Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steve and Russell Hartman, as personal representatives of the estate of Ray Hartman (the “Estate”), appealed an amended judgment entered after a bench trial. The Estate argued Ray lacked the capacity to contract, no valid contract for the sale of his farmstead and farmland existed, Trent Grager owed rent for the 2017 farming season, and Ray did not gift a tractor to Grager. Grager cross-appealed, arguing he was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding the district court did not err in finding Ray was capable of contracting, the 2016 agreement was a valid contract for the sale of the farmstead and farmland, Grager had no obligation to pay rent in 2017, and the tractor was gifted. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding the 2017 document did not supplement or alter the terms of the 2016 agreement, and Grager was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The case was remanded for the court to determine Grager’s damages for the Estate’s wrongful occupation. View "Hartman, et al. v. Grager" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of damages after a bench trial that resulted in a judgment in favor of appellees and a group of state guaranty associations where the district court ruled that Allegiant Bank breached its fiduciary duties in administering seven trusts, and that PNC was liable for the breach as the successor-in-interest to National City Bank, which in turn had acquired Allegiant.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the compensatory damages award; even assuming for the sake of analysis that Missouri law does require damages to be readily ascertainable to award prejudgment interest, the court still found no basis for reversal of the award of prejudgment interest; assuming that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) was not the proper source of authority for the district court's correction of a clerical mistake, any error was harmless; considered in its entirety, the evidence supports an award of punitive damages; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and PNC's claims to the contrary are unavailing. View "Jo Ann Howard & Assoc., PC v. National City Bank" on Justia Law

After her husband Benny Wall (decedent) died, petitioner Cindy Wall (wife) petitioned the probate court to determine that a home, titled in decedent’s name, was community property. Decedent’s children, objectors Timothy Wall and Tamara Nimmo (the children) unsuccessfully objected. On appeal, the children contended the trial court erred: (1) in determining the Family Code section 760 community property presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; (2) in failing to consider tracing evidence rebutting the community property presumption; (3) in determining the Family Code section 721 undue influence presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; and (4) by applying the undue influence presumption where there was no showing of unfair advantage. Though the Court of Appeal concluded the first two contentions had merit, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Estate of Wall" on Justia Law

A Mississippi chancery court order set aside the probate of a will after the original was lost. On appeal, Michael Taylor, the sole beneficiary under the lost will, contended that the chancellor erred by applying the presumption that the testatrix had destroyed the will. “Without the entry of a Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim action, is interlocutory.” The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the order appealed from was not a final judgment, thus it lacked jurisdiction to consider Taylor's appeal. The appeal was dismissed. View "Taylor v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

Linda and her husband Milton set up an estate plan with the help of attorney Roth. Milton created a trust and designated himself as sole trustee. Upon his death, Linda and his accountant, Sanders, would become cotrustees. Milton’s assets included a $1.5 million Vanguard account. Milton later changed the Vanguard account and other accounts to transfer on death directly to Linda as the sole primary beneficiary. Milton died in 2016. Linda believed that Roth was still her attorney. Roth and Sanders convinced Linda to waive her rights as co-trustee and to disclaim her interest in the Vanguard account; they suggested that she had acquired these interests through wrongdoing. Roth then transferred the disclaimed Vanguard account directly to Milton’s son, David, instead of to the trust. David sued Linda and obtained an Indiana state court judgment that she exerted undue influence on Milton and that the trust was the proper owner of certain assets Milton had transferred to Linda.Linda sued in federal court, asserting fraud, conspiracy, and malpractice against Roth and Sanders, claiming the two “duped” her into disclaiming certain assets and that Roth committed malpractice by transferring the account to David rather than the trust. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit; issue preclusion based on the Indiana judgment foreclosed Linda’s claims because the Indiana jury’s finding of undue influence showed that Roth and Sanders’s advice to disclaim her illegally-obtained interests was neither negligent nor fraudulent. View "Bergal v. Roth" on Justia Law

James Conway Liner, III (“Mr. Liner”) executed two notarial testaments: one in 2013 and another in 2015 (purporting to revoke all prior testaments). The 2013 testament, executed pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1577 for testators who were able to read and sign their name, divided Mr. Liner’s property equally amongst his three children: James Conway Liner, IV (“Conway”), Jeffrey Liner (“Jeff”), and Laura Liner Centola (“Laura”). The 2015 testament excluded Conway from any inheritance and was executed pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1579 for a testator who was unable to read regardless of whether they can sign their own name. Mr. Liner died in 2018. Jeff and Laura filed a petition to probate the 2015 testament. Conway intervened and sought to have the 2015 testament declared null under various theories including an allegedly defective attestation clause. As it was at the original hearing, the primary issue presented was whether the attestation clause verifying that Mr. Liner declared he “signed” the testament was substantially similar to the La. C.C. art. 1579 requirement that the attestation clause verify a testator declared he signed his name “at the end” and “on each other separate page” of the testament. The Louisiana Supreme Court also addressed Conway’s additional arguments as to whether the attestation clause reflected an inconsistency in the notary both following and reading the testament and whether the attestation clause failed to establish that Mr. Liner declared he heard the reading of the will in the presence of the notary and the witnesses. Following a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court vacated its original decree in this case, affirmed the decision of the court of appeal (reversed the trial court's nullification of the 2015 testament), and clarified the analytical framework for determining whether a notarial will is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. View "Succession of James Conway Liner, III" on Justia Law

Two appeals arose from a dispute between four siblings about the management of trusts set up by their parents. The siblings -- Lenn Rainwater ("Lenn"), Charles Edward Rainwater ("Charles"), Jean Rainwater Loggins, and Mary Rainwater Breazeale -- executed a settlement agreement resolving their dispute. In appeal no. 1190952, the parties petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court to consider whether that agreement should have been declared void. Lenn also sought to garnish trust assets that she says were hers. In appeal no. 1190951, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether those garnishment proceedings should have been quashed. The Court ultimately did not reach either of those issues because both appeals should been dismissed: appeal no. 1190952 was filed too late and appeal no. 1190951 was filed too soon. View "Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust et al. v. Rainwater" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiffs-respondents Jason Rubin and Cira Ross, as cotrustees of the Cira Ross Qualified Domestic Trust (judgment creditors) obtained a civil judgment against defendant-appellant David Ross (judgment debtor). In 2009, Ross filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In April 2019, following an order denying judgment debtor a discharge in bankruptcy, judgment creditors filed for renewal of their judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 683.120 and 683.130. Ross moved to vacate the judgment on the ground that judgment creditors failed to seek renewal within the 10-year time period proscribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that judgment creditor’s renewal was timely because title 11 United States Code section 108(c) provided for an extension of time within which to seek renewal. Ross appealed, arguing that judgment creditors were not precluded from seeking renewal by his bankruptcy proceeding and, therefore, section 108(c) 2 did not apply to provide an extension of time to seek renewal of their judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed that judgment creditors were not barred from seeking statutory renewal of their judgment during the pendency of judgment debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, but concluded that the extension provided for in section 108(c) applied regardless. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Rubin v. Ross" on Justia Law

K.S. appealed a district court order approving the sale of S.M.H.’s interest in real property and striking from the court record an affidavit filed by K.S. K.S. argued the court erred by determining that a document K.S. claimed transferred a majority of S.M.H.’s interest in the real property to K.S. failed to meet the statutory requirements for a valid conveyance under N.D.C.C. sections 47-10-01 and 47-10-05; the court erred in striking her affidavit from the record; and the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Lutheran Social Services. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Guardianship and Conservatorship of S.M.H." on Justia Law

Respondent-appellee Billie Dixon moved to dismiss petitioner-appellant John Dixon’s appeal due to mootness and lack of jurisdiction because the appeal was taken without a N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. This action started in October 2013 when John sought an accounting of the Shirley A. Dixon Revocable Trust, removal of Billie as trustee, court supervised administration of the trust, reimbursement of the trust for unauthorized distributions, and his attorney fees expended in the action. After trial on remand the district court granted John’s request for supervised administration of the trust and denied the remaining requests for relief. On December 11, 2020, Billie filed a Petition for Order Allowing Trustee to Make Final Distribution and Allowing Termination of the Trust. On December 28, 2020, John filed objections to the petition, and on the same day the court granted Billie’s petition. On February 26, 2021, John appealed the district court’s order granting the petition. On April 12, 2021, Billie moved to dismiss the appeal. On April 24, 2021, the district court granted Billie’s motion for stay, ordering “that its Order Allowing Trustee to Make Final Distribution and Allowing Termination of the Trust (Doc. ID# 239), and any attempts to enforce that Order, are hereby stayed, effective March 29, 2021, pending completion of the appeal in this matter filed by Petitioner John W. Dixon.” Thereafter, Billie moved to dismiss this appeal as moot and for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the latter issue was dispositive: the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal because the trust was court-supervised, and the last order was not final as to all matters relating to the trust. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law