Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Stacey and Mark Bent sued USAA for breach of their homeowners’ policy and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. The Bents subsequently stopped making mortgage payments, and their lender foreclosed on their home. The Bents’ case against USAA, however, proceeded to trial. The jury concluded that USAA had not breached the homeowner’s policy but did violate chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict but later granted the Bents’ motion for new trial. The court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion on each of its bases for ordering a new trial. The Bents sought relief in mandamus from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the Bents’ mandamus petition, holding (1) three of the trial court’s bases for ordering a new trial failed to satisfy the facial requirements set forth in In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P. and In re United Scaffolding, Inc.; and (2) on the remaining basis at issue on appeal, the court of appeals correctly found that the record did not support the trial court’s stated rationale. View "In re Bent" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, the decree gave Mother the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple’s two sons and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. After Mother moved to another city with the children, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce decree to obtain the right to determine the children’s residence and to reduce his child support. The trial court granted Father’s petition. After the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired, Mother filed a motion to reopen and vacate order, arguing that she had not been given notice of Father’s motion to modify because she did not live at the address where the citation was posted. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Mother’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, concluding that Mother’s motion did not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and post-judgment deadlines to run from the date she received notice of the trial court’s order because it was not captioned a motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that justice plainly required the trial court and court of appeals to treat Mother’s motion as extending post-judgment deadlines and that Mother's appeal was timely filed. Remanded. View "In re Interest of J.Z.P." on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originated in Mexico but traveled into parts of Texas. Respondents were residents of Texas who alleged that Petitioners defamed them in some of those television programs. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances. In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioners had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Middle school and high school cheerleaders, through their parents, sued Kountze Independent School District after the District prohibited them from displaying banners at school-sponsored events containing religious messages or signs. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting mootness in light of its subsequent adoption of a resolution providing that the District was not required to prohibit religious messages on school banners. The trial court denied the District’s plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the District voluntarily discontinued its prohibition on the display of banners containing religious messages or signs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the resolution only states that the District is not required to prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying religious messages on school banners and reserves to the District discretion in regulating those banners, this case was not moot, as the challenged conduct might reasonably be expected to recur. Remanded. View "Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Concerned by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s (Counsel) exposure to certain documents as a result of Counsel working “closely” with Defendant’s former finance manager, Defendant moved to disqualify Counsel from representing Plaintiff. The special master denied the motion to disqualify. The trial court, however, ordered Counsel’s disqualification. The court of appeals subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the trial court improperly disqualified Counsel under In re American Home Products Corp., as the American Home Products screening requirement does not govern a fact witness with information about his former employer if his position with that employer existed independently of litigation and he did not primarily report to lawyers. Rather, to the extent that a fact witness discloses his past employer’s privileged and confidential information, the factors outlined in In re Meador should guide the trial court’s decision regarding disqualification. View "In re RSR Corp. and Quemetco Metals Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law