Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff provided tax- and estate-planning services. Plaintiff filed a claim in Baltimore County Orphans’ Court against Defendant’s Estate for fees allegedly due under contracts. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. After the Estate disallowed the claim, Plaintiff sued in federal court. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the suit was barred by the “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction Plaintiff’s suit alleging breach of contract. The panel held that none of the Goncalves categories applied to Plaintiff’s suit against the Estate. First, neither party contends that Plaintiff was seeking to annul or probate Bond’s will. Second, this suit does not require the federal courts to administer Defendant’s Estate. Valuing an estate to calculate contract damages is not administering an estate. Third, this suit does not require the federal courts to assume in rem jurisdiction over property in the custody of the probate court. If Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, he would be awarded an in personam judgment for money damages. The panel held that Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. The panel held that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. View "ROGER SILK V. BARON BOND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky") appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John P. McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's order dismissing with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. At issue in this case was whether Ms. Bashinsky was competent and had the capacity to manage her considerable financial estate. When the case was filed, no one knew how long she would survive or whether she was sufficiently competent to continue to care for her financial security. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss appeal no. 1210153. As to Erskine's appeal, no. 1200401, the Court determined the December 11, 2020, order awarding fees to Hawley and his attorneys was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the case remanded for the probate to enter a final judgment. View "McKleroy Jr., et al. v. Ash, et al." on Justia Law

Orlando Bethel appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. 2022, Zoe Sozo Bethel died intestate in Florida; she was survived by her spouse, Brennan James Franklin (spouse), and their five-year-old daughter. After the decedent's death, the spouse arranged for the body to be cremated in Florida and had the cremated remains shipped to Hughes Funeral Home and Crematory in Alabama, where the spouse's mother, Mikki Franklin, was employed. A dispute arose between the spouse and the decedent's father, Orlando Bethel, concerning the right to control the disposition of the ashes. Bethel filed an emergency petition seeking a determination that the spouse and decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death and that the spouse had therefore forfeited his right as an "authorizing agent" to control the disposition of ashes. Bethel requested that he, rather than the spouse, be granted the right to control the disposition of the ashes. While the probate action was pending, the father filed a motion at circuit court for a temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction enjoining the spouse, the spouse's mother, and the funeral home ("the defendants") from further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up or otherwise disposing of" the ashes. A five-day restraining order was entered, but ultimately the preliminary injunction was not, and later the probate entered a final order dismissing the father's petition. The probate court did not address the father's allegation that the spouse and the decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying the father's motion for a preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel v. Franklin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Levorn and Levern Davis appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the estate of Henry Brim. In 2006, Brim sold property to Levern, executing a promissory note and mortgage for a principal of $56,000. The interest rate was 7% per year, and payments were to be made monthly. The final installment was scheduled to be August 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the property to his brother, Levorn. In 2017, Brim filed suit, alleging defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage. Defendants denied they were in default and disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that defendants were in default; to determine the amount still owed on the promissory note; and to authorize Brim to foreclose the mortgage. Brim died in 2019; Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative to Brim's estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Defendants unsuccessfully challenged Hamilton's substitution into the promissory note action. The circuit court thereafter found defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage, the amount owed was $26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the filing of the suggestion of death. The Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied defendants' motion to reconsider and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to set aside its order substituting Hamilton as plaintiff, set aside its order finding defendants in default of the note and mortgage, and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1). View "Davis v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law

Angus Kennedy owned real property and mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1960, Angus and his wife, Lois, executed two deeds conveying the surface and “excepting and reserving unto the parties of the first part, their heirs, successors or assigns, all right, title and interest in and to any and all . . . minerals in or under the foregoing described lands.” Lois did not own an interest in the property when Angus and Lois Kennedy executed the deeds. Angus died in 1965, and Lois died in 1980. Angus and Lois did not have children together. Angus had six children from a previous marriage. Angus' heirs executed numerous mineral leases for the property. Lois had one child, Julia Nevin, who died in 1989. In 2016 and 2017, Julia Nevin’s surviving husband, Stanley Nevin, executed mineral leases with Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2018, Stanley sued the successors in interest to Angus, alleging Lois owned half of the minerals reserved in the 1960 deeds. In response, the Angus heirs claimed Angus did not intend to reserve any minerals to Lois because she did not own an interest in the property conveyed in the 1960 deeds. The district court granted Northern Oil’s motion to intervene. Northern Oil appeals the quiet title judgment deciding Northern Oil did not own mineral interests in the McKenzie County property, arguing the district court erred in concluding the deeds at issue were ambiguous as to whether Angus intended to reserve minerals to his wife, Lois. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al." on Justia Law

Jonathan Starr brought a probate petition challenging the actions of M. Thomas Ashbrook, who was acting as the trustee of the revocable trust of Jonathan’s father, Arnold Starr. The petition alleged that Ashbrook had wasted and misused trust assets by pursuing a meritless petition for instructions and using trust assets to fund litigation against Jonathan Starr and his brothers. Ashbrook responded by bringing a special motion to strike the surcharge cause of action pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court concluded the allegations of the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of activity protected by section 425.16 and denied Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion. Ashbrook appealed the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that the alleged waste and misuse of trust assets was the injury-producing activity allegedly giving rise to Ashbrook’s liability for breach of trust. Because the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of allegations of protected activity the Court affirmed the order denying Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion without addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Starr v. Ashbrook" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the validity of modified terms, made by agreement of the settlor and beneficiaries, for removal and/or replacement of a trustee by the beneficiaries of irrevocable inter vivos trusts. The trusts at issue were all created by Walter Garrison, “Settlor,” founder and CEO of CDI Corp., a successful computer serving company. The trusts all named Settlor’s son Mark Garrison and any children Mark would have as beneficiaries. In 2017, Settlor and Beneficiaries entered into agreements to modify the Trusts pursuant to section 7740.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act (“UTA”). Settlor passed away in February 2019. Proceeding under the modified provision, Beneficiaries acted to remove the existing independent co-trustees and to appoint Dr. Mairi Leining, Christina Zavell, and Michael Zavell in their place. The existing co-trustees, when notified of Beneficiaries’ action, advised that they did not recognize the modifications to the Trusts as valid or their purported removal thereunder. Seeking to uphold the co-trustee replacements, Mark filed a declaratory judgment petition to test the validity of the 2017 modifications. The Supreme Court determined the lower courts’ extension of its holding in Trust under Agreement of Edward Winslow Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) to unified action of beneficiaries and settlor of a trust under section 7740.1(a) was improper. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Trust Under Deed of W. Garrison" on Justia Law