Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

A public children-services agency determined that an allegation of child abuse against Kelly D. Kyser was substantiated. Kyser challenged this finding through the agency’s administrative-review process, but her appeal was unsuccessful. She then appealed the agency’s decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The court dismissed her appeal as untimely, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court noted that under R.C. 2506.01, a person may appeal a final order or decision of an agency that determines their rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships. However, the court found that an agency’s disposition finding that an allegation of child abuse is substantiated does not determine any of these things. The court explained that while certain consequences may result from such a finding, the agency’s disposition itself does not determine those consequences.The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to hear Kyser’s appeal because the agency’s disposition was not a final order under R.C. 2506.01. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs." on Justia Law

Shawn Jones, a teacher employed under a limited contract by the Kent City School District Board of Education, faced nonrenewal of his contract. The board was required by Ohio law (R.C. 3319.111(E)) to conduct three formal observations of Jones teaching before deciding on nonrenewal. The first observation occurred in January 2020, and the second in May 2020, both involving Jones actively teaching. However, the third observation, conducted in May 2020, only involved the evaluator attending a remote session with Jones’s students, which Jones could not attend due to a medical condition.The Portage County Court of Common Pleas initially affirmed the board’s decision not to renew Jones’s contract. Jones appealed, arguing that the board did not comply with the statutory requirement of observing him teaching three times. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the board failed to meet the statutory requirements because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the board did not comply with R.C. 3319.111(E) because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching. The court ordered the board to reinstate Jones and remanded the case to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas for the calculation of Jones’s back pay. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement of observing the teacher teaching is mandatory and cannot be substituted by observing students without the teacher’s presence. View "Jones v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn." on Justia Law

The case involves a public-records request submitted by David Armiak and the Center for Media and Democracy to the Ohio Attorney General. The request sought documents related to the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA) and the Rule of Law Defense Fund (RLDF). The Attorney General refused to produce the documents, arguing they were not public records as defined by Ohio law. Armiak then filed a mandamus action to compel the production of the documents.The Tenth District Court of Appeals handled the initial proceedings. During discovery, the court allowed Armiak to conduct broad discovery to test the Attorney General's claim that the documents were not public records. This included deposing the Attorney General and obtaining extensive documents and interrogatories. The Attorney General sought a protective order to limit this discovery, arguing it was overly burdensome and interfered with his constitutional duties. The Tenth District denied the protective order and allowed the broad discovery to proceed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the discovery order was appealable. The court found that the order met the criteria for a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), as it determined the action regarding the discovery dispute and prevented a judgment in favor of the Attorney General. The court also found that the Attorney General would not be able to obtain effective relief through an appeal following final judgment, as the discovery process itself would cause irreparable harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied Armiak's motion to dismiss the appeal and set the matter for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Ctr. for Media & Democracy v. Yost" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in April 2017 between Ryan McCullough and Joseph Bennett, where McCullough alleged Bennett was at fault. McCullough initially filed a lawsuit on January 15, 2018, but it was dismissed without prejudice on February 28, 2018, due to unclaimed service. He refiled on June 27, 2018, and obtained service by publication, but the court dismissed this second complaint without prejudice on November 27, 2018, for failure to prosecute. McCullough filed a third complaint on September 12, 2019, after the statute of limitations expired but within one year of the second dismissal.The trial court dismissed the third complaint, agreeing with Bennett that it was time-barred since the statute of limitations had expired. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the saving statute applied by its plain terms, allowing McCullough to refile within one year of the second dismissal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Second District's decision. The court held that under the plain language of Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), McCullough’s third complaint was timely. The statute allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year after a previous action fails otherwise than on the merits. The court rejected Bennett’s argument for a “one-use” limitation on the saving statute, noting that the statute’s text does not support such a restriction. The court also dismissed Bennett’s argument that the saving statute could not apply because the second complaint was dismissed before the statute of limitations expired, clarifying that the current version of the statute does not include this requirement. Finally, the court found that the saving statute applied despite the service issues with the second complaint, as the third complaint was filed within the statutory period allowed. View "McCullough v. Bennett" on Justia Law

John H. Mack Jr., serving a life sentence for aggravated murder, filed a mandamus action to compel the Richland County Sheriff’s Office to produce records responsive to his public-records request. Mack also sought statutory damages. His request included eight categories of records related to the seizure of his property and a separate incident.The sheriff’s office argued that three of the eight categories were exempt under R.C. 149.43(B)(8), which restricts incarcerated individuals from obtaining public records related to criminal investigations or prosecutions without a finding from the sentencing judge. The sheriff’s office also claimed to have provided records responsive to the remaining categories, rendering those parts of Mack’s request moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It found that Mack’s claim was moot regarding five categories of records that had already been provided. The court agreed with the sheriff’s office that Mack had not complied with the statutory requirements for obtaining records related to his criminal investigation or prosecution for two categories. However, the court found insufficient evidence to support the sheriff’s office’s claim that no records existed for the eighth category. The court granted a limited writ ordering the sheriff’s office to either produce records responsive to the eighth category or certify that no such records exist. Mack’s request for statutory damages was denied due to lack of argument in his merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ as moot for five categories, denied the writ for two categories due to noncompliance with R.C. 149.43(B)(8), and granted a limited writ for the remaining category, ordering the sheriff’s office to produce the records or certify their nonexistence. The request for statutory damages was denied. View "State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Kimani E. Ware, currently incarcerated, filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the Stark County Prosecuting Attorney to produce records in response to a public-records request. Ware claimed he sent the request by certified mail in April 2022, asking for the prosecutor’s office’s employee roster and budget reports from January 2019 to January 2022. The prosecutor denied receiving this request, asserting that the certified mail contained a court filing from another case, not a public-records request.The Fifth District Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment, denied Ware’s motion for summary judgment, and ruled the writ request moot since the prosecutor provided the requested records after being served with the mandamus complaint. The court also denied Ware’s request for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Ware did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered the public-records request in April 2022.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that the prosecutor’s office did not act in bad faith by providing the records after the mandamus complaint was filed, as there was no clear evidence that the public-records request was delivered in April 2022. The court also upheld the denial of statutory damages and court costs, agreeing with the lower court’s findings and procedures. The court concluded that the prosecutor’s response time of 11 days after receiving the mandamus complaint was reasonable. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Stone" on Justia Law

The relator, Jumaane Scott, filed an action requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Toledo Correctional Institution (TCI) to produce public records. Scott claimed that between April and July 2023, he made four separate requests for public records, including body-camera footage from three different correction officers and a vegetarian diet menu. He alleged that TCI staff denied his requests or failed to respond. Scott sought the production of these records, statutory damages, and court costs.The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. TCI filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, leading to the issuance of an alternative writ. TCI conceded most of Scott’s factual allegations but argued that the requested body-camera footage did not exist. TCI’s evidence included an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the warden’s assistant, stating that the footage was not saved and therefore did not exist. Scott did not provide contrary evidence to rebut this claim.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Scott’s request for a writ of mandamus, finding that the body-camera footage did not exist and that TCI had no obligation to produce nonexistent records. The court also denied Scott’s request for the vegetarian diet menu because his petition did not explicitly seek relief for that request. Additionally, the court denied Scott’s requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Scott failed to demonstrate that TCI did not meet its obligations under the Public Records Act or acted in bad faith.In summary, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that TCI had no duty to produce nonexistent records and that Scott was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs. The court denied the writ of mandamus and all associated requests for relief. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

A labor dispute arose between the City of Cleveland and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (the union representing dispatch supervisors) over overtime scheduling. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the arbitrator denied the union's grievance. The union then sought to vacate the arbitration award by filing an application in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, serving the city but not the attorneys who represented the city in the arbitration.The Common Pleas Court initially denied the city's motion to dismiss the union's application, but later reversed its decision after the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled in a different case that failure to serve the adverse party's counsel deprived the court of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Common Pleas Court dismissed the union's application and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of the city. The Eighth District affirmed this decision, citing two defects: the union's application was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion, and it failed to serve the city's arbitration counsel.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2711.13, a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must serve either the adverse party or its counsel, not necessarily both. However, the court also held that the union's application did not meet the statutory requirements because it was filed as a pleading (a complaint) rather than a motion. The court emphasized that a motion must state with particularity the grounds for the requested order, which the union's filing failed to do. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's decision regarding the service requirement but affirmed the decision that the union's application did not meet the statutory form requirements, leaving the arbitration award in favor of the city intact. View "Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law