Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In pleading guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion, Defendant agreed to forfeit to the Government his interests in Jreck Subs, a franchised chain of sandwich shops that he used to perpetrate his fraud. Claimants, the Swartz Family Trust and Orienta Investors, LLC filed third-party petitions asserting an interest in the forfeited property. The district court granted the Government’s motions to dismiss the petitions, finding that the Trust’s petition was not submitted before the thirty-day deadline to file such petitions expired and that Orienta failed to state a claim under the forfeiture statute, as either the holder of an interest superior to the Government or as a bona fide purchaser for value. The district court also denied Orienta’s motion for reconsideration, as well as Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition.   The court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court concluded that the Trust’s petition was correctly dismissed as untimely and that Orienta’s petition does not state a claim. The court remanded, however, to allow the district court to further consider Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition with respect to its claim that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. The court explained that here, two things potentially tip the scales in favor of granting Orienta leave to amend its bona fide purchaser claim. First, the district court based its dismissal of that claim primarily on a technical issue. Second, the Government acknowledged that additional factual development was necessary to resolve whether Orienta’s petition stated a bona fide purchaser for value claim. View "United States v. Swartz Family Trust" on Justia Law

James Hal Ross created a series of trusts prior to his death to benefit his wife, Suzanne Dickson Ross, and sons from a previous marriage. He left some personal effects to Suzanne in his will but bequeathed the remainder of his estate to the James Hal Ross Revocable Trust, created on November 28, 2000. The revocable trust specified that Ross and Suzanne were the beneficiaries during Ross’s lifetime but that, upon his death, its assets would be transferred to two different trusts. The will of Ross was probated, and the estate was closed on July 29, 2005. Eight years later in 2013, the Ross sons petitioned to reopen the estate due to “maladministration” by Suzanne, individually and as executrix, and to require an inventory and accounting of all Suzanne’s activities as executrix of the estate. The action was dismissed in 2014. In 2016, Matthew Ross, through his conservator, Roy Hal Parker Jr., filed a complaint alleging mismanagement of the trusts and the improper selling of trust property by Suzanne. The complaint later was amended to include as Plaintiffs Matthew’s other brothers. Defendants responded by filing or joining another Defendant’s motion to dismiss; alternatively, Defendants sought to transfer the case to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Venue was ultimately transferred and defendants' motion to dismiss was granted based on a general three year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Ross sons that a ten year statute of limitations applied to some of their claims and ultimately reversed and remanded the case for the chancellor to determine which of the Ross sons’ causes of action dealt with mismanagement of the trusts and with the recovery of land. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by ruling on issues not properly pled before the chancery court, so the chancellor's judgment as to the ten year statute of limitations was reinstated. However, the Supreme Court found the Ross sons did sufficiently raise genuine issues of material fact as to Matthew’s soundness of mind, so it affirmed the Court of Appeals in this respect, and remanded the case to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "Parker, et al. v. Ross, et al." on Justia Law

In its prior decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected Optional’s contention that DAS should be held in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with the May 2013 final judgment that was entered in these forfeiture proceedings. Optional filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motion to amend the May 2013 judgment to provide that (1) the $12.6 million that DAS had received “is impressed with a constructive trust in favor of Optional” and that (2) “DAS is directed to return that $12,602,824.09, with interest, to Optional’s counsel.” Optional argued that the May 2013 judgment’s failure to specifically award the $12.6 million to Optional was a “scrivener’s error” that should be corrected under Rule 60(a). The district court denied Optional’s Rule 60(a) motion.   The Ninth Circuit granted DAS Corporation’s motion to summarily affirm the district court’s decision. First, the panel denied Optional’s motion to strike DAS’s papers, which alleged that DAS was not a proper party in this matter. The panel held that this contention was frivolous. The panel held that DAS had standing to object to the proposed entry of a subsequent final judgment that, in its view, did not correctly reflect the court’s earlier rulings that finally disposed of the matter as to DAS. The panel granted DAS’s motion for summary affirmance. Finally, the panel held that despite being warned in the prior decision that its prior litigation maneuvers had gone too far, Optional filed this utterly meritless appeal and filed a frivolous motion contesting DAS’s right even to be heard in this appeal. View "OPTIONAL CAPITAL, INC. V. DAS CORPORATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

This case involves disputes over the disposition of assets. The assets at issue include monies and real and personal property assets held in trust pursuant to the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (“Original Trust Instrument”) as amended and restated in the 2013 Amendment and Restatement of the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Amended/Restated Trust” or “Trust”). Appellant was the deceased’s nephew, as well as his attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney (POA), executor under a pour-over, will, and successor Trustee under the Amended/Restated Trust. Appellant appealed from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court sitting in probate (the “probate court”), in connection with an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 brought by Respondents each of whom were beneficiaries under the Amended/Restated Trust.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the probate court’s disposition of the Subject Property in the subject order. The court explained that even had evidence existed to demonstrate that the deceased wanted Appellant to have the subject funds, the lack of any written document authorizing Appellant to deposit the monies into the joint account would be fatal to Appellant’s appeal concerning the subject funds. The court concluded Appellant’s deposit of the subject funds violated section 4264, subdivision (f) by effectuating a change in the designation of beneficiaries who would have otherwise shared in the entitlement to the subject funds. View "Pool-O'Connor v. Guadarrama" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from a dispute between Richard Bentley and his brother, James Randall Bentley ("Randy"), and from a dispute between Richard and his ex-wife, Leslie Bentley. In case no. CV-19-7, an action concerning the administration of the estate of Richard and Randy's father, Dedrick William Bentley ("the estate action"), Richard, as coexecutor of Dedrick's estate, asserted cross-claims against Randy, as the other coexecutor of the estate. Richard sought, among other things, the return of certain real property previously owned by their parents to Dedrick's estate and sought to eject Randy from that property. Randy moved for summary judgment on those cross-claims, which was granted by the circuit court. Although the circuit court certified its partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., that certification was improper, and therefore Richard's appeal of the partial summary judgment (appeal no. SC- 2022-0522) should have been dismissed. In case no. CV-20-900058 ("the fraudulent-transfer action"), Leslie sued Richard seeking to set aside, pursuant to the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the AFTA") the allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets that Richard had obtained or inherited from Dedrick's estate to a trust that Richard had created. Leslie moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the circuit court, and Richard appealed (appeal no. SC-2022- 0526). Finding no error in that judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bentley v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Sheryl Lyne, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Kawzinski, filed suit against Debra Ann Kawzinski ("Debra Ann") to quiet title to a piece of real property to which Lyne and Debra Ann both claimed an ownership interest. Lyne further requested that the circuit court require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided among the rightful owners of the property. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Lyne. Debra Ann appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Debra Ann's appeal as untimely filed. View "Kawzinski v. Lyne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff provided tax- and estate-planning services. Plaintiff filed a claim in Baltimore County Orphans’ Court against Defendant’s Estate for fees allegedly due under contracts. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the suit was barred by the “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction Plaintiff’s suit alleging breach of contract. The panel held that none of the Goncalves categories applied to Plaintiff’s suit against the Estate. First, neither party contends that Plaintiff was seeking to annul or probate Bond’s will. Second, this suit does not require the federal courts to administer Defendant’s Estate. Valuing an estate to calculate contract damages is not administering an estate. Third, this suit does not require the federal courts to assume in rem jurisdiction over property in the custody of the probate court. If Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, he would be awarded an in personam judgment for money damages. The panel held that Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. The panel held that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. View "ROGER SILK V. BARON BOND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky") appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John P. McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's order dismissing with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. At issue in this case was whether Ms. Bashinsky was competent and had the capacity to manage her considerable financial estate. When the case was filed, no one knew how long she would survive or whether she was sufficiently competent to continue to care for her financial security. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss appeal no. 1210153. As to Erskine's appeal, no. 1200401, the Court determined the December 11, 2020, order awarding fees to Hawley and his attorneys was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the case remanded for the probate to enter a final judgment. View "McKleroy Jr., et al. v. Ash, et al." on Justia Law