Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that when a member of the original panel of the court of appeals leaves the bench the departing judge may be replaced by a new judge on the panel that reconsiders its original decision.In this litigation centering around a soured business relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant the trial court issued a decision appointing a receiver to manage the dissolution of the business and ordering that the business be sold to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the receiver to entertain offers from all interested bidders. After the case was argued but before the decision issued, Judge Horton announced his impending resignation, which became effective before Defendant filed his application for reconsideration. Judge Frederick Nelson was appointed to fill Judge Horton's seat. Defendant opposed reconsideration, arguing that Judge Nelson should not participate in the reconsideration decision because he did not sit on the original panel. The court of appeals disagreed and entered a new decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals acted within the bounds of the law when Judge Nelson replaced Judge Horton on the panel considering Plaintiff's application for reconsideration. View "Jezerinac v. Dioun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of mandamus and/or a writ of procedendo to compel Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Alison Hatheway to rule on Petitioner's jurisdictional motion, holding that there was no error.Petitioner filed a "Motion Challenging Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Trial Judge Pursuant to Sup.R. 4, Sup.R. 36, Hamilton County Local Rule 7(E), O.R.C. 2701.031" and then later filed his petition seeking to compel Judge Hatheway to rule on his motion. Eight days after Petitioner filed his petition Judge Heathway issued an entry dismissing Petitioner's motion on res judicata grounds. In dismissing Petitioner's petition, the court of appeals determined that the procedendo claim was moot and that a writ of mandamus was not the proper remedy to redress Petitioner's alleged injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the procedendo claim as moot and that mandamus could not lie. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Hatheway" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge John O'Donnell from exercising jurisdiction over a civil action that was transferred from the Lyndhurst Municipal Court but denied the writ of mandamus ordering Lyndhurst Municipal Court Judge Dominic Coletta to dismiss the case upon its return from the common pleas court.Plaintiff filed a complaint against State Farm Mutual Insurance Company in the small claims division of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court. Judge Coletta granted Plaintiff's subsequent motion to transfer the case to Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, where it was assigned to Judge O'Donnell. State Farm filed a motion to return the case to the municipal court, but Judge O'Donnell denied the motion. State Farm then brought this action. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge O'Donnell from hearing the case in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and granted a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering Judge O'Donnell to return the matter to the Lyndhurst Municipal Court, holding the peremptory writ was appropriate. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Relators, who owned property over which Ohio Power Company sought to take easements by eminent domain, holding that Relators were entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Washington County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Halliday from proceeding with a compensation trial during the pendency of Relators' appeal.After Judge Halliday ruled that Ohio Power's takings were necessary for a public use Relators appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the appeal, Judge Halliday scheduled a trial on the issue of compensation. Relators commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Halliday from holding the compensation trial while their appeal was pending. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the appropriations in this case did not fall under any of the exceptions to the owner's right to immediate appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(3); and (2) a compensation trial during the pendency of a section 163.09(B)(3) appeal is inconsistent with the court of appeals' jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Appellants - Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. and Buckeye Firearms Foundation, Inc. - did not have standing to bring an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Appellees - the City of Columbus and a Columbus City attorney (collectively, the City) - regarding two firearm-related ordinances that Appellants alleged were unlawful, holding that Appellants did not establish standing in this case.Appellants filed a complaint seeking an injunction against enforcement of the ordinances as unconstitutional, arguing that the ordinances are preempted by Ohio Rev. Code 9.68 and seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinances violate section 9.68. The trial court found one ordinance to be unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction enjoining its enforcement but denied injunctive relief regarding the other ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant failed to establish that they had standing under Ohio Rev. Code 733.59, Ohio Rev. Code 9.68, or Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2721. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not establish standing under section 9.68, section 733.58, or Chapter 2721 to challenge the ordinances. View "Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed as moot this original action for writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to disregard Am.Sub.S.D. No. 120 (S.B. 120), holding that Relators no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this case and that intervening legislation has rendered this cause moot.S.B. 120 amended the 2020-2021 biennial budget bill to appropriate $10 million to fund scholarships under the Ohio Educational Choice Scholarship Program (EdChoice) for first-time eligible applicants. Relators brought this action seeking to compel Respondents to disregard S.B. 120 and administer the EdChoice program under the law as it existed prior to S.B. 120's passage. The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding that the passage of time and intervening legislation have rendered this action moot. View "State ex rel. Citizens for Community Values, Inc. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that a dismissal without prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order, holding a trial court's order dismissing a case without prejudice based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02.Plaintiffs were obligated under Kentucky law to pay workers' compensation benefits to a worker who was injured at Defendant's facility. They subsequently filed a lawsuit against against Defendant in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio, seeking to recover the amount that they had been required to pay. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the action should be filed in the Circuit Court in Grant County, Kentucky. The trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, based on forum non conveniens. The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal on the basis that a dismissal without prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dismissal in this case was not a final, appealable order. View "Crown Services, Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for a writ of mandamus for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), holding that where the court's sole basis for dismissing the complaint may have been the result of a docketing error, the complaint should not have been dismissed.When Appellant, an inmate, did not get the desired response to his public-records requests he filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint based on Appellant's alleged failure to file an affidavit of prior actions, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that where the time-stamped affidavit supported Appellant's allegation that he complied with the statute and that the clerk's office failed to place the affidavit in the court file, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the complaint. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Pureval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacks original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions and dismissing the City of East Cleveland's petition for declaratory judgment sua sponte, holding that it is well settled that courts of appeals lack original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment.The City of East Cleveland brought criminal charges against Randolph Dailey and Patricia Coleman, both of whom were sergeants in the Cleveland police department. A jury found Coleman not guilty. In an attempt to obtain review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings before Dailey went to trial, East Cleveland filed a petition for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over the City's claim for declaratory judgment. View "State ex rel. City of East Cleveland v. Dailey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied res judicata to Appellant's claim.Appellant went into the office of the Plain Township zoning inspector to complain about a neighbor's trees, and the inspector told Appellant that the trees did not violate the zoning code. Appellant later filed a mandamus action seeking to compel the inspector and the Plain Township Board of Trustees to enforce the zoning provision against his neighbor. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. Two years later, Appellant attempted to appeal the inspector's initial decision, but the board of zoning appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Appellant then filed a second mandamus action in the court of appeals seeking to compel the inspector to issue his initial decision in writing. The court of appeals held that res judicata barred the claim because Appellant could have asserted that claim in his first mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied res judicata to Appellant's claim against the inspector in this case. View "State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Township Board of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law