and was substituted as the plaintiff. As amended, Wright's complaint asserted claims against the nurses, the Hospital Board, and various fictitiously named parties under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Wright's claim against the Hospital Board included 13 separate allegations of negligence. Wright's claims against each of the nurses included 13 separate allegations of negligence. Additionally, Wright alleged that the Hospital Board was vicariously liable for the actions of its agents, specifically, the actions of the nurses. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying the summary judgment in favor of the nurses as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Accordingly, the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification was invalid; this appeal was from a nonfinal judgment; and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wright v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se action against Phillip Morris, alleging Connecticut state law liability claims on behalf of her late husband's estate. The district court dismissed some of plaintiff's claims based on its determination that Connecticut law would not allow her to represent the estate pro se. In this case, Connecticut law and federal law conflict on the issue of whether plaintiff can represent the estate pro se.The Second Circuit held that the district court misread both Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2010), in concluding that Connecticut's rule controlled the circumstances in which a party may appear pro se in federal court. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1654, and federal rules interpreting it, are procedural in nature and therefore must be applied by federal courts in diversity cases. The court explained that, who may practice law before a federal court is a matter of procedure—which Congress and the federal courts have the power to regulate—notwithstanding contrary state law. In this case, Connecticut's substantive law will not be affected by permitting plaintiff to file motions, conduct depositions, or represent the estate at trial. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed plaintiff's claims under Connecticut law and the derivative consortium claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims based on statute of limitation grounds. View "Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Samuel Rogers appealed a superior court order dismissing his complaint against his son, Joseph Rogers, upon finding that the probate court and not the superior court, retained exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over his cause of action. Plaintiff’s wife died in March 2012 and the parties’ dispute arose after the disposition of her estate. The decedent’s will named defendant as the executor of the estate, which was comprised of, in pertinent part, two properties in Hollis, New Hampshire: plaintiff’s marital home and the decedent’s 50% ownership interest in 94.3 acres of undeveloped land on Rocky Point Road. In her will, the decedent devised one-third of the estate to plaintiff and the remaining two-thirds to defendant. The probate court appointed defendant as the executor of the estate in May 2012. At some point in 2015, plaintiff learned that the Town of Hollis had either offered to purchase or agreed to purchase Rocky Point for $2,500,000, but, for reasons not established by the record, the sale was never consummated. Thereafter, plaintiff discovered his son had commissioned an appraisal of Rocky Point in 2005 which estimated that the value of the property at that time was $1,950,000. These valuations suggested that following the parties’ exchange of property interests, defendant’s interest in Rocky Point would have been worth approximately $975,000. Based on these discoveries, plaintiffs sued his son in 2016 in superior court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and unjust enrichment. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing his father's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, which was within six months of the probate court's issuance of the certificate of appointment in May 2012. Ruling that defendant mischaracterized plaintiff's claims, the superior court denied defendant's motion. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's superior court claims, finding they related the the estate and will, and any misrepresentation of Rocky Point took place during the administration of the estate. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the claims at issue here did not fall within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rogers v. Rogers" on Justia Law

This appeal arose after Matthew DeForest petitioned for a Determination of Heirs-At-Law and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries following the death of his natural father, Jeff Underhill. Joe Alexander, Underhill’s brother, filed a responsive pleading to DeForest’s petition raising numerous affirmative defenses; however, the Chancery Court held in favor of DeForest. The Chancery Court entered a judgment declaring DeForest to be sole heir at law for the purpose of the pending wrongful death action. Finding no reversible error in the Chancery Court's judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alexander v. DeForest" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment ordering Lu Tuan Nguyen to return funds to the Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Joseph Ribal. On remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees incurred in enforcing the underlying judgment to Linda Rogers, the conservator, of $43,507.50. Nguyen argued on appeal of that order that he satisfied the underlying judgment, and after reviewing the record, the Court of Appeal agreed. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080 (a), required such motions to be made before the judgment is satisfied, the Court agreed with Nguyen that the motion was untimely. Therefore, the order granting Rogers $43,507.50 in attorney fees was reversed. View "Conservatorship of Ribal" on Justia Law

Mary Chmielewski, as personal representative of the estate of Yvonne Speer Hoover, deceased; Grace Ellis; and Roger Stone petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate an order purporting to set aside its earlier dismissal of a will contest. Hoover executed a will in May 2017. Hoover's will designated Tere Mills as a beneficiary of Hoover's estate. A codicil to Hoover's will was executed shortly before Hoover died in July 2017. The codicil eliminated Mills as a beneficiary of Hoover's estate and added Ellis and Stone as beneficiaries. After Hoover died, her will, along with the codicil, was admitted to probate, and letters testamentary were issued to Chmielewski. Thereafter, pursuant to section 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, Mills filed a petition in the circuit court contesting the validity of Hoover's will, as amended by the codicil. It was alleged that the circuit court entered final orders disposing of the action and, no postjudgment motion having been filed within 30 days, lost jurisdiction over the matter. Thereafter, the circuit court, allegedly without jurisdiction, entered an order purporting to grant a postjudgment motion and to reinstate the proceedings. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings were indeed dismissed, it granted the petition and directed the circuit court to set aside its order purporting to vacate the dismissal. View "Ex parte Chmielewski" on Justia Law