Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
In re Guardianship of Fairley
The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law
U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Moss
In this case involving proper service of lawsuits on financial institutions that act as fiduciaries the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment that the defendant financial institution take nothing on its equitable bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served and that the default judgment rendered against it must be set aside.At issue was which of two Texas statutes applied in this case: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.028, which provides that citation may be served on Defendant by serving its "registered agent," or chapter 505 of the Estates Code, which provides that a foreign corporate fiduciary must appoint the Secretary of State as an "agent for service of process." Plaintiff in this case served the Secretary rather than the defendant's designated registered agent. Because it had not updated its Chapter 505 designation of the person to whom the Secretary should forward process, Defendant did not receive the citation, and default judgment was entered against it. The Supreme Court rendered summary judgment granting Defendant's bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served. View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Moss" on Justia Law
In re American Airlines, Inc.
The Supreme Court conditionally granted Relator American Airlines, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief from an order compelling the oral deposition of a high-level corporation official, holding that Relator was entitled to relief.The real party in interest in this case, Dr. Donald Arnette, sued American, alleging that one of its gate agents had improperly accessed his personal information and used it to harass him. Arnette served American with a series of deposition notices for Elise Eberwein, one of the six officers on American's executive leadership team. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order requiring Arnette to serve a new deposition notice. When eight months had passed without service of the required deposition notice American filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking relief from the trial court's order. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the order compelling Eberwein's deposition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling Eberwein's testimony. View "In re American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Texas
In re Guardianship of Jones
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the appeal in this bill-of-review proceeding for want of jurisdiction, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the trial court's order dismissing the bill-of-review petition was interlocutory.The court of appeals held that the trial court order dismissing the bill-of-review petition was not final because the trial court failed to include decree-like language adjudicating and disposing of the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order was final where it (1) disposed of all claims and parties; (2) stated that it was a "final order"; and (3) declared that the legal effect of granting the motions to dismiss was the dismissal of the bill of review filed in the instant case. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Texas
WWLC Investment, LP v. Miraki
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that service on WWLC Investment, LP by Sorab Miraki was not defective, holding that WWLC met its burden to prove lack of proper service.After WWLC had Miraki evicted, Miraki sued for breach of lease, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code ch. 17. Miraki accomplished substituted service by attaching a copy of the petition and citation to the front door of the home of an WWLC employee. When WWLC did not answer, Miraki took a default judgment against it. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that service on WWLC was not defective. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WWLC demonstrated that it was not properly served. View "WWLC Investment, LP v. Miraki" on Justia Law
In re Luther
The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered that Petitioner is and shall remain discharged from custody, holding that the subject temporary restraining order's lack of specificity regarding the conduct to be restrained rendered it and the judgment of contempt and order of confinement void.Petitioner was jailed and her solely-owned business, a cosmetology salon, was fined for violating a temporary restraining order requiring them to cease and desist for operating the salon for in-person services in violation of regulations related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court issued a judgment holding Petitioner and her business in contempt. Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition arguing that she was illegally restrained because the temporary restraining order was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the temporary order was void; and (2) therefore, the contempt judgment based on that order was void as well. View "In re Luther" on Justia Law
In re Texas Education Agency
The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for mandamus relief, holding that Tex. Gov't Code 22.004(i)'s prohibition on counter-supersedes refers to a particular procedural process, not an appellate court's temporary orders under other authority.In this ultra vires dispute, state regulators appealed an adverse temporary injunction. The trial court allowed Plaintiff, a school district, to counter-supersede the injunction so the regulators could not undertake unauthorized actions absent success on appeal. The court of appeals reversed the counter-supersedeas order, concluding that it was contrary to section 22.004(i) and Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(3), but issued its own temporary order continuing the injunction pending disposition of the appeal. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the appellate court's temporary order did not conflict with section 22.004(i) because it was not counter-supersedes relief within the meaning of the statute. View "In re Texas Education Agency" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Texas
Cooke v. Karlseng
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims of a limited partner for harm done to the partnership because he lacked standing to bring the claims individually, holding that the appeal should be reconsidered in light of Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020).Plaintiff formed multiple real estate-related partnerships and then sued his partners, later adding the partnerships as plaintiffs. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiff individually lacked standing to bring claims against the individual individuals because the claims belonged to the partnerships. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Plaintiff's individual claims for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Defendant lacked standing to assert his original individual claims and that the doctrine of relation back could not create jurisdiction where none existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals' holding regarding standing was in direct conflict with Pike. View "Cooke v. Karlseng" on Justia Law
In re Commitment of Jeffery Lee Stoddard
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a jury's finding that Jeffery Lee Stoddard was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and civilly committing him under Tex. Health & Safety Code chapter 841, holding that the court of appeals applied an improper standard.The court of appeals described the standard governing the factual sufficiency review in which the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt the court of appeals described the standard as requiring the court to weigh the evidence in a neutral light to determined whether the jury's finding was factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an improper standard that allowed the court to substitute its own judgment for that of a reasonable fact-finder and incorporated a statutory element that chapter 841's text did not support; and (2) a properly conducted factual-sufficiency review in an SVP case requires the appellate court to determine whether, on the entire record, a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an SVP. View "In re Commitment of Jeffery Lee Stoddard" on Justia Law
Spanton v. Bellah
In this negligence action, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Plaintiff after Defendants failed timely to file an answer or otherwise appear, holding that the substitute service in this case did not strictly comply with the order permitting such service.More than thirty days after the trial court's default judgment entry, Defendants filed a restricted appeal asserting that Plaintiff had failed properly to serve them with process. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a discrepancy between the address at which the trial court authorized substitute service and the address where the process server actually sent substitute service did not invalidate service or the default judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment, holding that substitute service did not strictly comply with the trial court's order. View "Spanton v. Bellah" on Justia Law