Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Orlando Bethel appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. 2022, Zoe Sozo Bethel died intestate in Florida; she was survived by her spouse, Brennan James Franklin (spouse), and their five-year-old daughter. After the decedent's death, the spouse arranged for the body to be cremated in Florida and had the cremated remains shipped to Hughes Funeral Home and Crematory in Alabama, where the spouse's mother, Mikki Franklin, was employed. A dispute arose between the spouse and the decedent's father, Orlando Bethel, concerning the right to control the disposition of the ashes. Bethel filed an emergency petition seeking a determination that the spouse and decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death and that the spouse had therefore forfeited his right as an "authorizing agent" to control the disposition of ashes. Bethel requested that he, rather than the spouse, be granted the right to control the disposition of the ashes. While the probate action was pending, the father filed a motion at circuit court for a temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction enjoining the spouse, the spouse's mother, and the funeral home ("the defendants") from further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up or otherwise disposing of" the ashes. A five-day restraining order was entered, but ultimately the preliminary injunction was not, and later the probate entered a final order dismissing the father's petition. The probate court did not address the father's allegation that the spouse and the decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying the father's motion for a preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel v. Franklin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Levorn and Levern Davis appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the estate of Henry Brim. In 2006, Brim sold property to Levern, executing a promissory note and mortgage for a principal of $56,000. The interest rate was 7% per year, and payments were to be made monthly. The final installment was scheduled to be August 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the property to his brother, Levorn. In 2017, Brim filed suit, alleging defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage. Defendants denied they were in default and disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that defendants were in default; to determine the amount still owed on the promissory note; and to authorize Brim to foreclose the mortgage. Brim died in 2019; Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative to Brim's estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Defendants unsuccessfully challenged Hamilton's substitution into the promissory note action. The circuit court thereafter found defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage, the amount owed was $26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the filing of the suggestion of death. The Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied defendants' motion to reconsider and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to set aside its order substituting Hamilton as plaintiff, set aside its order finding defendants in default of the note and mortgage, and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1). View "Davis v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law

Angus Kennedy owned real property and mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1960, Angus and his wife, Lois, executed two deeds conveying the surface and “excepting and reserving unto the parties of the first part, their heirs, successors or assigns, all right, title and interest in and to any and all . . . minerals in or under the foregoing described lands.” Lois did not own an interest in the property when Angus and Lois Kennedy executed the deeds. Angus died in 1965, and Lois died in 1980. Angus and Lois did not have children together. Angus had six children from a previous marriage. Angus' heirs executed numerous mineral leases for the property. Lois had one child, Julia Nevin, who died in 1989. In 2016 and 2017, Julia Nevin’s surviving husband, Stanley Nevin, executed mineral leases with Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2018, Stanley sued the successors in interest to Angus, alleging Lois owned half of the minerals reserved in the 1960 deeds. In response, the Angus heirs claimed Angus did not intend to reserve any minerals to Lois because she did not own an interest in the property conveyed in the 1960 deeds. The district court granted Northern Oil’s motion to intervene. Northern Oil appeals the quiet title judgment deciding Northern Oil did not own mineral interests in the McKenzie County property, arguing the district court erred in concluding the deeds at issue were ambiguous as to whether Angus intended to reserve minerals to his wife, Lois. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al." on Justia Law

Jonathan Starr brought a probate petition challenging the actions of M. Thomas Ashbrook, who was acting as the trustee of the revocable trust of Jonathan’s father, Arnold Starr. The petition alleged that Ashbrook had wasted and misused trust assets by pursuing a meritless petition for instructions and using trust assets to fund litigation against Jonathan Starr and his brothers. Ashbrook responded by bringing a special motion to strike the surcharge cause of action pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court concluded the allegations of the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of activity protected by section 425.16 and denied Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion. Ashbrook appealed the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that the alleged waste and misuse of trust assets was the injury-producing activity allegedly giving rise to Ashbrook’s liability for breach of trust. Because the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of allegations of protected activity the Court affirmed the order denying Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion without addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Starr v. Ashbrook" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the validity of modified terms, made by agreement of the settlor and beneficiaries, for removal and/or replacement of a trustee by the beneficiaries of irrevocable inter vivos trusts. The trusts at issue were all created by Walter Garrison, “Settlor,” founder and CEO of CDI Corp., a successful computer serving company. The trusts all named Settlor’s son Mark Garrison and any children Mark would have as beneficiaries. In 2017, Settlor and Beneficiaries entered into agreements to modify the Trusts pursuant to section 7740.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act (“UTA”). Settlor passed away in February 2019. Proceeding under the modified provision, Beneficiaries acted to remove the existing independent co-trustees and to appoint Dr. Mairi Leining, Christina Zavell, and Michael Zavell in their place. The existing co-trustees, when notified of Beneficiaries’ action, advised that they did not recognize the modifications to the Trusts as valid or their purported removal thereunder. Seeking to uphold the co-trustee replacements, Mark filed a declaratory judgment petition to test the validity of the 2017 modifications. The Supreme Court determined the lower courts’ extension of its holding in Trust under Agreement of Edward Winslow Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) to unified action of beneficiaries and settlor of a trust under section 7740.1(a) was improper. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Trust Under Deed of W. Garrison" on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky"), deceased, appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's dismissal with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. Ms. Bashinsky was the widow of Sloan Bashinsky, who owned the majority stock in Golden Enterprises, Inc., and who was the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Golden Flake Foods ("Golden Flake"). McKleroy and Townsend, two former Golden Flake employees who had professional relationships with Ms. Bashinsky, alleged that Ms. Bashinsky was incapable of caring for herself and for her assets, which were then valued at approximately $218 million. McKleroy and Townsend's allegations of Ms. Bashinsky's incompetence centered on her request that Level Four Advisory Services LLC, which held approximately $35 million of Ms. Bashinsky's personal assets, transfer $17.5 million to David Heath at investment firm Morgan Stanley. McKleroy and Townsend further alleged that the transferred assets would end up being controlled by Ms. Bashinsky's grandson, Landon Ash, whom they alleged had already accumulated $23.5 million in total indebtedness to Ms. Bashinsky and whom they alleged exerted undue influence upon Ms. Bashinsky. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss. The Court determined the order awarding attorney fees was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, Erskine's appeal was dismissed, and the matter remanded for the probate court to enter a proper final judgment in this case. View "Erskine v. Guin, et al." on Justia Law

The court appointed a guardian ad litem for two minor trust beneficiaries. A few years later, but before the beneficiaries reached 18, they sought the removal of the guardian ad litem. The guardian responded by filing a motion to disqualify the beneficiaries' attorney, which the trial court granted. The beneficiaries appealed.By the time the case reached the Second Appellate District, the beneficiaries had reached the age of majority. Thus, The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's order disqualifying the counsel of two trust beneficiaries, finding that the issue was moot. The court explained that there is no longer statutory authority permitting the appointment of a guardian ad litem because the beneficiaries are no longer minors. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law

This action was brought by plaintiff Nancy Holm, administratrix of the estate of her husband, Christopher Friedauer, who died in 2015 after falling at his workplace, Holmdel Nurseries, LLC. As a longtime employee of the family-owned business, Christopher had been covered by workers’ compensation insurance, but he was no longer covered after he became a member of the LLC in 2012. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Daniel Purdy, who served as the insurance broker for Holmdel Nurseries from 2002 to 2015, failed to provide to the LLC the notice mandated by N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, and that Christopher was unaware that he no longer had workers’ compensation coverage in his new role as an LLC member. She alleged that as a result of defendant’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Friedauer’s dependents were deprived of a workers’ compensation death benefit to which they would have been entitled under N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 had he been covered by workers’ compensation insurance at the time of his death. Defendant asserted that Friedauer’s father, Robert Friedauer, the LLC’s managing member for insurance issues, instructed defendant in 2002 that Holmdel Nurseries did not want to purchase workers’ compensation coverage for its LLC members because of the cost of that coverage. At the close of a jury trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and his motion for judgment at trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1. Informed by the New Jersey Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf was eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Supreme Court held that defendant could not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause. Accordingly, the Court concurred that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and his motion for judgment at trial, and affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The case was thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Holm v. Purdy" on Justia Law