Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Texas was asked to consider whether Texas Rules of Evidence 509(e)(4) and 510(d)(5) apply to a discovery request for a minor plaintiff’s psychological treatment records. The minor, E.B., was seeking damages for mental anguish she suffered from witnessing her younger brother's death in an ATV accident. The ATV was sold by Richardson Motorsports, who requested all of E.B.’s psychological treatment records from her clinical psychologist and pediatrician. The court had to decide whether E.B.’s mental or emotional condition was part of her negligence claim for mental anguish damages or Richardson’s defense that post-accident causes contributed to E.B.’s anguish, thus making her psychological records discoverable under the privilege exceptions.The trial court denied E.B.’s motions to quash the discovery request and ordered that all of E.B.’s requested psychological records be produced to Richardson. E.B. and her mother then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, which conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate its orders denying their motions to quash and requiring disclosure of the records. The court of appeals held that the records are privileged and the exceptions do not apply because E.B.’s pleadings make no more than a routine claim of mental anguish.The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that E.B.’s mental or emotional condition is part of her claim because she is relying on expert testimony about that condition to prove her mental anguish damages, and it is also part of Richardson’s defense that those damages have alternative causes. Thus, discovery of E.B.’s mental health care treatment records relevant to the claim or defense is not foreclosed by privilege. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the court of appeals to withdraw its mandamus order preventing discovery. The court also noted that discovery of some records may be permitted on privilege-waiver grounds and further trial court proceedings are necessary to determine which parts of the records are not privileged under each rule. View "IN RE RICHARDSON MOTORSPORTS, LTD." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, the owner of Margaritaville Resort Lake Conroe, and a guest, Mendez, who claimed to have sustained severe bodily injuries after stepping into a deep hole on the property. Mendez sued Lakeside for premises liability and negligence, seeking monetary relief between $200,000 and $1,000,000, along with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, court costs, and expenses. Lakeside failed to timely answer the lawsuit due to an alleged failure by its registered agent for service of process to send a physical copy of the service and misdirect an electronic copy. Mendez then moved for a default judgment, which was granted by the district court.The district court signed a "Final Default Judgment" proposed by Mendez's counsel, which awarded Mendez damages exceeding the $1 million upper limit stated in her original petition. The judgment concluded with the language: "This Judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable." Lakeside, unaware of the suit, did not respond before or after the judgment was signed. After the time for a restricted appeal had run, Mendez requested an abstract of judgment and began execution. Lakeside, upon learning of the suit and resulting judgment, filed an answer containing a general denial, a motion to rescind abstract of judgment, and a combined motion to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial. The district court denied Lakeside’s motions, concluding that the judgment was final and that its plenary power had therefore expired.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the default judgment was not final despite being labeled as a "Final Default Judgment." The court reasoned that the judgment's assertion of non-appealability did not just prevent it from unequivocally expressing an intent to finally dispose of the case—it expressly and affirmatively undermined or contradicted any such intent. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the challenged orders that were predicated on that court’s conclusion that its prior judgment is final. View "IN RE LAKESIDE RESORT JV, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a family dispute over the management of a trust established by Bernard and Jeannette Fenenbock. The trust was divided into three sub-trusts (Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C) to benefit their children, Glenna Fenenbock Gaddy and Mark Fenenbock. After Bernard's death, Glenna began serving as co-trustee with her mother Jeannette. Upon Jeannette's death, Glenna transferred shares from the sub-trusts to her own trust and sold them to her sons, Weston and Lane. Mark filed a lawsuit against Glenna, asserting that she had breached her duties as a trustee by transferring the shares without his approval as a co-trustee.The probate court ruled in favor of Mark, declaring that Mark is a co-trustee and that the transfer of shares to Glenna's Trust was void. The court ordered that the shares be restored to the sub-trusts. Glenna appealed this decision, and the court of appeals vacated the probate court’s order, concluding that the buyers of the shares, Weston and Lane, were “jurisdictionally indispensable parties” whose absence deprived the probate court of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction but erred by ordering Glenna to restore property she no longer owns or controls. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the probate court’s order, reversed the probate court’s order, and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. The court noted that any appropriate relief must come from Glenna or Glenna’s Trust or through the ultimate distribution of the assets remaining in the Sub-Trusts. View "IN THE MATTER OF TRUST A AND TRUST C. ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BERNARD L. AND JEANNETTE FENENBOCK LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT" on Justia Law

Christine John and Christopher Lewis were injured in a rear-end collision involving a tractor-trailer driven by Roberto Alonzo. In the subsequent personal-injury lawsuit, Alonzo and his employer, New Prime, Inc., admitted liability for Alonzo’s negligence, leaving damages as the only issue at trial. The jury awarded $12 million to John and $450,000 to Lewis for physical pain and mental anguish. Alonzo and New Prime sought a new trial, arguing that the plaintiffs’ counsel had inflamed the jury with an unprovoked accusation of race and gender bias. The trial court rejected this motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions, finding that the plaintiffs’ counsel had indeed crossed the line with an uninvited accusation of discriminatory animus. The court noted that while it is not inherently improper to question potential jurors about bias, the plaintiffs’ counsel had gone further by accusing the defense of seeking a lower damages amount because John is a black woman. The court found this argument to be inflammatory, uninvited, and unprovoked, and it concluded that it was so prejudicial that its harmfulness was incurable. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Alonzo v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a construction dispute where several homeowners in the San Marcial neighborhood sued Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc., for negligence and gross negligence. The homeowners alleged that the company's misuse of heavy equipment and faulty construction techniques caused damage to their homes during the construction of a drainage pipeline. They sought actual damages to restore their properties and exemplary damages based on gross negligence.The trial court found Renda Contracting negligent and grossly negligent. However, the jury was not unanimous in deciding the amount of exemplary damages, with ten out of twelve jurors agreeing. Consequently, the trial court omitted exemplary damages from the judgment. The homeowners appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that unanimity as to exemplary damages could be implied despite a divided verdict.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The court held that under Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a court may not imply a unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and "may not be shifted." The court concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden to obtain the findings necessary to impose exemplary damages, including that the jury is unanimous as to any amount of exemplary damages awarded. It is the plaintiff who must challenge a divided verdict as infirm or in need of clarification. View "OSCAR RENDA CONTRACTING, INC. v. BRUCE" on Justia Law

The case involves two plaintiffs, Michael Grim and Jim Maynard, who were employees of the Denton Municipal Electric (DME), a local electric utility owned by the City of Denton. The plaintiffs supported the construction of a controversial new power plant, the Denton Energy Center (DEC). Keely Briggs, a member of the Denton city council, opposed the new plant and leaked internal city documents about the project to a local newspaper. The plaintiffs reported Briggs's leak of confidential vendor information, alleging it violated the Public Information Act and the Open Meetings Act. They claimed that this report triggered the protections of the Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs were later fired, which they alleged was retaliation for their report about Briggs.The case was initially heard in the district court, where the city argued that the Whistleblower Act did not apply because the plaintiffs did not report a violation of law "by the employing governmental entity or another public employee." The court was not convinced, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a $4 million judgment for the plaintiffs. The city appealed, raising several issues, including the legal question of whether the Whistleblower Act applied in this case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Whistleblower Act did not protect the plaintiffs because they reported a violation of law by a lone city council member, not by the employing governmental entity or another public employee. The court found that the lone city council member lacked any authority to act on behalf of the city, and her actions could not be imputed to the city. Therefore, her violation of law was not a "violation of law by the employing governmental entity." The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a viable claim under the Whistleblower Act, and rendered judgment for the city. View "CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Hannah Tanner against Texas State University. Tanner was injured on October 4, 2014, when she was thrown from a golf cart on the University campus. She filed a lawsuit against the University, the Texas State University System, and Dakota Scott, a University employee who was driving the golf cart, on September 29, 2016, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions was set to expire. However, Tanner did not serve the University until May 20, 2020, several years after the statute of limitations had run.The University argued that Tanner's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she did not serve the University until after the statute of limitations had expired. The University contended that timely service of process is a statutory prerequisite to a suit against a governmental entity, and Tanner did not satisfy this prerequisite. The district court granted the University's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that untimely service does not pose a jurisdictional issue that a plea to the jurisdiction can resolve.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the statute of limitations, including the requirement of timely service, is jurisdictional in suits against governmental entities. Therefore, the University's plea to the jurisdiction was a proper vehicle to address Tanner's alleged failure to exercise diligence in serving the University. However, the court declined to determine whether the district court properly granted the plea. Instead, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to determine whether Tanner's service on Scott excuses her from the duty to serve the University. View "TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY v. TANNER" on Justia Law

The case involves successors in interest of mineral-rights holders who sued in 2019 to declare a 1999 judgment foreclosing on their predecessors’ property for delinquent taxes as void. They argued that there was constitutionally inadequate notice of the foreclosure suit, rendering the foreclosure judgment and the tax sale that followed both void. The current owners sought traditional summary judgment based on the Tax Code’s command that an action relating to the title to property against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale may not be commenced later than one year after the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record.The trial court granted the current owners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The majority held that the sheriff’s deed conclusively established the accrual date for limitations, so the burden shifted to the successors to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a due-process violation that could render the statute of limitations inoperable. Because the successors relied only on their arguments and presented no evidence of a due-process violation, the majority concluded, the current owners were entitled to summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas held that under Draughon v. Johnson, the nonmovant seeking to avoid the limitations bar by raising a due-process challenge bears the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact about whether the underlying judgment is actually void for lack of due process. Because the nonmovant here adduced no such evidence, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on Section 33.54(a)(1). However, the court also noted that the law governing this case has undergone meaningful refinement since the summary-judgment proceedings took place. Given these recent and substantial developments in the relevant law, the court remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings in the interest of justice. View "GILL v. HILL" on Justia Law

Maryam Mohammadi, an employee at a Wells Fargo branch located inside a Randalls grocery store, slipped and fell next to a shopping cart that contained leaking items. Mohammadi sued Randalls, alleging that the store failed to warn her about the puddle that formed next to the cart. The jury ruled in favor of Randalls, finding that the store was not liable under a constructive-knowledge standard of premises liability, which asked whether Randalls should have reasonably known about the danger. The jury was instructed not to consider Randalls's liability under an actual-knowledge standard based on their answer to the constructive-knowledge question.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed the jury's decision, arguing that the jury should have been allowed to consider liability under the actual-knowledge standard, even after finding no liability under the constructive-knowledge standard. The court of appeals held that Randalls could be charged with actual knowledge of the danger even without actual knowledge of the wet floor, because its employees knew a leaking product placed in a shopping cart would drip onto the floor.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation. The court found that any error in the jury instructions would have been harmless because there was no evidence that Randalls had actual knowledge of the wet floor. The court clarified that the relevant danger was the wet floor, not the antecedent situation that produced it. The court concluded that since there was no evidence of actual knowledge of the danger, no reasonable jury could have answered the actual-knowledge question in Mohammadi’s favor. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Albertsons, LLC v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law