Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-respondent Keely Rickard purchased the subject residential real property from the Coulimore Family Living Trust, U/A/D March 6, 2014 ("the Coulimore Trust"). Rickard later sued Defendants-petitioners Jonathan Coulimore and Elinor Coulimore, individually, and as Trustees of the Coulimore Trust, for damages from defects they failed to disclose. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order to determine whether the transaction was exempt from the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act (RPCDA). The Court found the transaction was a transfer by a fiduciary who was not an owner occupant of the subject property in the course of the administration of a trust and, pursuant to 60 O.S.2011 section 838(A)(3), the transaction was exempt from the RPCDA. The Court therefore affirmed partial summary judgment as to the inapplicability of the RPCDA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rickard v. Coulimore" on Justia Law

David Miles appealed a circuit court order denying his postjudgment motion seeking to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment appointing a guardian for Nadine Chalmers. The administration of the guardianship was purportedly removed to the circuit court from probate court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the removal was not proper under section 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, and thus, the circuit court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal. View "Miles v. Helms" on Justia Law

In 2018, five of the late Richard Redd’s six children (Petitioners) sought the appointment of a conservator and guardian over their mother, Joyce Redd. They also sought various temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions to prevent Joyce from taking further financial action without their approval. Petitioners claimed their brother, Brian Redd, unduly coerced Joyce into financial decisions detrimental to her estate. Joyce filed a motion for summary judgment as to the conservatorship issue, which the chancery court granted. The chancellor found Petitioners failed to produce certificates from at least two examining physicians stating that Joyce was unable to manage her own personal and financial affairs. Regions Bank, as the trustee of the trusts at issue, moved for mediation regarding the remaining issues. The chancellor granted Regions’ motion and, after mediation, the parties settled the case. Disagreements later arose regarding the terms of the settlement, which the chancery court resolved in favor of Petitioners. Both Joyce and Petitioners appealed the final judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment. View "In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Joyce G. Redd" on Justia Law

Mutual sold fractional investment interests in viatical settlements in which a terminally ill insured sold his life insurance policy to a third party for a lump-sum cash payment--a percentage of the policy’s face value. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Mutual for falsely representing that its life expectancy figures, “of paramount importance” for valuing the settlements, had been produced by independent physicians. The Mutual policies were put into receivership; investors were given the option of retaining their investments or directing the receiver to sell. Some of the "Keep" investors did not pay their share of premiums, leaving the policies at risk of lapse and the non-defaulting investors at risk of losing their investments. Acheron purchased fractional interests of defaulting investors from the receiver.In 2009, the district court approved the transfer and management of the Keep Policies—including some policies in which Acheron held fractional interests—from the receiver to a trustee. The trustee obtained court approval to sell the policies in the trust, including those in which Acheron held an interest. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Acheron’s appeal, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The order is not a final decision, 28 U.S.C. 1291, and did not involve the refusal to wind up a receivership, section 1292(a)(2). View "Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal" on Justia Law

Clark Beach appealed a district court order denying his petition for formal probate of a holographic will. Clark was the brother of Skip Beach (“decedent”). The decedent lived in Golden Valley County, North Dakota. He was survived by seven siblings and one daughter. The will at issue was submitted to informal probate, and co-personal representatives were appointed. Clark filed a petition for formal probate of the will. The purported holographic will left everything the decedent owned to Clark. The court entered its order denying the petition for formal probate of the holographic will. The court found the signature “Skip Beach” on the proposed holographic will was the decedent’s signature based on the evidence. The court held the clause “Everything I own” was a material portion and was not in the decedent’s handwriting. The court reasoned that the clause appeared to have been written in different ink, was lighter in appearance, and was slanted different than the rest of the document. Additionally, the court found the clause was smaller in text and was written in only printed letters while other portions of the document use a mix of cursive and printed letters. The court stated the testimony given by Clark Beach, his siblings, and others did not change the court’s finding and stated “[n]one of these individuals are handwriting experts, and none of them ever saw this purported will before Skip’s death.” The court held that Clark Beach failed to meet his burden of proof that a material portion of the document was in the testator’s handwriting as required by law. Clark argued the district court erred in finding the material portions of the holographic will were not in the testator’s handwriting. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the petition for formal probate. View "Estate of Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law

Appellants sued Respondents over alleged self-dealing and other purported breaches of fiduciary duty in the administration of a trust. Respondents argued that proceedings in Idaho were improper under the provisions of Title 15, chapter 7 of the Idaho Code (the “trust code”) because they alleged that the principal place of the Trust’s administration was in Indiana. The district court agreed and dismissed Appellants’ complaint. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Campbell" on Justia Law

After a woman died and left a will disposing of several parcels of real property and two trailers, her ex-husband — with whom she had maintained a romantic relationship following divorce — filed claims against the woman’s estate for those properties. He contended the decedent had transferred title to three of those parcels to him. He also claimed that they made an agreement about two parcels and the trailer that sat on them: he and the decedent would live there until their deaths, after which the properties would be sold and the proceeds given solely to their great-grandchild. The estate rejected these claims, invoking the statute of frauds. The superior court ruled in favor of the estate, finding that the ex-husband failed to prove the existence of contracts satisfying the statute of frauds and rejecting his alternative claims for restitution. On appeal, the ex-husband argued the proceedings were marred by procedural flaws, and challenged the superior court’s decision on the merits. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the superior court’s decision, but remanded for further proceedings on the restitution claim involving one parcel. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Alexina Rodman" on Justia Law

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment and award of attorney’s fees in favor of Darren Harr as personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. Behle filed a petition asking the district court to determine the validity of the decedent’s will and convert the administration to a formal probate. Harr, as personal representative of the Estate, objected to Behle’s petition and moved for summary judgment. Behle argued the probate application was defective because an electronic copy of the decedent’s will was filed with the district court rather than the original. Behle also claimed Harr asserted undue influence over the decedent. The district court granted Harr’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the probate to proceed informally. Harr thereafter moved for an award of attorney's fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Behle’s contentions only amounted to suspicion; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Behle, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding undue influence. Therefore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court found the district court erred in ordering Behle to pay attorney's fees: the district court did not analyze whether the allegations in Behle’s petition were made in good faith when it awarded attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31. Instead, the district court focused on Behle’s arguments made in opposition to summary judgment. "The plain words of the statute pertain only to pleadings and not to motions or other documents. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31." View "Estate of Behle" on Justia Law

Michael J. Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement” on February 14, 2007. The trust named State Bank & Trust (now known as Bell Bank), as trustee. On October 3, 2011, Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement II” and merged assets from the first trust into the second trust. Tharaldson died intestate on December 11, 2017. On June 28, 2019, Bell Bank filed a petition seeking the district court’s determination of trust beneficiaries and approval of asset distribution. Bell Bank claimed the sole beneficiary was Tharaldson’s brother, Matthew Tharaldson. Tharaldson had three biological children. Bell Bank mailed its petition, proposed order, and notice of hearing to the two adult children. Bell Bank sent the documents via email to the attorney representing Tharaldson’s minor child, E.M., in the separate probate action. E.M. challenged the court's jurisdiction after it ultimately granted Bell Bank's petition to distribute the trust assets. The district court found the language of the trust was not ambiguous, Tharaldson died intestate, and Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary of the trust, entitling him to distribution of all trust assets. E.M. argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting Bell Bank’s petition. He claimed the merger of assets from the first trust to the second trust was invalid. E.M. also claimed the trust designated E.M. and his siblings as the only beneficiaries, entitling them to share in the trust assets, and entitling E.M. to recover attorney’s fees. Bell Bank and Matthew Tharaldson argued collateral estoppel barred relitigation of E.M.’s claims in this case because of the district court’s findings about E.M.’s status as an heir in the Tharaldson probate case. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court’s order denying E.M.’s demand for change of judge should have been granted, making the assigned judge's actions with respect to the merits of E.M.'s claims invalid. This case was remanded for assignment of a new judge and for proceedings anew on the merits of the petition. View "Matter of Michael J. Tharaldson Trust" on Justia Law