Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves disputes over the disposition of assets. The assets at issue include monies and real and personal property assets held in trust pursuant to the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (“Original Trust Instrument”) as amended and restated in the 2013 Amendment and Restatement of the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Amended/Restated Trust” or “Trust”). Appellant was the deceased’s nephew, as well as his attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney (POA), executor under a pour-over, will, and successor Trustee under the Amended/Restated Trust. Appellant appealed from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court sitting in probate (the “probate court”), in connection with an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 brought by Respondents each of whom were beneficiaries under the Amended/Restated Trust.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the probate court’s disposition of the Subject Property in the subject order. The court explained that even had evidence existed to demonstrate that the deceased wanted Appellant to have the subject funds, the lack of any written document authorizing Appellant to deposit the monies into the joint account would be fatal to Appellant’s appeal concerning the subject funds. The court concluded Appellant’s deposit of the subject funds violated section 4264, subdivision (f) by effectuating a change in the designation of beneficiaries who would have otherwise shared in the entitlement to the subject funds. View "Pool-O'Connor v. Guadarrama" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from a dispute between Richard Bentley and his brother, James Randall Bentley ("Randy"), and from a dispute between Richard and his ex-wife, Leslie Bentley. In case no. CV-19-7, an action concerning the administration of the estate of Richard and Randy's father, Dedrick William Bentley ("the estate action"), Richard, as coexecutor of Dedrick's estate, asserted cross-claims against Randy, as the other coexecutor of the estate. Richard sought, among other things, the return of certain real property previously owned by their parents to Dedrick's estate and sought to eject Randy from that property. Randy moved for summary judgment on those cross-claims, which was granted by the circuit court. Although the circuit court certified its partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., that certification was improper, and therefore Richard's appeal of the partial summary judgment (appeal no. SC- 2022-0522) should have been dismissed. In case no. CV-20-900058 ("the fraudulent-transfer action"), Leslie sued Richard seeking to set aside, pursuant to the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the AFTA") the allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets that Richard had obtained or inherited from Dedrick's estate to a trust that Richard had created. Leslie moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the circuit court, and Richard appealed (appeal no. SC-2022- 0526). Finding no error in that judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bentley v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Sheryl Lyne, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Kawzinski, filed suit against Debra Ann Kawzinski ("Debra Ann") to quiet title to a piece of real property to which Lyne and Debra Ann both claimed an ownership interest. Lyne further requested that the circuit court require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided among the rightful owners of the property. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Lyne. Debra Ann appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Debra Ann's appeal as untimely filed. View "Kawzinski v. Lyne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff provided tax- and estate-planning services. Plaintiff filed a claim in Baltimore County Orphans’ Court against Defendant’s Estate for fees allegedly due under contracts. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the suit was barred by the “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction Plaintiff’s suit alleging breach of contract. The panel held that none of the Goncalves categories applied to Plaintiff’s suit against the Estate. First, neither party contends that Plaintiff was seeking to annul or probate Bond’s will. Second, this suit does not require the federal courts to administer Defendant’s Estate. Valuing an estate to calculate contract damages is not administering an estate. Third, this suit does not require the federal courts to assume in rem jurisdiction over property in the custody of the probate court. If Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, he would be awarded an in personam judgment for money damages. The panel held that Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. The panel held that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. View "ROGER SILK V. BARON BOND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky") appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John P. McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's order dismissing with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. At issue in this case was whether Ms. Bashinsky was competent and had the capacity to manage her considerable financial estate. When the case was filed, no one knew how long she would survive or whether she was sufficiently competent to continue to care for her financial security. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss appeal no. 1210153. As to Erskine's appeal, no. 1200401, the Court determined the December 11, 2020, order awarding fees to Hawley and his attorneys was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the case remanded for the probate to enter a final judgment. View "McKleroy Jr., et al. v. Ash, et al." on Justia Law

Orlando Bethel appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. 2022, Zoe Sozo Bethel died intestate in Florida; she was survived by her spouse, Brennan James Franklin (spouse), and their five-year-old daughter. After the decedent's death, the spouse arranged for the body to be cremated in Florida and had the cremated remains shipped to Hughes Funeral Home and Crematory in Alabama, where the spouse's mother, Mikki Franklin, was employed. A dispute arose between the spouse and the decedent's father, Orlando Bethel, concerning the right to control the disposition of the ashes. Bethel filed an emergency petition seeking a determination that the spouse and decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death and that the spouse had therefore forfeited his right as an "authorizing agent" to control the disposition of ashes. Bethel requested that he, rather than the spouse, be granted the right to control the disposition of the ashes. While the probate action was pending, the father filed a motion at circuit court for a temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction enjoining the spouse, the spouse's mother, and the funeral home ("the defendants") from further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up or otherwise disposing of" the ashes. A five-day restraining order was entered, but ultimately the preliminary injunction was not, and later the probate entered a final order dismissing the father's petition. The probate court did not address the father's allegation that the spouse and the decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying the father's motion for a preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel v. Franklin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Levorn and Levern Davis appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the estate of Henry Brim. In 2006, Brim sold property to Levern, executing a promissory note and mortgage for a principal of $56,000. The interest rate was 7% per year, and payments were to be made monthly. The final installment was scheduled to be August 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the property to his brother, Levorn. In 2017, Brim filed suit, alleging defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage. Defendants denied they were in default and disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that defendants were in default; to determine the amount still owed on the promissory note; and to authorize Brim to foreclose the mortgage. Brim died in 2019; Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative to Brim's estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Defendants unsuccessfully challenged Hamilton's substitution into the promissory note action. The circuit court thereafter found defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage, the amount owed was $26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the filing of the suggestion of death. The Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied defendants' motion to reconsider and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to set aside its order substituting Hamilton as plaintiff, set aside its order finding defendants in default of the note and mortgage, and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1). View "Davis v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law