Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Morrison Informatics, Inc. (the “Company”) filed a petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy relief in September 2009. In May 2011, the Company and two shareholders, who also were officers of the corporation, commenced a civil action in the court of common pleas against Members 1st Federal Credit Union, Mark Zampelli, and Scott Douglass. In the ensuing complaint, the Company and the Shareholders asserted that, beginning sometime after January 2005 and continuing into 2009, the Company’s finance manager, Zampelli, had colluded with a Credit Union relationships officer, Douglass, to embezzle Company funds. The complaint advanced claims against the Credit Union, Zampelli, and Douglass variously sounding in fraud, conversion, civil conspiracy, and negligence. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned whether a federal bankruptcy trustee could be substituted as a plaintiff in a civil action previously commenced by the debtor in bankruptcy in a Pennsylvania state court, although the statutory limitations period expired prior to the attempted substitution. "Although we recognize that the interests of a debtor and a trustee may diverge in some respects, we find it most important that trustees’ interests are derivative, and accordingly, they generally cannot assert any greater rights as against defendants than debtors could have in the first instance." The Supreme Court departed from the Superior Court’s focus on the continued “existence” of the Company after the initiation of insolvency proceedings, and the Court rejected a strict rule foreclosing a relation-back approach to substitution of a bankruptcy trustee for a debtor. Instead, the Court held that relation back in favor of a federal bankruptcy trustee was appropriate, at least where the trustee has acted in a reasonably diligent fashion to secure his or her substitution, and there is no demonstrable prejudice to defendants. View "Morrison Info. v. Members 1st FCU" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant. In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a car accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation. In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted Rhodes' petition and awarded total disability benefits. Several years later, the employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination, and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect, Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateef’s impairment rating opinion. In her estimation, Dr. Lateef’s assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances, and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology, the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion. On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[w]hether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that the WCJ lacked authority to reject the uncontradicted testimony of the IRE physician. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the WCJ's adjudication, as affimed by the WCAB. View "IA Construction v. WCAB" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether state legislators have standing to intervene in a challenge to the issuance of an executive order concerning direct care health workers. In early 2015, Governor Tom Wolf issued Executive Order 2015-05, “Participant-Directed Home Care Services,” which focused on individuals who received, and workers who provided, in-home medical and personal care. The Executive Order established, inter alia, an advisory group to ensure the quality of long-term personal assistance services to seniors and persons with disabilities, and a process by which workers who provide such care, and who were employed by the individuals they serve, could obtain a designated representative for discussions with the Secretary of Human Resources regarding various matters (namely wages, and health and retirement benefits). Petitioners filed suit arguing that Executive Order 2015-05 established organizational labor rights for domestic home care workers, but was issued without authorization and conflicted with existing Commonwealth labor laws, specifically the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and the Public Employe Relations Act. The Commonwealth Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, initially rejecting rejected Appellants’ attempt to directly intervene at the preliminary injunction stage. However, the court issued an order enjoining Governor Wolf from entering into any memorandum of understanding pursuant to Executive Order 2015-05 until disposition of the matter on the merits, establishing an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs on preliminary objections and cross-motions for summary relief, and listing the matter for en banc argument. Appellants' Application to Intervene was denied, giving rise to this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that in these circumstances, Appellants did not have standing to intervene because the legislators’ interests purportedly impacted by the executive order did not involve unique legislative prerogatives, but, rather, were interests common to the general citizenry which only remotely impact the legislators’ right to act as legislators. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court denying the legislators’ request to intervene. View "Markham v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action was appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Child ("L.A.") was born on in late 2011 to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”). Nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo.” Mother did not contest the matter; however, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents. Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. After review, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and reversed the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein. View "K.C. v. L.A." on Justia Law

In a defamation action, appellants Randall Castellani and Joseph Corcoran brought suit against The Scranton Times and its former reporter, Jennifer L. Henn (collectively, the Newspaper) regarding the Newspaper’s publication of three articles concerning Appellants’ testimony before the Twentieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. The trial court denied Appellants’ pretrial motion to admit two judicial opinions at trial as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, and the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed. Because the judicial opinions are admissible as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, the trial court should have permitted Appellants to introduce them in their action against the Newspaper. View "Castellani v. Scranton Times" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court applied the proper legal principles and level of deference in its appellate review of the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), which found Lancaster County (the County) engaged in unfair labor practices under Sections 1201(a)(1) and (3) of the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), when it terminated the employment of Adam Medina and Tommy Epps. During a 2010 organizing effort, Medina attended meetings held by a Union, reported back to the third shift staff members, and successfully encouraged other employees to attend meetings, as well as vote in favor of unionizing. Epps supported the Union’s efforts and talked to other staff members about how the Union could benefit them. A fellow employee reported to supervisors that accused someone of stealing foodstuffs from her open workplace mailbox. An internal investigation revealed Media taking a snack-sized bag of potato chips on one day; Epps took a similarly-sized bag of cookies from the box. Though no one had previously been disciplined for incidents like these, Media and Epps were fired for taking items from the mailbox. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court indeed applied the wrong standards in reversing the Board. The case was remanded for further consideration of issues raised by the parties on appeal but not previously addressed by the Commonwealth Court. View "Lancaster Co v. PA Labor Relations Board -" on Justia Law