Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment and award of attorney’s fees in favor of Darren Harr as personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. Behle filed a petition asking the district court to determine the validity of the decedent’s will and convert the administration to a formal probate. Harr, as personal representative of the Estate, objected to Behle’s petition and moved for summary judgment. Behle argued the probate application was defective because an electronic copy of the decedent’s will was filed with the district court rather than the original. Behle also claimed Harr asserted undue influence over the decedent. The district court granted Harr’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the probate to proceed informally. Harr thereafter moved for an award of attorney's fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Behle’s contentions only amounted to suspicion; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Behle, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding undue influence. Therefore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court found the district court erred in ordering Behle to pay attorney's fees: the district court did not analyze whether the allegations in Behle’s petition were made in good faith when it awarded attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31. Instead, the district court focused on Behle’s arguments made in opposition to summary judgment. "The plain words of the statute pertain only to pleadings and not to motions or other documents. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31." View "Estate of Behle" on Justia Law

Michael J. Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement” on February 14, 2007. The trust named State Bank & Trust (now known as Bell Bank), as trustee. On October 3, 2011, Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement II” and merged assets from the first trust into the second trust. Tharaldson died intestate on December 11, 2017. On June 28, 2019, Bell Bank filed a petition seeking the district court’s determination of trust beneficiaries and approval of asset distribution. Bell Bank claimed the sole beneficiary was Tharaldson’s brother, Matthew Tharaldson. Tharaldson had three biological children. Bell Bank mailed its petition, proposed order, and notice of hearing to the two adult children. Bell Bank sent the documents via email to the attorney representing Tharaldson’s minor child, E.M., in the separate probate action. E.M. challenged the court's jurisdiction after it ultimately granted Bell Bank's petition to distribute the trust assets. The district court found the language of the trust was not ambiguous, Tharaldson died intestate, and Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary of the trust, entitling him to distribution of all trust assets. E.M. argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting Bell Bank’s petition. He claimed the merger of assets from the first trust to the second trust was invalid. E.M. also claimed the trust designated E.M. and his siblings as the only beneficiaries, entitling them to share in the trust assets, and entitling E.M. to recover attorney’s fees. Bell Bank and Matthew Tharaldson argued collateral estoppel barred relitigation of E.M.’s claims in this case because of the district court’s findings about E.M.’s status as an heir in the Tharaldson probate case. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court’s order denying E.M.’s demand for change of judge should have been granted, making the assigned judge's actions with respect to the merits of E.M.'s claims invalid. This case was remanded for assignment of a new judge and for proceedings anew on the merits of the petition. View "Matter of Michael J. Tharaldson Trust" on Justia Law

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they moved to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering judgment against the estate. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Burke v. Criterion General Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Darren Harr as the personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. The district court held Behle’s claims against the Estate concerning two parcels of real estate were untimely under N.D.C.C. 30.1-19-03(2), which barred certain claims that were not brought within three months of a decedent’s death. The court also held Behle’s claim to personal property was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for conversion under N.D.C.C. 28-01-16. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Behle v. Harr" on Justia Law

In 2006, Rose Rellick (decedent) purchased two certificates of deposit ("CDs") listing as co-owners herself, her sister appellee Betty Rellick, and the daughters of her deceased brother George, appellee Kimberly Vasil and appellant Sharleen Rellick-Smith. Prior to purchasing the CDs, Decedent executed powers of attorney designating Betty and Kimberly as her attorneys-in-fact. It purportedly was Decedent’s intention that, upon her death, the proceeds of the CDs be divided equally among Appellant and Appellees. However, prior to Decedent’s death, Appellees removed Appellant’s name from the CDs. In March 2013, subsequent to Decedent’s death, Appellees cashed the CDs, which were worth approximately $370,000, and divided the money between the two of them. In 2014, Appellant filed an action against Appellees, claiming they breached their fiduciary duties to Decedent by removing Appellant’s name from the CDs and refusing to pay her any of the proceeds. Appellees filed a timely response to the complaint, but, relevant to this appeal, did not raise any affirmative defenses therein. Four months later, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Appellant lacked standing and that her claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellees’ motion was ultimately granted on the basis that Appellant lacked standing. Notably, however, the trial judge determined that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as a new matter in their answer, as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court erred in affirming an order of the trial court that permitted the appellees to file an amended answer to include the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, which a different trial court judge previously ruled was waived. The Supreme Court concluded the second trial judge’s order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule in this regard, thus the Superior Court erred in affirming the second court's order. The Superior Court decision was reversed, the trial judge's order vacated in part, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, et al." on Justia Law

Robert filed a petition, alleging that Dae violated a “no contest” clause in a family trust by filing a previous petition challenging Robert’s actions as trustee. Dae’s subsequently moved to strike Robert’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc. 425.16.)The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Robert’s No Contest Petition arose from protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(1); to defeat Dae’s motion, Robert was required to show a probability that he would prevail on that Petition. Robert made such a showing. Dae’s petition broadly challenged Robert’s conduct in setting up a financial structure that Robert claimed was designed to avoid estate taxes. If Robert’s claim is true, Dae’s petition would implicate the no-contest provision by seeking to “impair” trust provisions giving Robert the authority to manage trust assets. Dae also challenged his own removal as a beneficiary. Whether that more specific challenge amounts to a “contest” for purposes of the no-contest clause depends upon the trustors’ intent. Robert provided sufficient evidence of the trustors’ intent to allow a change of beneficiary to make a prima facie showing of probability of prevailing on Robert’s contention that Dae’s claims are a “contest.” The court expressed no opinion on the outcome of Robert’s petition. View "Dae v. Traver" on Justia Law

Karen Wheeler, as administrator of the estate of Eugene Drayton, appealed a probate court judgment declaring Kristin Marvin was the biological child of Drayton, and was therefore an heir of Drayton for purposes of intestate succession. The probate court appointed Wheeler, who was Drayton's daughter, as the administrator of Drayton's estate. In her filings with the probate court, Wheeler identified herself and her brother as Drayton's only heirs. Marvin, however, later filed a petition with the probate court in which she claimed to also be a biological child of Drayton. She requested that the probate court consider the results of a DNA test allegedly showing that Drayton's half brother was Marvin's uncle and, therefore, indicating that Marvin was Drayton's daughter. Wheeler testified that she was unaware that Drayton had any children other than herself and her brother. She asserted that no one, including Drayton, had ever stated to her that Marvin was Drayton's child. Wheeler claimed to have met Marvin for the first time at a funeral held after the death of Drayton's mother, but, she said, Drayton did not introduce them. On appeal, Wheeler argued primarily that the probate court erred in considering the DNA test result, because the DNA samples were collected not by disinterested parties but by Marvin and Curtis, who then mailed them outside the presence of disinterested parties. Wheeler asserts that "there is a possibility that the samples were switched because they were in the exclusive possession of interested parties prior to being mailed to [the laboratory that performed the test]." She points out that the test result itself disclaims any responsibility for how the samples were collected and is based on the assumption that they were collected correctly. The Alabama Supreme Court found after review that Wheeler did not present any authority suggesting that the probate court could not admit and consider the DNA test if it believed the testimony of Curtis and Marvin describing how the DNA samples were collected and submitted. Accordingly, she did not show the probate court erred in considering the DNA test result based on how the samples were collected and submitted. View "Wheeler v. Marvin" on Justia Law

The petitioners in six cases before the Alabama Supreme Court were brothers Michael Todd Scoggins and Matthew Tyler-Crimson Scoggins. The brothers sought to set aside orders in some of the cases, to intervene in some of the cases, and to order the Circuit Court to permit the interpleader of funds by a third party in one case. The proceeds of a wrongful death settlement were to be used to purchase four annuities for the brothers; their father died in an industrial accident when they were children. The annuities provided for periodic payments and lump-sum payments on various dates. In 2010, the brothers' paternal grandfather Thomas Scoggins (through an attorney) petitioned to have Thomas named conservator for the brothers in order to "reopen" the wrongful-death action for the purpose of obtaining a ruling that a sale of the structured settlement-payment rights was in the best interests of the brother. Court documents would later reveal that the brothers' grandfather did not have authority to sell the payment rights, and that the attorney their grandfather hired to help with the payment rights paid himself from the brothers' trusts with "nearly every single disbursement .... made to himself with virtually no money being paid to the beneficiaries, Michael and Matthew." The brothers sued multiple parties relating to the sale of the payment rights and the mismanagement of their trusts. They moved the circuit court to set aside orders that empowered Thomas to sell certain structured-settlement-payment rights. The motion was denied without a rationale for the ruling. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus in case number 1200107, which pertained to the circuit court's denial of the brothers' motion to set aside the circuit court's August 11, 2011, and November 21, 2011, orders in the wrongful-death action; the Court denied the petitions for the writ of mandamus in case numbers 1200103, 1200104, 1200105, and 1200106, which pertained to the circuit court's October 7, 2020, order denying Michael's motion to intervene in the Stratcap actions; and the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus in case number 1200102, which pertained to the circuit court's October 1, 2020, order denying American General's motion for interpleader relief in the 2019 action. View "Ex parte Michael Todd & Matthew Tyler-Crimson Scoggins." on Justia Law

Steve and Russell Hartman, as personal representatives of the estate of Ray Hartman (the “Estate”), appealed an amended judgment entered after a bench trial. The Estate argued Ray lacked the capacity to contract, no valid contract for the sale of his farmstead and farmland existed, Trent Grager owed rent for the 2017 farming season, and Ray did not gift a tractor to Grager. Grager cross-appealed, arguing he was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding the district court did not err in finding Ray was capable of contracting, the 2016 agreement was a valid contract for the sale of the farmstead and farmland, Grager had no obligation to pay rent in 2017, and the tractor was gifted. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding the 2017 document did not supplement or alter the terms of the 2016 agreement, and Grager was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The case was remanded for the court to determine Grager’s damages for the Estate’s wrongful occupation. View "Hartman, et al. v. Grager" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of damages after a bench trial that resulted in a judgment in favor of appellees and a group of state guaranty associations where the district court ruled that Allegiant Bank breached its fiduciary duties in administering seven trusts, and that PNC was liable for the breach as the successor-in-interest to National City Bank, which in turn had acquired Allegiant.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the compensatory damages award; even assuming for the sake of analysis that Missouri law does require damages to be readily ascertainable to award prejudgment interest, the court still found no basis for reversal of the award of prejudgment interest; assuming that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) was not the proper source of authority for the district court's correction of a clerical mistake, any error was harmless; considered in its entirety, the evidence supports an award of punitive damages; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and PNC's claims to the contrary are unavailing. View "Jo Ann Howard & Assoc., PC v. National City Bank" on Justia Law