Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Anthony sued Theresa for a divorce. Theresa failed to answer. The court rendered a default judgment granting the divorce and dividing the marital estate. Theresa sought a new trial contending that Anthony’s attorney lied, telling her that the final hearing had not yet been scheduled. On appeal from the denial of her motion, Theresa brought a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in the property division. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Theresa had not preserved that argument.The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to file a "Craddock" motion for a new trial in the trial court does not foreclose a party’s ability to raise on appeal an evidentiary challenge to a default property division. The court noted that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d) specifically offers a defaulting party an appellate remedy to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried to the bench. A motion under Craddock does not attempt to show an error in the judgment; rather, it seeks to excuse the defaulting party’s failure to answer by showing the Craddock elements. View "Marriage of Williams" on Justia Law

Blanchard hired Industrial Specialists to provide turnaround services at Blanchard’s refinery in Texas City. Three years into the contract, a fire occurred in a regenerator vessel, injuring several Industrial Specialists employees and one employee of another contractor. The employees sued Blanchard and all of its other contractors but did not sue Industrial. Blanchard demanded a defense and indemnity from Industrial under the parties’ contract. Industrial rejected the demand. Blanchard and the other contractors settled all the employees’ claims for $104 million. Blanchard paid $86 million, then filed suit, seeking to enforce the indemnity provision.The trial court denied competing summary-judgment motions without explaining its reasons but granted Industrial's unopposed motion to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d). The court of appeals denied the petition in 2019, stating that it “fail[ed] to establish each requirement” for a permissive appeal. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept this permissive interlocutory appeal or by failing to more thoroughly explain its reasons. The final-judgment rule may entail “inevitable inefficiencies,” and permissive appeals may reduce those inefficiencies, but the permissive-appeal process should not “morph into an alternative process for direct appeals to this Court, particularly from orders denying summary-judgment motions.” View "Industrial Specialists, LLC, v. Blanchard Refining Company LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to federal wiretap claims but reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant-attorney on Plaintiffs' state wiretap claims, holding that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to the federal wiretap claims but did attach to the state wiretap claims.Plaintiffs brought this private party civil suit asserting that Defendant and others had violated the federal and Texas wiretap statutes by using and disclosing illegally intercepted electronic communications. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was immune from liability as a matter of law because Plaintiffs' claims all stemmed from her role as an attorney in a modification proceeding. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the state wiretapping claims; but (2) Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the claims under the federal wiretap statute because this Court is not convinced that federal courts would apply Texas's common-law attorney-immunity defense to that statute. View "Taylor v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

In this case involving proper service of lawsuits on financial institutions that act as fiduciaries the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment that the defendant financial institution take nothing on its equitable bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served and that the default judgment rendered against it must be set aside.At issue was which of two Texas statutes applied in this case: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.028, which provides that citation may be served on Defendant by serving its "registered agent," or chapter 505 of the Estates Code, which provides that a foreign corporate fiduciary must appoint the Secretary of State as an "agent for service of process." Plaintiff in this case served the Secretary rather than the defendant's designated registered agent. Because it had not updated its Chapter 505 designation of the person to whom the Secretary should forward process, Defendant did not receive the citation, and default judgment was entered against it. The Supreme Court rendered summary judgment granting Defendant's bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served. View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Relator American Airlines, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief from an order compelling the oral deposition of a high-level corporation official, holding that Relator was entitled to relief.The real party in interest in this case, Dr. Donald Arnette, sued American, alleging that one of its gate agents had improperly accessed his personal information and used it to harass him. Arnette served American with a series of deposition notices for Elise Eberwein, one of the six officers on American's executive leadership team. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order requiring Arnette to serve a new deposition notice. When eight months had passed without service of the required deposition notice American filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking relief from the trial court's order. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the order compelling Eberwein's deposition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling Eberwein's testimony. View "In re American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the appeal in this bill-of-review proceeding for want of jurisdiction, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the trial court's order dismissing the bill-of-review petition was interlocutory.The court of appeals held that the trial court order dismissing the bill-of-review petition was not final because the trial court failed to include decree-like language adjudicating and disposing of the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order was final where it (1) disposed of all claims and parties; (2) stated that it was a "final order"; and (3) declared that the legal effect of granting the motions to dismiss was the dismissal of the bill of review filed in the instant case. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that service on WWLC Investment, LP by Sorab Miraki was not defective, holding that WWLC met its burden to prove lack of proper service.After WWLC had Miraki evicted, Miraki sued for breach of lease, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code ch. 17. Miraki accomplished substituted service by attaching a copy of the petition and citation to the front door of the home of an WWLC employee. When WWLC did not answer, Miraki took a default judgment against it. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that service on WWLC was not defective. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WWLC demonstrated that it was not properly served. View "WWLC Investment, LP v. Miraki" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered that Petitioner is and shall remain discharged from custody, holding that the subject temporary restraining order's lack of specificity regarding the conduct to be restrained rendered it and the judgment of contempt and order of confinement void.Petitioner was jailed and her solely-owned business, a cosmetology salon, was fined for violating a temporary restraining order requiring them to cease and desist for operating the salon for in-person services in violation of regulations related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court issued a judgment holding Petitioner and her business in contempt. Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition arguing that she was illegally restrained because the temporary restraining order was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the temporary order was void; and (2) therefore, the contempt judgment based on that order was void as well. View "In re Luther" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for mandamus relief, holding that Tex. Gov't Code 22.004(i)'s prohibition on counter-supersedes refers to a particular procedural process, not an appellate court's temporary orders under other authority.In this ultra vires dispute, state regulators appealed an adverse temporary injunction. The trial court allowed Plaintiff, a school district, to counter-supersede the injunction so the regulators could not undertake unauthorized actions absent success on appeal. The court of appeals reversed the counter-supersedeas order, concluding that it was contrary to section 22.004(i) and Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(3), but issued its own temporary order continuing the injunction pending disposition of the appeal. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the appellate court's temporary order did not conflict with section 22.004(i) because it was not counter-supersedes relief within the meaning of the statute. View "In re Texas Education Agency" on Justia Law