Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed. View "Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, the “Estate”), brought this action against Defendant-Appellee, Betty Diamond (“Diamond”), the former wife of Gregory Diamond (the “Decedent”). The complaint alleged the Decedent was a federal employee who had a Thrift Savings Plan account (the “TSP Account”) administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (“FRTIB”). During Diamond’s marriage to the Decedent, she was the named beneficiary of Decedent’s TSP Account. When Diamond and the Decedent divorced in 2013, they entered into a divorce decree containing the following provision relevant to the Decedent’s TSP Account: “The parties have acquired an interest in retirement accounts during the course of the marriage. [Diamond] waive[s] her interest in [Decedent’s] retirement accounts. Therefore, [Decedent] is awarded any and all interest in his retirement accounts, free and clear of any claim of [Diamond].” When the Decedent died in 2017, however, Diamond was still designated as the beneficiary of the TSP Account. The Estate requested that Diamond waive all her interest in any distribution she received from the TSP Account. After Diamond refused and indicated her intent to retain any monies distributed to her, the Estate filed a declaratory judgment action against her in Utah’s Third Judicial District Court. Diamond removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss the Estate’s complaint. The district court granted the motion, concluding the Estate’s breach of contract claims against Diamond are preempted by federal law governing the administration of TSP accounts. Finding that the district court correctly concluded the relevant provisions of the Federal Employee Retirement Systems Act (“FERSA”) preempted any conflicting Utah state property rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Evans v. Diamond" on Justia Law

In 2003, Dansker obtained an $83,000 home loan to purchase Las Vegas real estate. In 2009, Dansker died. No probate proceedings were instituted. In 2011, the neighborhood HOA began foreclosure proceedings and sold the property to LN. The priority lien-holder was Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The district court held that LN had not identified any legal representative of Dansker’s estate, and since no such person was identified and joined, complete diversity existed. The district court dismissed and denied a motion to substitute Dansker’s daughter.The Ninth Circuit vacated. Diversity did exist at the time of removal. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a motion to substitute, so diversity jurisdiction continued to exist. The lawsuit was against Chase and Dansker. Dansker, being dead, had no legal existence, and, therefore, was not a citizen of any state. Jurisdiction exists where the federal entity is not the record beneficiary on the deed of trust but can prove its property interest through admissible evidence.The Federal Foreclosure Bar, which provides that FHFA's property shall not be subject to foreclosure without FHFA's consent, applies and is fatal to LN’s case on the merits. View "LN Management, LLC Series 5664 Divot V. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Janice Tubbs challenged certain assets her father, Harry William Berkowitz transferred to himself after his wife passed away. Berkowitz and his wife, Janice's parents, created The Berkowitz Family Trust (the Trust). The Trust provided for the allocation of assets to a surviving spouse’s trust and a marital appointment trust (the Marital Trust) upon the death of either Berkowitz or his wife. The surviving spouse’s trust and the Marital Trust included a general power of appointment allowing the surviving spouse to designate a person who would receive the Trust assets. Under that power of appointment, the surviving spouse could designate himself or herself as the person who would receive the assets. Berkowitz exercised this power of appointment after his wife passed away and transferred all the Trust assets to himself, effectively divesting Tubbs and her children who were contingent beneficiaries. According to Tubbs, Berkowitz’s fiduciary duties as the successor trustee limited his exercise of the power of appointment. Berkowitz moved for summary judgment contending he had the right to transfer all assets to himself pursuant to the general power of appointment provisions, which allowed him to act in a nonfiduciary capacity. The court granted Berkowitz’s motion for summary judgment and found the general power of appointment provisions gave him unfettered discretion. Because the power of appointment was given to the surviving spouse, and not the trustee, the court rejected Tubbs’s contention that Berkowitz’s discretion was limited by his role as the successor trustee. On appeal, Tubbs contended the court erred because Berkowitz was bound by his fiduciary duties as trustee when he exercised the general power of appointment. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment. View "Tubbs v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

Huntingdon College, a beneficiary of the Bellingrath-Morse Foundation Trust ("the Foundation"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Probate Court to vacate its order denying Huntingdon's motion to dismiss an action filed by the Foundation's trustees, on behalf of the Foundation, and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. Walter Bellingrath established the Foundation, a charitable trust ("the Trust Indenture"). Mr. Bellingrath contributed to the Foundation, both at its inception, and through his will and codicil, substantial property, including the Bellingrath Gardens ("the Gardens") and his stock in the Coca-Cola Bottling Company. Beneficiaries of the Foundation included three privately supported Christian colleges: Huntingdon College, Rhodes College, and Stillman College. The Foundation’s trustees and the beneficiaries have historically disagreed as to whether the Trust Indenture contemplated the subsidy of the Gardens by the Foundation and, if so, to what extent and with what limitations, if any. The trustees had difficulty operating the Gardens based on agreed-upon caps to the Garden's subsidy, and have voted to increase the distribution amount to the Gardens. They sought declaratory relief in order to maintain a reserve for the repair and capital improvement of the Gardens, and to distribute to the Gardens, in the trustees' sole discretion, such amount of the Foundation's income they deemed necessary for the maintenance, repair and operation of the Gardens. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the the probate court lacked jurisdiction to modify the Mobile Circuit Court's final judgment approving a 2003 Amendment. The Supreme Court therefore granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the probate court to dismiss the trustees' action. View "Ex parte Huntingdon College." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Carol McCoy Brown’s petition for an elective share of her decedent husband’s augmented estate. When Michael Orion Brown (the decedent) died intestate, she discovered that he had set aside multiple payable on death (POD) accounts for his children and grandchildren from a prior marriage. Carol filed a petition to recover a portion of the POD funds as part of the decedent’s augmented estate. The decedent’s children, Dorraine Pool and Michael J. Brown (the Heirs), challenged the petition. The magistrate court denied Carol's petition, concluding that she had not met her burden of demonstrating that the POD funds were quasi-community property as required by the elective share statutes. Carol appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s denial of the petition, and granted the Heirs attorney fees. Still aggrieved, Carol sought certiorari review by the Idaho Supreme Court. But finding no reversible error in either of the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

The estate of Ed Young, deceased, by and through its personal representative, Fannie Pollard, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of H.C. Partnership d/b/a Hill Crest Behavioral Health Services ("Hill Crest") in a wrongful-death action alleging medical malpractice. On May 7, 2017, the estate of Ed Young sued Hill Crest alleging that Hill Crest caused Young's death on May 9, 2015, by improperly administering the antipsychotic drugs Haldol and Thorazine to Young as a chemical restraint without taking a proper medical history and evaluating him. The style of the complaint indicated that it was filed by the "Estate of Ed Young and Fannie M. Pollard as personal representative of the Estate of Ed Young." On May 8, 2017, the probate court appointed Fannie M. Pollard as administrator of Young's estate. On May 9, 2017, the two-year limitations period under Alabama's wrongful-death act expired. On June 15, 2017, the estate filed an amended complaint, adding additional claims against Hill Crest. The amended complaint listed as plaintiffs the estate and Pollard as the personal representative of the estate. The parties then engaged in discovery. In 2019, Hill Crest moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pollard was not the personal representative of the estate when the complaint was filed, and therefore she lacked capacity to bring suit. Furthermore, Hill Crest argued the complaint was a nullity and there was no properly filed underlying action to which Pollard's subsequent appointment as personal representative could relate. The Alabama Supreme Court found Hill Crest's argument regarding the relation-back doctrine as unavailing: "the relation-back doctrine 'simply recognizes and clarifies what has already occurred' in that application of the doctrine does not extend the limitations period but merely allows substitution of a party in a suit otherwise timely filed." Summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollard v. H.C. Partnership d/b/a Hill Crest Behavioral Health Services" on Justia Law

Gary D. Foster and Stephen Foster were brothers who had a disagreement over the management of the "Foster Family 1989 Trust" ("the Trust"). Gary filed a "complaint" seeking an accounting and an inventory of the Trust and, subsequently, seeking to remove Stephen as the trustee of the Trust. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Gary and assessed damages. Stephen appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decision, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Foster v. Foster" on Justia Law

A district court dismissed Plaintiff–Appellant Lawrence Smallen and Laura Smallen Revocable Living Trust’s securities-fraud class action against Defendant–Appellee The Western Union Company and several of its current and former executive officers (collectively, “Defendants”). Following the announcements of Western Union’s settlements with regulators in January 2017 and the subsequent drop in the price of the company’s stock shares, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on behalf of itself and other similarly situated shareholders. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendants committed securities fraud by making false or materially misleading public statements between February 24, 2012, and May 2, 2017 regarding, among other things, Western Union’s compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-fraud laws. The district court dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff failed to adequately plead scienter under the heightened standard imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”). While the Tenth Circuit found the complaint may have given rise to some plausible inference of culpability on Defendants' part, the Court concurred Plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts giving rise to the strong inference of scienter required to state a claim under the PSLRA, thus affirming dismissal. View "Smallen Revocable Living Trust v. Western Union Company" on Justia Law

Respondent L.N. appealed a circuit court order denying a motion to authorize removal of life support filed by her guardian. In 2018, tests indicated that L.N. had suffered a stroke. L.N. was 69 years old at the time of the orders on appeal, and had “enjoyed a full, active, independent life” prior to her stroke on September 12. Thereafter, L.N. remained in the hospital on a ventilator to assist with breathing and a nasal-gastric tube for nutrition and hydration. L.N.’s attorney informed the court in a motion for expedited hearing that “[a]fter consulting with personnel, it has been indicated that [L.N.] will probably not survive the massive stroke which precipitated this hospitalization, but there is no one with authority to act.” There was no evidence that L.N. had previously executed either a living will or a durable power of attorney for healthcare. M.C., a former co-worker, was ultimately appointed as guardian. Based upon conversations, the guardian’s sense was that L.N. “would want to be allowed to have a natural death.” Notwithstanding testimony by L.N.’s caregivers and guardian, the trial court concluded that, “in cases of doubt, the Court must assume that the patient would choose to defend life” and did “not find that [L.N.] - under the facts in this case - would choose to have life support removed and a natural death process to occur.” On appeal, L.N. argues that the probate court erred in determining that “it had jurisdiction to make a determination as to the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of the removal of life support in the case of a patient who was in a persistent vegetative state” where “no party challeng[ed] the proposed removal.” She further argued that, even if the court had the authority to exercise its discretion in this matter, its findings were unsupported by the testimony. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the order denying authority to remove life support and vacated, in part, the order appointing the guardian: “Because any limitation on the guardian’s RSA 464-A:25, I(d) authority after the October 17 hearing was not supported by the statutorily-required finding that it was “desirable for the best interests of [L.N.],” RSA 464-A:25, II, we vacate that limitation. Without that limitation, the guardianship order’s grant of the ‘right and authority to determine if refusal should be made or consent should be given to any medical or other professional care, counseling, treatment, or service’ constitutes a general grant of authority that includes the authority to withdraw life-sustaining treatment in appropriate circumstances.” View "In re Guardianship of L.N." on Justia Law