Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Taxpayers did not file returns for 2007 and 2012. The Tax Court concluded that taxpayers owed no deficiencies or penalties for those years, because the partnership losses claimed for those years exceeded the IRS’s adjusted non-partnership deficiencies.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for recalculation of the deficiencies and penalties for those years. The panel held that the unsigned, unfiled tax returns on which the partnership losses were reported were legally invalid because they had not been filed and executed under penalty of perjury and, therefore, could not be used to offset non-partnership income in an individual deficiency proceeding. Accordingly, the panel reversed the Tax Court’s deficiency determinations for these years and remanded with instructions to determine taxpayers’ deficiencies without regard to any partnership losses claimed on the legally invalid tax returns. For 2009 through 2011, taxpayers reported no tax liability because of large net operating losses (NOLs) from partnerships subject to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). The panel explained that when carried forward as deductions, net operating losses composed of partnership losses can offset a taxpayer’s non-partnership income or instead are part of the “net loss from partnership items” under Internal Revenue Code Section 6234(a)(3), as it was then in effect. The panel remanded for the Tax Court to assess the non-partnership items in the recomputed deficiencies for those years, accounting for the TEFRA-eligible partnership components of the net-operating-loss deductions only in the Section 6234(a)(3) calculations of “net loss from partnership items.” View "CIR V. RITCHIE STEVENS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Gulf South Pipeline Company, LLC owned an underground natural gas storage facility in Rankin County, Mississippi. It owned additional properties that ran through thirty-two Mississippi counties. As a public service corporation with property situated in more than one Mississippi county, property belonging to Gulf South was assessed centrally by the Mississippi Department of Revenue rather than by individual county tax assessors. After conducting the central assessment, MDOR apportions the tax revenues among the several counties in which the property is located. A significant amount of the natural gas stored in Gulf South’s Rankin County facility is owned by Gulf South’s customers and, therefore, it is excluded from MDOR’s central assessment. The Rankin County tax assessor requested that Gulf South disclose the volume of natural gas owned by each of its customers. Following Gulf South’s refusal to provide these data, in September 2021 the Rankin County tax assessor gave notice of its intention to assess Gulf South more than sixteen million dollars for approximately four billion cubic feet of natural gas stored by Gulf South but owned by its customers. Gulf South filed suit at the Chancery Court in Hinds County, seeking to enjoin the assessment and seeking a declaratory judgment that MDOR was the exclusive entity with the authority to assess a public service corporation with property located in more than one Mississippi county. On interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to determine whether venue was proper in Hinds County when Rankin County was named as a defendant and MDOR was joined as a necessary party. The Court held that, under the venue provisions of Mississippi Code Section 11-45-17 and the Court’s consistent construction of these statutory provisions as mandatory and controlling, venue was proper only in Rankin County. Therefore, the chancellor erred by denying Rankin County’s motion to transfer venue. View "Rankin County v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors for Lowndes County appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lowndes County School District. The Board argued that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 37-57-107(1) (Rev. 2014) and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s September 15, 2020 decision to exclude $3,352,0751 from the District’s requested ad valorem tax effort. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the District appealed the decision of a county board of supervisors. As such, the District’s exclusive remedy was Section 11-51-75. Because the District failed to meet these requirements and because Section 11-51-75 was the District’s exclusive remedy, the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear this matter and issue a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded to the chancery court for it to enter an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Board of Supervisors for Lowndes County v. Lowndes County School District" on Justia Law

Clary Hood, Inc. (“Hood, Inc.”), a South Carolina corporation engaged in land excavation and grading, with revenue of $44 million in 2015 and $69 million in 2016, paid its CEO a $5 million bonus in both of those years, deducting the payments on its income tax returns as reasonable business expenses under 26 U.S.C. Section 162(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) contended that the bonuses were excessive, with the excess amount actually representing a disguised payment of dividends from profits, which could not be deducted. The Tax Court mostly agreed with the IRS and determined that Hood, Inc. could only deduct roughly $3.7 million for 2015 and $1.4 million for 2016 as reasonable amounts for total compensation to its CEO. Accordingly, it assessed tax deficiencies for both years in the total amount of roughly $1.96 million, as well as a penalty for 2016 in the amount of $282,398.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s findings with respect to the amount of reasonable deductions and consequent tax deficiency but vacated the imposition of the penalty. The court explained that because the record indicates that Hood, Inc. anticipated remedying Mr. Hood’s past under compensation in installments over multiple years and discussed that plan with its tax advisors, who approved it as reasonable, the court concluded that the Tax Court’s finding regarding the reasonable-cause defense for the 2015 tax year should also have applied to the 2016 tax year. Further, Hood, Inc. used a consistent methodology to determine the amount of Mr. Hood’s bonuses for both 2015 and 2016 with the advice of independent accountants. View "Clary Hood, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioners chartered their yacht, Lady Leila, in 2014 and 2015. They did not conduct the chartering activity for profit—it was a hobby. Though the hobby generated income, it also incurred sizeable expenses each year. Petitioners deducted some of those expenses under Section 183(b)(2) and placed them “above the line” to reduce their gross income. After an audit, the Commissioner determined that the Section 183(b)(2) deductions were miscellaneous itemized deductions under Section 67, meaning that they belonged “below the line” and reduced adjusted gross income, not gross income. Moreover, because Petitioners had earned tens of millions of dollars in 2014 and 2015 and, at that time, the Code allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of adjusted gross income, the Commissioner disallowed the Section 183(b)(2) deductions altogether. Facing deficiencies and penalties, Petitioners petitioned the Tax Court, which granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. They sought appellate review.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court and denied the petition for review. The court explained that because Sections 63 and 67 also omit Section 183, hobby expenses deducted under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous itemized deductions. During the relevant time period, these deductions were subject to a two-percent floor on adjusted gross income. The result is that Section 183(b)(2) gave Petitioners a deduction for their expenses from operating Lady Leila, but Section 67 did not allow them to take that deduction because they could not meet the two-percent threshold for miscellaneous itemized deductions. View "Carl L. Gregory, et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The IRS audited Plaintiff's and erroneously determined he owed tax for 2013 when he had actually overpaid. Plaintiff sought a timely 2012 tax refund based on the discovered miscalculation. Plaintiff claimed that, in the same envelope, he also requested a refund for the 2013 tax year, although the IRS claims it did not receive the 2013 refund request. Ultimately, the IRS awarded Plaintiff the requested 2012 refund, but denied the 2013 refund based on Plaintiff's failure to provide a timely request.Plaintiff sought enforcement of his 2013 refund, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to meet the required elements of the Mailbox Rule but plausibly alleged physical delivery of his refund request. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephen Pond v. US" on Justia Law

Appellant sent information to the Whistleblower Office of the Internal Revenue Service that he believed showed a company was underpaying taxes by taking unjustified deductions and using improper pricing practices. Section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code entitles whistleblowers to a percentage of the proceeds the IRS collects based on whistleblower information identifying underpayment of taxes or violations of internal revenue law. Appellant claimed he is entitled to a mandatory whistleblower award under Section 7623. The Whistleblower Office accordingly denied Appellant’s application for an award. The Tax Court entered summary judgment in favor of the IRS.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on Appellant’s challenge to the Whistleblower Office’s determination. The court wrote that Appellant admits that his submission “did not explicitly reference” the tax issues that led to adjustments, and the administrative record supports the revenue agent’s statements that those tax issues were not related to the issues Appellant identified. The record also shows substantial independent information gathering by the revenue agent. The Whistleblower Definitions Rule allows the IRS to treat a portion of an examination into unrelated tax issues as a separate administrative action, and Appellant does not show that the agency incorrectly applied that rule here. View "Luis Villa-Arce v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Appellant claimed the IRS owes him a whistleblower award under subsection 7623(b)(1), and he argued that the Treasury regulation on which the IRS relied to decide otherwise contravenes the text of the statute. Appellant submitted information to the IRS that he thought showed that a condominium development group evaded taxes through its treatment of golf-club-membership deposits. The IRS deemed the information Appellant submitted sufficiently specific and credible to warrant opening an examination but later concluded that the membership deposits were correctly reported. Through its own further investigation, however, the IRS discovered an unrelated problem. The IRS eventually ordered the development group to pay a large adjustment relating to its treatment of that debt, but it denied Lissack’s claim for a percentage of those proceeds. When Appellant sought a review of that decision, the Tax Court granted summary judgment to the IRS. Appellant appealed, and the IRS primarily argued that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review its award denial.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction and that the challenged provisions of the rule are consistent with the tax whistleblower statute. The court wrote that the Tax Court correctly concluded that “the record provides more than enough evidence to confirm that petitioner is not eligible for a mandatory award” and ruled in favor of the IRS as a matter of law. The Tax Court credited information in the administrative record showing that “none of the adjustments had anything to do with the membership deposits issue.” View "Michael Lissack v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC (SSO), was a one-man operation that sold clothing online and at trade shows, conventions, and other events. SSO kept few records of what it had sold or where, though its sole member testified that most of its sales occurred out of state. After an audit, the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) assessed additional sales tax liability, ultimately settling on about $80,000 based on the disparity between SSO’s wholesale purchases and the sales taxes it had paid in Mississippi and other states. MDOR’s assessment was appealed to the circuit court, which granted summary judgment in favor of MDOR. SSO appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that SSO’s failure to keep adequate records rendered MDOR’s assessment presumptively correct. The Court found no merit to SSO’s various arguments on appeal, including that the promoters of the events at which SSO sold were the true parties liable for the taxable sales. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC v. Mississippi Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Idaho Power Company and Avista Corporation (collectively the “Companies”) contested the the Idaho State Tax Commission (the “Commission”), in its capacity as the State Board of Equalization, assessments of their operating property during 2019 and 2020, asserting that those assessments violated the proportionality and uniformity requirements set out in Article VII, sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. The Commission rejected the Companies’ challenges and upheld its assessments. The Companies then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in district court, arguing that the Commission had erred in two significant ways: (1) because the Commission reduced the assessed values of certain railroads’ operating property in compliance with federal law, the assessed values of the Companies’ operating property were unconstitutionally assessed at a higher percentage of their actual cash value than were the railroads’ operating properties (the "4-R" claim); and (2) that commercial property had been assessed (and therefore taxed) at a lower percentage of its actual cash value than the Companies’ operating property, rendering the Companies’ operating property unconstitutionally disproportionally over-taxed (the "alternative claim"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission as to the Companies’ first argument. However, the district court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed as to the Companies’ second argument and declined to grant the Commission’s request for summary judgment. Both parties appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing the 4-R claim, but did not err as to the alternative claim. Judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Power Company v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law