Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In these two original actions the Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt certain paragraphs of its order.Two brothers, who were coexecutors of their deceased father's estate, sought writs of prohibition to prevent the judge of the general division from enforcing her order memorializing a settlement in a judicial-dissolution action, arguing that they were not bound by the order because the general division lacked both subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the general division patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt the paragraphs of its order directing the brothers to take actions as coexecutors. View "Neiman v. LaRose" on Justia Law

After Royals’ father, Adams, died at age 99, Royals became the successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the Adams Trust. Lu, Adams’s second wife, was 59 years old when she married Adams, then 95. Royals alleged that Adams intended to leave none of his assets to Lu. Lu claims Adams intended to provide for her support by depositing certain funds in certain accounts under Lu’s control outside of the Trust. A pretrial right to attach order was issued against Lu under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600).The court of appeal reversed. The prospect of punitive recovery on a financial elder abuse claim (exemplary damages or statutory penalties) may not be secured by the extraordinary remedy of pretrial attachment. A financial elder abuse claimant may obtain an attachment for potential compensatory damages and an award of attorney fees and costs associated with those damages only if the request for it complies with all applicable provisions of the statutory scheme governing pretrial attachments (Code Civ. Proc. 481.010). Royals’s attachment application did not comply with four provisions of the Attachment Law. Royals failed to support her prayer for compensatory damages with competent evidence; to the extent she sought an attachment for prospective recovery of punitive damages and statutory penalties in addition to compensatory damages, her attachment request also failed to comply with the attachable amount, attachable claim, and claimed indebtedness requirements. View "Royals v. Lu" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District resolved three appeals, referred to as the 270 Action and the other as 475 Action.   In the 270 Action, the trial court sustained special motions to strike Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant and her counsel, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)1 (i.e., anti-SLAPP motions). The trial court further awarded Defendant and her attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). The first 270 Appeal (No. B308337) is of the trial court’s judgment following its order on the anti-SLAPP motions. The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits in the 270 Action because, under the circumstances presented, he lacked standing to bring a malicious prosecution claim with respect to an action that had not been prosecuted against him. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.   The 475 Appeal (No. B307242) is of an order entered by the probate court dismissing Defendant’s creditor’s petition for a finder’s fee in the 475 Action. This order was rendered primarily on a misapplication of the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Second Appellate District reversed this order and remanded to the probate court for further proceedings. By their cross-appeal, Plaintiff and his attorney appeal an order directing the attorney to pay expenses for repeated violations of the probate court’s page limit rules. The Second Appellate District found that the probate court acted within its authority in directing such payment and therefore affirm View "Tukes v. Richard CA2/" on Justia Law

Relator—the decedent’s personal representative—brought a wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020 that sought, among other things, damages on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries for their loss of decedent’s society and companionship. The trial court entered an order under ORCP 44 C requiring the beneficiaries to produce records of their medical and psychological care that was relevant to those alleged damages. Relator filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed, arguing that the beneficiaries’ records were privileged, and that ORCP 44 C could not require disclosure because that rule applied to claims made for “damages for injuries to the party,” and the beneficiaries were not parties. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling was in error. As a matter of law, the Court held that statutory beneficiaries of a wrongful death claim were not, by virtue of that status, “parties” who could be compelled under ORCP 44 C to provide privileged records. View "Dahlton v. Kyser" on Justia Law

This case involved a contentious family dispute over the effect of an in terrorem clause in a trust instrument that was executed by David Slosberg (“David”), which said that if his son, Robert Slosberg (“Plaintiff”), or daughters, Suzanne Giller and Lynne Amy Seidner (“Defendants”), challenged the trust, they would forfeit any benefits they were to receive from it. After David died, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Defendants unduly influenced David to create the trust that contained the in terrorem clause, and at a trial in June 2019, the jury agreed. The trial court accordingly entered an order ruling that the trust instrument was void. Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, that the in terrorem clause contained in the trust instrument precluded Plaintiff from asserting the undue-influence claim in the first place. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the in terrorem clause barred Plaintiff’s claim and resulted in his forfeiture of any benefits from the trust. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by determining that the in terrorem clause barred Plaintiff’s undue-influence claim and resulted in forfeiture of the assets the trust instrument otherwise provided. That part of the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings at the trial court. View "Slosberg v. Giller, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Warrior ("Warrior") and the Town of Trafford ("Trafford") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order denying their motions for a summary judgment in this tort action filed by plaintiff James Griffin, as the personal representative of the estate of James R. Olvey, and to enter a summary judgment in Warrior's and Trafford's favor on the basis of immunity. A Warrior police officer saw a cehicle operated by Donald Wright run a red light. Though the officer tried to stop Wright's vehicle, Wright sped away and the officer pursued. A Trafford officer joined in pursuit. When Wright entered the interstate to avoid the police chase, the officers stopped their pursuit. Approximately three quarters of a mile from where the officers ceased their pursuit, Wright's vehicle collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Olvey in a southbound lane. Olvey died as a result of the collision. When Wright was apprehended at the collision scene, a syringe was found hanging from his right arm. Subsequent testing revealed that, at the time of the collision, he was under the influence of both marijuana and cocaine. Wright was subsequently criminally indicted in connection with Olvey's death. Griffin, as the personal representative of Olvey's estate, later sued, among others, the two officers and their respective Town employers, alleging among other things, that Olvey died as the result of the allegedly unskillful, negligent, and/or wanton conduct of the officers in pursuing Wright while carrying out duties. As to each municipality, Griffin further alleged, based on a theory of respondeat superior, that they were vicariously liable for the purported wrongful conduct of the officers. After review, the Supreme Court determined Warrior and Trafford demonstrated a clear legal right to summary judgment in their favor on the basis of immunity. Accordingly, the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in favor of each on Griffin's claims against them. View "Ex parte City of Warrior and Town of Trafford." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review in this case centered on the six-month time limit set forth in Subsection 2210(b) of Pennsylvania’s Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code. The surviving spouse here timely filed her election to take against the will, but, several years later, petitioned to revoke her election in an attempt to reclaim her testate share. The parties disputed whether a survivor who sought to revoke a statutory election against the will must do so within the six-month period specified in Subsection 2210(b), even though it speaks only to the time for filing the election, not to the revocation of a prior election. The Supreme Court concluded that the widow here was not permitted to revoke her election after the expiration of Section 2210’s six-month time limit. View "In Re: Est. of C. Jabbour" on Justia Law

Appellant Marie Yammine, as former wife and primary beneficiary of a two million dollar life insurance policy issued by Respondent ReliaStar Life Insurance Company to her former husband, Dr. Jean Bernard, appealed a declaratory judgment finding the contingent beneficiary, Appellee Roland Ghoussoub, was entitled to the policy's death benefit. Dr. Bernard died after the trial court granted the parties' divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues. The trial court declared Yammine and Bernard were divorced and that 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) operated to revoke her beneficiary designation to the death benefits. Whether Oklahoma's revocation-upon-divorce statute, 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A), applied when one party dies after the granting of the divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues, was a matter of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court concluded Section 178(A) required a final judgment on all issues, and that the trial court erred by interpreting 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) to revoke Yammine's beneficiary designation in Bernard's life insurance policy based on an order granting divorce when the final judgment on all issues remained pending at husband's death. The trial court's declaratory judgment was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghoussoub v. Yammine" on Justia Law

Born in 1967, Carroll was raised by a single mother near Albert Barber's property. Albert’s younger sister was Arlene. Albert died in 1998. . In 2000, Arlene informed the Geauga County Probate Court that she had lost Albert’s will and possessed only an unsigned copy. She filed an application to probate the will. The court found that all interested parties were given appropriate notice and admitted the will. The court distributed most of the estate— land worth $232,000 and slightly over $30,000 in other assets—to Arlene under the will.Carroll claims that in 2018, Arlene told her that Albert was Carroll’s father. Carrol sued, claiming that Arlene submitted an invalid version of Albert’s will to an Ohio probate court and that she should have inherited Albert’s estate. The district court concluded that she lacked standing and that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction barred it from hearing her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing her lack of standing. Carroll has not plausibly pleaded that the Barbers’ misconduct injured her, that they left her any worse off. Even given an opportunity to contest Albert’s will, Carroll would not have been eligible to contest Albert’s will under Ohio law when he died. View "Carroll v. Hill" on Justia Law

Central to this case was a dispute between two daughters and a stepdaughter of the testatrix, Jacquelin Stevenson, who died in 2007. She was survived by six children: four from her marriage to Thomas Stevenson, a son by a former marriage, and a stepdaughter. The testatrix's two sons by Stevenson, Thomas and Daniel, stole millions from the estate while co-trustees from 1996 to 2006, thereby forfeiting any rights they had to take under their mother's will and leaving Jacquelin and Kathleen as the personal representatives. The theft by Thomas and Daniel left the estate with insufficient monies remaining to fund specific bequests of $400,000 each to the two stepchildren of the marriage. Further, the bequest of a Lake Summit property to the two sons failed, sending it to the residuary, and because no amendment by codicil preceded the testatrix's demise, after acquired properties passed through the residuary as well. The residuary clause provided that "[a]ll the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate . . . I give, devise and bequeath to Kathleen S. Turner, Jacquelin S. Bennett, Thomas C. Stevenson, III, Daniel R. Stevenson, James Kelly King, and Genevieve S. Felder in equal shares." The probate court, the circuit court, and the court of appeals all interpreted this to mean in equal ownership interests rather than equal monetary values. Just as the language of the residuary clause was relevant to the resolution of this dispute, so was section 10 of the will, which set forth the powers of the personal representatives and expressly stated the testatrix's intention to give broad discretion and flexibility to her personal representatives. The probate judge, the circuit court, and the court of appeals all determined the broad powers did not govern distributions of the residual estate. Also, the court of appeals affirmed the probate court's finding that the personal representatives' conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the court of appeals erred and reversed. View "Bennett v. Estate of James Kelly King" on Justia Law